










Title of Dissertation:                    BEYOND POLITICAL NEUTRALITY: 
     
     TOWARDS A COMPLEX THEORY OF  
   
     RIGHTS IN THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC STATE 
 
     Chataquoa Nicole Mason, Doctor of Philosophy, 2006 
 
Dissertation Directed by:      Professor Wayne McIntosh  




      
     As of late, women, racial and ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians, and other 
similarly situated groups have begun to make right-claims that once again test liberal 
notions of neutrality and raise significant questions concerning whether or not full 
equality and autonomy is possible in modern democracies. This study focuses on the 
impact of race, class, gender, sexual orientation, and other markers of difference on the 
realization of rights in the modern democratic state.  
     This dissertation uses three case studies, which separately and together demonstrate 
attempts to realize full freedom and autonomy through practices of direct democracy, 
the California Referendum Initiative; appeal to the courts, the issue of Gay Marriage; 
and the creation of public policies and landmark legislation, the Violence Against 
Women Act. The findings of my research suggest that at all levels of government, race, 
 
class, gender, sexual orientation and other markers of difference shape the realization of 
rights in the modern democratic state.    
     In this study, I extend the insights offered by critical race scholars by proffering a 
complex theory of rights that is able to account for the impact of identity and culture to 
the realization of rights and rights-claims made by individuals and groups in the public 
sphere.  Employing a complex theory of rights, the findings of this study confirm that 
there are a variety of factors that influence the realization of rights in the modern 
democratic state. Chief among them are: (1) A notion of the good operating in society 
that is connected to deeply entrenched societal values and norms and that privileges the 
dominant culture; (2) the structures and institutions that govern society are enmeshed in 
race, class, sexuality, and ethnic hierarchies; (3) the accumulated advantages gained 
through historic practices of exclusion, conquest, and enslavement; (4) the 
representation of the dominant group and subjugated groups in the public sphere 
through texts, the media, and discourse; and (5) whether or not individuals or groups 
are recognized as bearers of rights under the law.      
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Beyond Political Neutrality:  











Pale skin, long, straight hair, ambiguous features, and non-existent 
familial ties assured her that she would take her secret to the grave. 
Her husband had died many years prior and she had bore no children. 
When asked about her background, she answered by describing herself 
of Portuguese descent.   
 
As she grew older and unable to care for herself, the mask she had 
worn for what seemed like an eternity began to fade. Her long, straight 
hair was revealed to be a wig and underneath it suffocated short, 
coarse hair. Without the wig, her skin appeared darker and her 
features more pronounced.  
 
     Lydia Turnage Connolly who lived her life as a White woman, as death neared had 
become Black. Her secret life and past had been revealed. When she passed, among 
the possessions left behind was a journal written by her father detailing his life as a 
slave in Alabama and old photos of her with family members. All of who were 
Black.1 
                                                
1 Staples, Brent. 2004. “Editorial Observer: Secret Father, a Black Literary Treasure 
and an Old Woman.” New York Times. 28, June. Also, for a more in depth discussion 
on this issue, see O’Toole, James. 2002. Passing for White: Race, Religion, and the 
Healy Family, 1820-1920. Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press. 
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     At the time of Lydia Connolly’s death in 1984, the Civil and Voting Rights Acts 
had been in effect for nearly twenty years. Collectively, both Acts symbolized an 
important turning point for the nation. Civil rights activists and leaders spoke 
passionately about change and progress. In fact, in a speech to congress, President 
Kennedy noted in the years leading up to the passage of the legislation that the 
progress in securing the civil rights of all Americans had been more than any period 
in the history of the country. “Progress, he said, had been made through executive 
action, litigation, persuasion, and private initiative in achieving and protecting 
equality of opportunity in education, voting, transportation, employment, housing, 
government, and the enjoyment of public accommodations.”2 
     The question is why then didn’t Mrs. Connolly toss her wig and false identity 
away with the signing of the legislation and the promise of a better tomorrow?  It is 
my belief that Mrs. Connolly understood something very real and very true about 
race, class, gender, and rights in the modern democratic state.  She clearly understood 
the value and privilege attached to whiteness or one’s proximity to whiteness, 
specifically white maleness.3 Further, it is possible that she understood that revealing 
herself might mean risking the mobility, institutional power, access, protection, and 
invisibility she had come to rely on as a white woman in a society that privileges 
                                                
2 Kennedy, John F. Special message to the Congress on Civil Rights. Feb. 1963. 
3 This point is made by Adrienne Davis in her ground breaking article “Don’t Let 
Nobody Bother Yo Principle (2002),” in Sister Circle: Black Women and Work, ed. 
Sharon Harley and in an interview in the documentary film NO! by Aishah Shahidah 
Simmons (2006) where she notes that white women although disadvantaged because 
of their gender benefited from patriarchy and whiteness through their relationship to 
white men. 
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whiteness, despite legislation and laws enacted to erase4 racial differences and 
inequality.   
     While the story of Mrs. Connolly might appear to be an aberration or an antiquated 
tale from yesteryear, I believe it is made fresh by the fact that the core tensions 
arising from the gap between formal equality and the everyday lived experiences of 
women, racial and ethnic minorities, Gays, and other similarly situated groups still 
remain. In the liberal democratic state, attempts to remedy historic inequalities and to 
create a level playing field are mitigated by the norms, values, culture, institutions, 
and structures present in society. As Frederick Douglass5 (1866) notes, “Human law 
may know no distinction among men in respect to rights, but human practice may.”  
     In this dissertation, I focus on the impact of race, gender, class, sexual orientation, 
and other markers of difference on the realization of rights in the modern democratic 
state. Looking beyond the simple interaction between the state and the individual, I 
attempt to investigate the factors that prevent groups and individuals from attaining 
their full bundle of rights in society. 
Individual Liberty and Freedom in the Modern Democratic State 
 
     Individual liberty and freedom are highly prized values in the modern democratic 
state. As a political theory, liberalism places a heavy emphasis on individual rights, 
autonomy, equality of opportunity, and the pursuit of goods. The appeal of liberalism 
in modern democracies rests in its originary tale of natural rights codified in the social 
                                                
4 It is noted that perhaps erase is a strong word to use in this context and the goal at 
least as civil rights leaders stated it was to move us toward a more color-blind society.  
5 Reconstruction by Frederick Douglass. Atlantic Monthly 18 (1866): 761-765. 
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contract and the ability of all individuals to assert and defend those rights in the 
public sphere.  
     In all liberal democracies, the protection of individual rights is entrusted to the 
state. Conflicts arising either concerning a violation or a denial of rights are made 
through the state by invoking agreements set forth in the original contract. As such, 
rights constitute the heart of the conception of justice that make plausible claims of 
legitimacy of any modern polity . The state, a general term for the institutions, 
agencies, and procedures related to the government, serves as a kind of arbitrator of 
conflicting interests and acts as both a mediator and regulator of rights-claims in the 
public sphere.  
      In Modern democracies, rights—human, civil, and legal depend on liberal notions 
of political neutrality and the relegation of difference to the private sphere for its 
success. The sharp distinction between the public and the private sphere and the 
denial of difference under liberalism is problematic because it denies women, racial 
and ethnic minorities, and other similarly situated groups full recognition and equal 
freedom in society. 
     As a matter of course, the history of the United States has been the extension of 
rights to groups previously excluded.6 Throughout the 19th and into the late 20th 
Century social groups identified common interests based on experience and 
formulated agendas to have their concerns addressed in the public sphere. 
                                                
6 A prime illustration of this point is the fourteenth amendment and the Dred Scott 
ruling which defined citizens as “all persons born or naturalized in the United States.” 
As a result, the courts were tasked with the protection of individual liberties. The 
Fourteenth amendment defined the subject of rights by constituting all individuals as 
moral equals under the law. 
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Conversations about power, politics, rights, and justice were conducted largely in 
terms of identity-based claims.7 Women, Gays, Blacks, Native-Americans, the 
disabled, and other groups appealed to shared experiential and historical knowledge 
of discrimination in order to establish a collective identity and further rights in the 
political arena.  
     Many among the excluded and disadvantaged believed securing formal equality, 
that is, equal political and civil rights,8 would lead to their full freedom and equality. 
However, women, Blacks, Native Americans, Latinos, Gays, and other similarly 
situated groups still find themselves treated like second-class citizens, with a half-full 
bundle of rights, or constantly reasserting or defending their rights in the public 
sphere.  
     In this dissertation, I will argue liberal democratic theory fails to adequately 
account for the impact of race, class, gender, sexuality, and other markers of 
difference on the realization of rights in the modern democratic state. Even the most 
complex accounts of identity and difference under liberalism does a poor job of 
providing an integrative and historical understanding of how difference among and 
between individuals and groups has shaped rights-claims, privileges, and the 
distribution of wealth and resources in the public sphere.  
                                                
7 For a more thorough discussion on this point see, Valverde, Mariana. 1999. 
“Identity Politics and the Law in the United States.” Feminist Studies 25:2 
(November) 345-361 
8 In the Civil Rights movement, mobilization around race and gender issues tended to 
be framed around issues of equality, access, and rights and within the liberal 
framework. Calls for Freedom and Justice in some, not all cases, meant equality 
before the law, access to information and resources, and formal rights. 
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     Further, I will seek to demonstrate how Rights—civil, social, and political, hinge 
on difference in liberal democracies and how the realization of rights is directly 
related to how close one is to the core-self as articulated through the liberal discourse. 
The core-self is defined as the masculine subject of rights as articulated through the 
liberal discourse. I seek to better understand the promise of political neutrality in 
relationship to rights as a means of securing material goods, civil freedom, and social 
equality in liberal democracies. I focus on the ways in which the possibility of a truly 
civil and participatory democracy are compromised because of the smoldering tension 
between liberal claims of neutrality and equality and rights-claims made in the public 
sphere by marginalized groups and individuals. 
    Finally, in this dissertation, I propose to extend some of the insights offered by 
critical race scholars by proffering a complex theory of rights that is able to account 
for the impact of identity and culture on the realization of rights and rights-claims 
made by individuals and groups in the public sphere. Moreover, I attempt to explain 
why formal equality does not necessarily translate into social and political equality 
for some groups in the modern democratic state.  
An Originary Tale of Rights in Modern Democracies 
      In this dissertation, I argue that there is an originary tale that provides context for 
contemporary discussions of rights in modern democracies. The story, as it has been 
traditionally told tends to emphasize the moral and political equality of all 
individuals. As Carole Pateman (1988) notes, it is often presented as a story of 
freedom. One interpretation of the original contract is that the inhabitants of the state 
of nature exchange the insecurities of natural freedom for equal, civil freedom, which 
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is protected by the state. In this new civil society freedom is universal; all adults 
enjoy the same civil standing and exercise their freedom by, as it were, 
replicating/enforcing the original contract . In Hobbseian terms, all individuals are 
seen as equal partners in the moral dialogue when it comes to asserting and defending 
rights-claims in the public sphere. I would like to take the opportunity to present this 
tale differently. 
     Let us imagine that there is a group of people. They don’t know one another, but 
they have X in common. Let us assume that X stands for property. Because of X they 
decide to form a group to protect the rights bestowed upon them because of their 
possession of X. In establishing the group, they agree to a set of rules to govern the 
group. The rules serve their individual interests of protecting X and their rights to 
hold X. As a group, they adopt symbols, language, laws, establish institutions, and 
ultimately enter into a binding agreement to protect X. 
     Next, let us further imagine that over time others wish to join the group. It is not a 
stretch to imagine that there will be a number of issues that will surface. The 
individuals seeking to join the group are at an obvious disadvantage in relationship to 
the founding members on several accounts: (1) the laws and institutions governing the 
group are reflective of the interests and concerns of the founding members, (2) the 
original agreement did not include the Others, (3) Power rest almost exclusively in 
the hands of the members, and (4) upon entering the group, the Others have no rights. 
     As a result, we end up with two distinct classes of people. The first class of people 
consists of those who have rights from the beginning and as members of the group go 
about ensuring the state or others do not infringe upon those rights. Conversely, the 
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second class consists of those who enter into the group with essentially no rights and 
must use the mechanisms and laws set up by the founding members to secure rights 
or advance rights-claims. What we are talking about here is the classic distinction 
between negative and positive liberty.9 
     In the above story, the founding members of the group establish the terms of 
agreement and define neutrality. The so-named neutral position is constructed 
through the lens of the original members. The laws, language, institutions, and 
structures are skewed to their benefit and normalized through practices and behaviors 
of the members. Consequently, their ideals and beliefs come to be considered natural, 
obvious, and therefore true. Others who enter the group must adopt the terms of 
agreement and the definition of neutrality of the group in order to participate even if 
they are incommensurate or undermine their own beliefs and values. It is my 
contention that an originary tale set forth in this way chips away at claims of 
neutrality and equality set forth in liberal democratic theory. It also provides a 
historical context for the ways in which groups previously excluded enter into society 
and the set of circumstances under which they must engage.  
                                                
9 See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of liberty in Four Essays on Liberty (1969). In Two 
Concepts of Liberty, Berlin sets out to define negative and positive liberty. He argues: 
“The extent of a man's negative liberty is, as it were, a function of what doors, and 
how many are open to him; upon what prospects they open; and how open they are 
[and] The 'positive' sense of the word '[freedom]' derives from the wish on the part of 
the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, 
not on external forces of whatever kind.” Embedded in positive freedom are the 
notions of agency and autonomy. I believe it is important to make a further distinction 
between the two classes of individuals set forth in the above tale. It would be 
misleading and quite simplistic to assert that there are only two groups of individuals 
and that there are no further distinguishing characteristics that matter. Indeed, women, 
racial and ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians compose sub-groups within the latter 
group. 
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Political Neutrality, the right, and the good in Modern Democracies      
     The promise of neutrality in the liberal democratic state is expressed most 
completely in constitutional law.  As a mediator between competing conceptions of 
the good in society, the court gives voice to the liberal ideal of the priority of the right 
over the good. Rather than promote a particular conception of the good, the liberal 
framework insists on toleration, fair procedures, and respect for individual rights .  As 
Sandel notes, the court increasingly interprets the requirement of neutrality as 
expressing or advancing a conception of persons as free and independent selves.  
     The liberal notion of neutrality draws a clear and discernable distinction between 
the right and the good.  For liberals like Kant and Rawls, individuals possess rights 
that are inviolable and are separate from the good people choose to pursue within the 
framework.  The claim for the priority of the right over the good connects the idea of 
neutrality to individual rights. As such, rights function as “trump cards” and protect 
individuals from policies and laws that infringe upon one’s ability to pursue his or her 
own good in his or her own way. In a pluralist society where there are necessarily 
irreconcilable and competing conceptions of the good , the individual or group must 
trust the state to deliver on its promise of political neutrality when disputes arise.  
     In this dissertation, I will attempt to demonstrate that to the extent that individuals 
or groups have difficulty realizing or exercising rights in liberal democracies, it is, in 
part, a result of the state’s failure to deliver on its promise.  Further, I will attempt to 
demonstrate there exists a working notion of the good present in the liberal 
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democratic state that imposes itself on the group and the individual and in turn affects 
the realization of rights in the public sphere.10  
                                                
10 Michael Sandel raises this question in Democracy’s Discontent (1996) when he 
asks how is it possible to affirm certain liberties and rights as fundamental without 




Egalitarianism and Ascriptive Inequality in the Modern Democratic State  
     Some have argued that concern with difference and the inequalities that exist in 
the public sphere is not a result of the flaws of liberalism, but rather a result of the 
social and political dynamics present in society that make the normative ideals of 
liberalism difficult to realize.  In fact, they argue, individual liberalism has no real 
responsibility to ensure the welfare of the whole or to ensure that those with the least 
amount of resources and opportunities are placed on equal footing with those whom 
resources and opportunity favor. Difference does not figure in the liberal subject as 
features such as race, religion, ethnicity, and gender do not define our identity. As 
Sandel points out, they are not constituents, but merely attributes of the self, the sort 
of the thing that the state should look beyond.  Further, he goes on to say, once these 
contingencies are seen as products of our situation rather than aspects of our person, 
they cease to supply the familiar grounds for prejudice and discrimination.  
     The Liberal mind places a high premium on a description of the modern 
democratic state as egalitarianism and shaped mostly by “ the comparatively free and 
equal conditions and the enlightenment ideals to have prevailed at its founding.”11 
This thinking, I contend, has prevented us from seriously being able to grapple with 
the impact of difference on the realization of rights in the liberal democratic state. For 
                                                
11 Alexander Tocqueville, for example, in Democracy in America (1831) wrote 
“Amongst the novel objects that attracted my attention during my stay in the United 
States, nothing struck me more forcibly than the general equality of conditions." His 
observation is short-sided and exclusive of women, Blacks, Native-American, and 
other ethnic minorities. However, Democracy in America (1831) remains a seminal 
text in describing the early republic and the conditions under which individuals go 
about exercising rights and freedom in society. 
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example, the question is rarely raised concerning the status of Women, Blacks, and 
Native-Americans in the early republic. Under liberal democratic theory, there is 
never an acknowledgement of the historic exclusion of groups from the republic that 
demonstrates the existence of inegalitarian ideologies that shaped the liberal state as 
well.  
       For this point, I rely heavily on an alternate framing of the modern democratic 
state as put forth by Rogers Smith that recognizes the “inegalitarian ideologies and 
institutions of ascriptive hierarchies that defined the political status of racial and 
ethnic minorities and women through most of U.S. History.”  Smith argues rather 
than seeing illiberal, undemocratic beliefs and practices as expressions of ignorance 
and prejudice, destined to marginality because of their lack of rationality to see them 
as elaborate justifications for ascriptive hierarchies, differential treatment, and 
exclusion.  For example, he goes on to say:  
 “…the comparative moral, material, and political egalitarianism that 
prevailed at the founding among moderately propertied white men was 
surrounded by an array of other fixed, ascriptive systems of unequal 
status, all largely unchallenged by the American revolutionaries. Men 
were thought naturally suited to rule over women, within both the 
family and the polity. White northern Europeans were thought superior 
culturally—and probably biologically---to black Africans, bronze 
Native Americans, and indeed all other races and civilizations. Many 
British Americans also treated religion as an inherited condition and 
regarded Protestants as created by God to be morally and politically, as 
well as theologically, superior to Catholics, Jews, Muslims, and others 
(Smith, 1993 p. 549).” 
 
     As such, I argue in this dissertation that the history of the United States is one that 
has allowed for the influence of race, gender, religion, ethnicity, and other markers of 
difference on rights and individual freedom. Further, liberal democratic theory must 
 13 
deal seriously with its legacy of exclusion and ascriptive inequality as a fundamental 
aspect of the modern democratic state.  
 14 
 
Difference and the Politics of Recognition  
     Demands for recognition by groups arise in part out of the belief or suspicion that 
liberal politics and law covertly imports its own, non-neutral norms into the political 
sphere. Connectedly, these norms influence individual and group mobility; access to 
political and economic resources; and rights and privileges in society. As such, the 
claims of individuals and groups to rights and protection under the law in the public 
sphere are ‘embroiled in characteristic struggles for redistribution and recognition in 
society.12 
      The politics of recognition13 relies on the centrality of group membership as a 
determining factor in the formation of individual identity and as the impetus for 
rights-claim made in the public sphere. The attraction of a politics of recognition for 
marginalized groups is that it provides pride of place to difference and group identity 
. It places difference and diversity at the center of the discussions of rights, autonomy, 
and justice in liberal democracies.  
     Connectedly, Benhabib (1994) writes the identity politics of “we” depends on a 
power structure that relies heavily on paradigms of inclusion, exclusion, and by the 
oppression of others, over and against whom they define themselves. She goes on to 
say, ‘the identity of the “we” contains the result of collective struggles for power 
among groups, culture, genders, and social classes. The collective “we” is formed as a 
result of past struggles for hegemony and power.’ Lister (1997) concurs by noting the 
                                                
12 For a more thorough discussion on this point see Seyla Benhabib’s The Claims of 
Culture (2002). 
13 See Chuck Taylor’s Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition” (1994) in 
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Guttman. 
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individual’s ability to act as a citizen or to be seen as a part of the “we” is shaped by 
where one stands on a continuum of inclusion or exclusion.   
    The defense of claims made by marginalized groups for recognition in society is 
rooted in the idea that securing rights in liberal democracies is related to how close 
one is to the dominant culture.14 To the extent that there is distance between the core 
and the periphery, marginalized groups are at a distinct disadvantage in terms of 
being able to integrate their norms, values, and beliefs into the fabric society. They 
must compete with dominant culture to provide a context of choices for members  and 
advance claims in the public sphere.  For example, the rights and liberties of Gays 
and Lesbians depend, in part, on the group’s ability to move closer to the core by 
being able to successfully assimilate by adopting dominant cultural norms or values 
or by being able to demonstrate the value of alternative familial and relationship 
structures in a heteronormative society.  
     As of late, the politics of recognition or identity politics has come under increased 
scrutiny and criticism (Young 1990, Fraser 1997).15 Charges leveraged against group 
specific representation include its essentialism and the tendency to take the focus of 
broad structural and institutional problems by turning them into narrow group-
specific concerns. The politics of recognition transforms what could be collective 
struggles against state and institutional forms of oppression into struggles for 
recognition for Blacks, Women, or Gays, thereby decreasing the likelihood that 
                                                
14 ibid.  
15 It is important to note that many of the critiques of identity politics have come from 
the political left with feminist scholars of color leveraging some of the most powerful 
critiques against identity politics.  For a more thorough discussion, see the Combahee 
River Collective Statement (1986).  
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groups will recognize common or similar goals.  Further, some argue that identity-
based rights-claims are rooted in a politics of suffering and subordination and the 
coherence of the group identity depends heavily on its marginalization (Brown 1995). 
In other words, as Susan Bickford (1997) argues politicized identity has an 
ontological investment in its own subjection.  While the above points are reasonable, 
they fail to account for the historic denial of rights and subjugation of groups by the 
dominant class, and the continued and systemic acts of injustice that plague groups 
and individuals present day; instances of which are not imaginary, but well 
documented and preserved.  
     Next, it has been recently accepted that social group identities are socially 
constructed and not fixed as previously assumed. Markers such as race, ethnicity, 
gender, and sexual preference are no longer assumed to be fixed, but a result of 
human discourse and social relations. As such, they are inherently contestable, subject 
to power relations that in turn embed them in political life . To address this point, I 
find Benhabib’s framework on narrativity and the self particularly useful.  Benhabib 
understands group identity as dynamic and argues that the focus should be less on 
what the group is or who constitutes the group, but what the political leaders of such 
groups demand in the public sphere. Further, she argues that to be and to become a 
self is to insert oneself into the webs of interlocution where one knows how to answer 
when one is addressed and how to address others (Benhabib 2002).  Individuals are 
born into webs of interlocution or narratives—real, constructed, or imagined—that 
ultimately shape rights and privileges in the public sphere.  
 17 
     Benhabib’s framework is supported by Feminists and communitarians16 who have 
consistently argued against the transcendental subject of liberalism and for a subject 
that is connected and constituted by the necessary connections that bind us human 
beings to those around us . In this way, attention is called to underlying and inherent 
assumptions of the subject of liberalism and the significance of social associations 
and institutions in shaping the individual’s concept of the self. For example, feminists 
have claimed that the subject is inherently masculine and patriarchal, and exclusive of 
that which has been defined as feminine. As such, many feminist scholars have 
attempted to move the discourse in a new direction by proposing a “politics of 
difference” or a radical pluralist epistemology or politics that rests on a conception of 
multiplicity and diversity, rather than homogeneity and polarity . 
     Accordingly, in thinking about identity and culture in relationship to rights, it is 
important to consider how once assumed stable categories have become complex and 
dynamic with individuals sharing membership in one or more social groups. In some 
instances, identities overlap, contradict, or betray others. The political implications of 
such recognition are significant and far-reaching. At once, we can begin to theorize 
about the relationship between complex identities and the demand for rights on the 
part of marginalized groups and individuals in society. Further, we can begin to 
understand how such claims challenge the legitimacy of established constitutional 
democracies.  
     In response to the challenges posed by difference and complex identities to liberal 
democracies, contemporary political philosophers such as John Rawls (1993), Joseph 
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Raz (1994), and Will Kymlicka (1996) have sought to formulate responses or propose 
relevant alternatives that recognize the potency of group and individual identity to 
citizenship rights in the public sphere. While these frameworks have been useful in 
terms of articulating the significance of cultural membership to our sense of identity, 
they fail to adequately address the core concerns of some marginalized groups with 
regard to securing rights and personhood in the liberal democratic state, specifically 
the lack of social and political equality. In an effort to harmonize claims by 
marginalized group with the liberal framework, difference is relegated to the private 
sphere leaving the masculine subject of liberalism in tact.  
     Contemporary political philosopher John Rawls’ answer to the dilemma of 
difference is to confine it to the private sphere; a move he considers necessary if we 
are able to accommodate the wide variety of incompatible, yet reasonable, religious, 
philosophical and moral doctrines characteristic of contemporary liberal 
democracies17. He argues that we must seek a freestanding conception of political 
justice, which can nonetheless be endorsed by an overlapping consensus of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines (Rawls 1993). Rawls’ consensus theory obscures 
the fact that marginalized groups are at a distinct disadvantage in relation to the 
dominant culture because their values and beliefs have never constituted the 
consensus or majority in western societies. 
                                                
17 While normally at two separate ends on the discussions, Jurgen Habermas starts 
with a similar assumption that asserts in modern, pluralistic societies, social norms, 
[values, and beliefs] can derive their validity only from the reason and will of those 
who decisions and interactions are supposed to be bound by them. However, 
Habermas differs from Rawls in that he believes there exists a more universal basis 
for agreement on general normative principles even among members of pluralistic 
societies who differ on questions on values and the good life (Habermas 1996). 
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     Under the terms of an overlapping consensus, beliefs need not be threatening, 
fanatical or undemocratic to lose out under the terms of particular core commitments 
or an overlapping consensus.18 They only need to fall outside of dominant cultural 
norms and beliefs to be at a risk for loss. While Rawls accounts for this loss by noting 
“there is no social world without loss: that is, no social world that does not exclude 
some way of life that realizes in special ways fundamental values (Rawls 1993),” he 
fails to account for the reasons why marginalized groups and individuals seem to 
endure more than their fair share of losses in liberal democracies.  
      For many liberals, the accommodation of diversity and difference is seen as 
undermining political liberalism and therefore impossible to achieve. As David Miller 
(1995) notes, the cost of incorporating are high, for the recognition of groups can only 
be attained on the basis of a prior decision about which groups are to be granted 
recognition.  
     The liberal response to difference leaves a lot to be desired. In this dissertation, I 
will seek to establish that rights-claims made by marginalized groups need not be 
seen as threats to democracy or cause for political instability, but in line with historic 
struggles for recognition and equal freedom in liberal democracies. Further, I will 
argue that from a rights standpoint, there are very few grounds on which to deny 
recognition and rights to individuals in society.19 
                                                
18 For a more thorough discussion see Emily Gill’s Becoming Free: Autonomy and 
Diversity in the Liberal Polity (2001). 
19 For this point, John Stewart Mill’s discussion on the Harm Principle in On Liberty 
(1860) is important. In On Liberty, Mill argues “[T]he only purpose for which power 
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a 
 20 
 
 Towards a Complex Theory of Rights in the Modern Democratic State: The 
Major Questions of the Research 
 
      As of late, women of color; gays and lesbians; and other similarly situated groups 
have begun to make rights-claims that once again test liberal notions of neutrality and 
raise significant questions concerning whether or not full equality and autonomy is 
possible in modern democracies.  
     It is my belief that the current historical moment presents us a fair opportunity to 
grapple with the ways in which rights are intimately linked to culture, social identity, 
political institutions and structures present in society. A liberal conception of rights 
that refuses to acknowledge the accumulation of privilege as a result of historic 
exclusion and relies heavily and almost exclusively on the relationship between the 
individual and the state is incomplete. As such, I will advance a complex theory of 
rights, which will attempt to explain not only the impact of race, gender, sexuality, 
and class on the realization of rights in the modern democratic state, but also how 
rights and privileges are intimately shaped by difference and identity in the public 
sphere.  
     In this dissertation I seek to answer a series of questions: What is the impact of 
race, gender, sexuality, and other markers of difference on the realization of rights in 
the modern democratic state? Does even the most complex account of multi-cultural 
identity under liberal democratic theory accurately account for the impact of 
difference on the realization of rights in liberal democracies? Lastly, why doesn’t 
                                                                                                                                      
sufficient warrant.” In other words, we may do as we please as long as we do not 
harm others or infringe on others rights or privileges.  
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formal equality, say the right to vote, translate into social and political equality for 
some groups and individuals? These questions form the central inquiry of this 
dissertation and provide the opportunity to theorize a rights framework that is rooted 
in and reflective of the lived experiences of women, racial and ethnic minorities, 
Gays, and individuals affected by class status.   
     I pursue these questions through three case studies, which separately and together 
demonstrate how racial, sexual orientation, and gender differences continue to impact 
the realization of rights in the liberal democratic state despite legal gains made by 
marginalized or disenfranchised groups. As will be demonstrated, the case studies 
will be chosen on the basis of their suitability for demonstrating the limitations of 
liberal democratic theory with regard to the accommodation of difference in the 
public sphere; interrogating liberal claims of neutrality and equality; and shedding 
light on the reason why despite legal equality, social and political equality remain 
elusive for some and not others in the liberal democratic state. 
    The story I tell about rights is different from the one that has been told many times 
over. Much of the literature on rights has focused on discrediting the transcendental 
subject of rights or the need to relegate difference to public sphere. This dissertation 
focuses on the significance of race, class, gender, sexuality and other markers of 
difference on an individual’s or group’s ability to obtain rights and equality in civil 
society. It describes the struggle for recognition in modern democracies on the part of 
individuals who up until recently had not been defined as the subject of rights under 
the law.  
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     The findings of this dissertation confirm that there are a variety of factors that 
contribute to the realization of rights in liberal democracies. Chief among them is the 
interaction between various markers of difference and the structures and institutions 
that govern society.  Over time, institutional and structural discrimination have 
become entrenched and embedded in the laws, structures, and institutions present in 
civil society thereby making identifying the ways in which rights are denied or go 
unrealized difficult to pursue.  
     In my analysis, I conclude that race, gender, and sexual orientation shape the 
rights and privileges that individuals and groups are able to enjoy in the modern 
democratic state. Further, I argue that race, gender, sexual orientation, ethnic, and 
cultural hierarchies dominate American political and legal institutions. In a 
commodity-based economy these hierarchies are intrinsically meaningful and have 
direct social and material benefits or consequences. Remedies available to 
marginalized groups and individuals depend in part on the political recognition of 
difference and the demonstration that it is the cause for the denial of rights and 
privileges in the public sphere.  
Outline of the study 
     In the subsequent chapters, I set out to paint a more accurate account of individual 
rights and freedom in the modern democratic state by examining three instances 
where difference has played a significant, if not determining role on the realization of 
rights in the public sphere. In Chapter two, I provide the theoretical framework 
necessary for exploring the significance of difference in relationship to rights-claims 
made by individuals and groups in modern democracies. It examines the core claims 
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of a complex theory of rights and why it promises to be a more complete political and 
theoretical framework in terms of contemporary discussions of political and social 
equality in the liberal democratic state.   
     I develop a complex theory of rights which enables us to understand the impact of 
difference and culture on rights-claims made in the public sphere and to recognize the 
structural and institutional barriers that undermine liberal notions of neutrality. 
Having said this, I seek to displace the unitary subject of rights by intentionally 
privileging difference in the discourse on rights in modern democracies. 
     In chapter three, I explore the meaning of race and rights through the State of 
California ballot initiative, Proposition 54. The referendum sought to ban the 
collection of racial data by the government. In the last decade, the State has served as 
a testing ground for many of the racially charged issues of the country like affirmative 
action, immigration, and bilingual education. While Proposition 54 is a very specific 
case, the implications of passage of the proposition would have been far-reaching. If 
passed, it would have reverberated across the county and opened the door for similar 
kinds of legislation in other states. At the core of the initiative was an intense debate 
around the relevance of race to privileges and opportunities available to groups and 
individuals in the public sphere and whether or not race should indeed be a private 
issue. Like the other cases chosen, this case challenges liberal notions of equality and 
neutrality and demonstrates how the dominant group has benefited from historic 
exclusion and accumulated privileges and opportunities that all but ensure racial and 
ethnic minorities never realize their full bundle of rights.  
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     For this discussion, I examine existing literature on race and racialization 
processes to map the ways in which race has shaped American law, public policies, 
individual rights, and freedom in the liberal democratic state. I also rely on exit polls, 
national surveys, newspaper articles, and the national debates surrounding proposition 
54.  In Chapter three, I conclude that race is a determining factor in whether an 
individual will be able to realize his or her full bundle of rights in the public sphere. 
Race not only shapes the rights one is able to enjoy, but the privileges and the share 
of resources one is able to benefit from as well.  
     In Chapter four, I continue to emphasize the impact of difference on the realization 
of rights through the lens of sexual orientation. Over the last two decades the issue of 
Gay rights, most recently in the guise of marriage, has been a highly debated and 
divisive topic for politicians, legislators, legal scholars, and ordinary citizens. 
Whereas once the struggle for Gay rights took a back seat to racial and gender equity 
during the civil rights era, in the millennium the rights of Gays and Lesbians tend to 
be at the center of legal and moral discussions around individual rights, autonomy, 
equality, and freedom.  
    In this chapter, I examine the issue of gay marriage to explore notions of neutrality 
and the concept of the good in the modern democratic state. I use the recent 
Massachusetts Supreme Court case of Goodridge v. the Department of Health to 
discuss the subject of rights and abstract individualism under liberalism. In this 
chapter, I focus on the legal history of same-sex marriage and the public debates 
around homosexuality and the definition of marriage. I show that the issue of Gay 
marriage problematizes and highlights the tension between liberal claims of political 
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neutrality and rights-claims of individuals and groups who until recently had not been 
defined as individuals under the law. For this chapter, I rely on court decisions and 
briefings; newspaper and magazine articles; and legislation and public opinion polls.  
     Chapter five examines gendered citizenship in the modern democratic state.  In 
this chapter, I seek to further demonstrate how race and gender continue to be 
primary tools of social organization and shape individual rights and freedom in the 
modern democratic state. I also demonstrate how the intersections of race and gender 
alter rights-claims made in the public sphere by women situated within multiple 
hierarchies. For this chapter, I use the issue of violence against women to illustrate 
the ways in which the struggle to attain and secure rights on the part of women has 
been closely tied with not the protection of rights, a kind of negative freedom, but by 
the denial of rights or privileges based on gender or sex. As such, a woman’s right is 
defined contextually within the masculine public sphere and towards securing 
protection and freedom long extended to men in the liberal democratic state.  For this 
chapter, I rely on court decisions and briefings, the existing literature on violence 
against women, and legislation. 
     Chapter six concludes this dissertation and in this chapter I summarize the findings 
of the dissertation, argue for a fuller and more accurate account of citizenship and 
rights in the modern democratic state, and suggest ways in which we can reconcile 
liberal ideals of egalitarianism and full equality with the lived reality and experiences 
of marginalized groups and individuals. 
 
METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH 
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      The general theoretical approach of this dissertation is critical theory. In my 
attempt to tell the story of the difficulty of accommodating difference in modern 
democracies, I rely heavily on the history and origins of narratives that seem to have 
been weaved into the very fabric of society. I explore the obvious and not so obvious 
disruptions to interject a more complicated reading of the experiences of individuals 
and groups in modern democracies. My plan is not to tell a neatly, integrated story of 
rights, but to raise significant questions with regard to how and why, despite legal 
gains, some groups and individuals struggle to realize their full autonomy and agency 
in supposedly in society.  
    The case studies represent my attempt to examine the struggle for the attainment of 
rights at different levels of government—local, state, and federal, and to demonstrate 
how these various branches have played significant roles in shaping individual rights 
and freedom in the liberal democratic state. Further, the cases demonstrate attempts to 
realize full freedom and autonomy through practices of direct democracy, the 
California Referendum Initiative; appeal to the courts, the issue of Gay Marriage; and 
the creation of public policies and landmark legislation, the Violence Against Women 
Act. The findings of my research suggest that at all levels of government, race, class, 
gender, sexual orientation and other markers of difference shape the realization of 
rights in the modern democratic state. The case studies are fastened together by their 
capacity to demonstrate the limitations of liberal democratic theory with regard to the 
accommodation of difference in the public sphere; interrogation of liberal claims of 
neutrality and equality; and shedding light on the reason why despite legal equality, 
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Theoretical Framework: A Complex Theory of Rights in the Modern 
Democratic State 
 
      The question of the deliverability of rights to those whose citizenship is dependent 
upon the subordination of identity markers such as race, gender, sexual orientation, 
and class to a national identity is of critical importance. The collapse of global and 
national boundaries (Soysal 1994); the recognition and constructedness of identity 
classification systems (Lopez 1995, Butler 1999, Guttman 2003); and rights claims 
made on the part of individuals who are situated within multiple hierarchies or who 
until recently had not been defined as the individual of which the laws speak,20 
provide us the opportunity to theorize a rights framework that extends beyond the 
simple interaction between the state and the individual.  
     During the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the topic of citizenship rights in 
relationship to difference was explored by feminist and legal scholars who sought to 
address the fundamental flaws of individual liberalism, specifically the liberal 
conception of the individual (Pateman 1988), the primacy of rights within the liberal 
framework, the concept of the good, and the neutrality of the state (Delgado 1995). 
However, despite these powerful critiques of individual liberalism, there is still much 
we do not know about the impact of difference on the realization of rights in the 
modern democratic state.  Particularly, there is a need for a broader and nuanced 
                                                
20 See Goodridge v. Department of Health 440 Mass. 309, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Nov. 18, 
2003) 
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explanation of why social and political equality remains elusive for some groups and 
individuals.  
     This study of rights in the modern democratic state attempts to not only encompass 
the legal ramifications of the denial of difference, but the implications for public 
policies, material resources, mobility, and visibility in the modern democratic state.  
In this chapter, I will review the frameworks that have been offered thus far to 
address the impact of difference on the realization of rights in liberal democracies. 
Finally, building on these frameworks, I suggest a complex theory of rights that 
attempts to fairly account for the impact of identity and culture on the realization of 
rights by individuals and groups in the public sphere. 
Defining Rights in The Modern Democratic State 
     In this dissertation, I employ T.H. Marshall’s tripartite formulation of citizenship 
rights as a starting point for the discussion on the realization of rights in the modern 
democratic state. Marshall holds that there are three sets of rights that taken together 
should guarantee formal or full equality in liberal democracies—civil, political and 
social rights. Civil rights refers to legal equality or equality before the law. The civil 
pays close attention to the rights of property and speech, and the right to work 
(Sarvasy 2001). Within the civil sphere, the courts are entrusted to handle disputes 
that arise over the interpretation or the extension of these rights to groups previously 
excluded.  Political rights refer to the right to participate in the exercise of political 
power (Sarvasy 2001) and is seen as fundamental to the idea of citizenship. The 
political right is an active engagement in politics in the public sphere and can be seen 
as a duty or obligation. The last, social rights concerns itself with equality of 
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opportunity and the rights to education, health care, and social services, and 
protection from harm. Social rights ‘provide a modicum of economic welfare and 
security, that allows citizens to live the life of a civilized being according to the 
standard prevailing in the society (Marshall 1965).” Social rights are protected and 
implemented by state and federal agencies. 
     According to Marshall, the relationship between the three sets of citizen rights is 
historical in nature, with citizenship status attached to civil rights in the eighteenth 
century, political rights in the nineteenth century, and social rights in the twentieth 
century.  In the millennium, however, citizenship rights and status tend to be defined 
partially or wholly by all three sets of rights. Civil, political, and social rights 
intersect, overlap, and inform individual and groups lived experiences and the 
possibility of full autonomy and freedom in society.   
    In the case of women, and racial and ethnic minorities in the United States, legal 
equality under the law has not always translated into social and political equality. A 
prime example can found by examining the struggle of Blacks to achieve social and 
political equality in the United States. The thirteenth through fifteenth amendments 
abolished Slavery and constituted Blacks as core-selves under the law. However, the 
laws failed to consider the second-class status or half-full bundle of rights Blacks 
possessed upon entering society. Politically, Blacks were entering a society that until 
recently had viewed them as inferior. Economically, they were resource poor. Both 
put them at a distinct disadvantage for being able to secure and exercise social and 
political rights in the public sphere (Bell 1992). The struggle of Blacks to secure full 
rights in the civil sphere post fifteenth amendment continued well after reconstruction 
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(DuBois 1935). While newly emancipated Blacks were allowed to vote, there were 
limitations imposed by states to prohibit them from exercising the right. Poll taxes 
and literacy test are just a sampling of these limitations.21 In struggles to repeal racist 
and biased laws, Blacks were not only asserting their rights as individuals, but also 
relying on the promise of neutrality for the assurance in the delivery of those rights 
within the liberal democratic state. A similar example posited by Wendy Sarvarsy 
(2001) is that of Women in the United States where women reformers of the early 
twentieth century argued for universal equal citizen rights, but they had failed to 
persuade men in power. Women were granted aspects of married women’s civil 
property rights in the nineteenth century, but complete civil rights, especially 
ownership and control of their bodies eluded them. 
     For the purposes of this study, social rights are of extreme importance and pivotal 
to postulating a more complex understanding of the impact of difference on the 
realization of rights in modern democracies. In the words of Ruth Lister (2001), 
Social rights help to promote the exercise of political and civil rights by 
disenfranchised groups in terms of power and resources. Moreover, they are essential 
to the promotion or exercise of individual autonomy. Qualitatively, social rights 
provide a measure of equality and freedom in society. Social rights focuses on the 
distribution of wealth, resources, and power in society by shedding light on the 
beneficiaries and benefactors of social rights. Through the lens of social rights and the 
                                                
21 This point is explored further in The Possessive Investment in Whiteness (1998) by 
George Lipsitz where he argues that the extension of formal equality through laws 
were met by resistance by Whites and supported by parallel laws that sought to curtail 
or limit the exercise of newly granted rights by disenfranchised groups. In some 
states, for example, poll taxes were a pre-condition to exercising the right to vote.  
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mechanisms (institutions and social structures) put in place to protect and ensure 
these rights by the state, the context for struggles for the realization of rights or the 
attainment of rights comes into focus.  
OPPOSITIONAL RIGHTS FRAMEWORKS 
      Oppositional rights frameworks are those that as a course of engagement critically 
examine the fundamental assumptions and biases embedded in American political 
liberalism. During the late 1980s, Critical Race Theory emerged as one of the leading 
oppositional frameworks in the discourse on rights. As an oppositional rights 
framework, Critical Race Theory rejects many of the core assumptions of liberalism, 
particularly its claims of political neutrality and substantive doctrines of formal 
equality.  
    The significant contribution of Critical Race Theory to the discourse on rights is 
that it clearly articulates the ways in which race and through extension other makers 
of difference, are differentiated and commodified in modern democracies. Further, 
that this differentiation and commodification is the root causes for discrimination and 
unequal treatment in society. By foregrounding race in the discussion on rights, 
Critical Race Scholars make visible key political institutions and structures by 
shedding light on the ways in which laws, public policies, and legal remedies or 
penalties work to maintain dominant cultural, societal and political norms.  
    Derrick Bell’s seminal work Faces at the Bottom of the Well (1992) underscores 
the above point by noting that despite legislative gains, the chance that Blacks [and 
other disenfranchised groups] will gain full equality in [America] is nearly impossible 
because the Herculean efforts often hailed as successes and signals of progress are no 
 33 
more than short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in 
ways that maintain white dominance. This observation made by Bell calls into 
question the very core of civil rights discourse particularly the idea that formal 
equality would translate into social and political equality and desirability of 
colorblind approaches to justice.  
     In the years following the emergence of Critical Race Theory as an oppositional 
rights framework, Latinos, Women of Color, Gays and Lesbians began to articulate 
critical theories, which sought to foreground their complex, and layered experiences 
of discrimination and unequal treatment. LatCrit, Critical Race Feminism, and Queer 
Critical Theory speak directly to the importance of an intersectional analysis of 
power, difference, rights, and privilege in society. Whereas, Critical Legal Studies 
tended to reflect the experiences of white men and Critical Race Theory, the 
experiences of Black men, these frameworks stress the need to broaden the lens of 
analyses to gain a fuller grasp of the range of experiences of individuals and groups in 
society. For example, In her insightful article, Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics and Violence Against Women of Color (1994), legal 
scholar Kimberle Crenshaw closely examines the intersections of race and gender in 
relationship to violence against women and demonstrates that these intersections 
dramatically alter the individual’s experience of violence in the public sphere and 
remedies available to her in the public sphere.  
      In the next section, I will work to extend the frameworks and insights offered by 
Critical Race Theorists to develop a Complex Theory of Rights that will attempt to 
explain the impact of race, class, gender, sexual orientation, and other markers of 
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difference on the realization of rights in modern democracies. The theory grows out a 
deep concern over the lack of coherency and consistency in liberal democratic theory 
with regard to the relevance of difference and identity to rights. On the one hand, 
under liberalism, difference and identity are treated as non-issues or as private 
matters. On the other hand, the courts and laws have responded to difference and 
rights-claims made by women, racial and ethnic minorities, Gays, and other similarly 
situated groups in the public sphere by making accommodations and allowances;22 
protecting and/or delivering rights’23 or providing remedies for injuries,24 thereby 
essentially recognizing the ways in which difference and identity has shaped and 
impacted rights in the modern democratic state.  
      A complex theory of rights fits squarely within the tradition of critical legal 
theory and studies and makes many of the same core assumptions, specifically the 
idea that the logic and structure attributed to the law grows out of power relationships 
present in the society. Further, the law exists to support the interests of the party or 
                                                
22 For example, the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 acknowledged the 
sexual division of labor whereby women are often the primary caretakers and 
responsible for childrearing. It also acknowledged the traditional roles of men and 
women in society and held that ‘employment standards that apply to one gender only 
have serious potential for encouraging employers to discriminate against employees 
and applicants for employment who are of that gender.  The gender differences, real 
or imposed, between men and women were accommodated under the law to protect 
women from discrimination. 
23 Protection here is used broadly and meant to imply protection from harm as well as 
protection that would allow individuals to pursue his or her own good. Examples 
include the landmark sexual harassment case Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986) 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
24 ibid 
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class that forms it and is merely a collection of beliefs and prejudices that legitimize 
the injustices of society.25  
     And like many of the other oppositional rights frameworks, Critical Race Theory, 
LatCrit, Queer Critical Theory, and Critical Race Feminism among them, I attempt to 
foreground the experiences of discrimination and unequal treatment of marginalized 
groups and individuals to demonstrate the biases in institutions and structures that 
govern society; inform and shape public policy outcomes; and influence remedies for 
injuries26 in the public sphere. Similarly, I also take issue with the notion under 
liberalism that ignoring race, class, gender, sexual orientation, or other markers of 
difference will eventually eliminate racism, class, sexism, homophobia, or 
ethnocentrism. Moreover, that the problem in terms of the realization of rights in 
modern democracies is the constant attention paid to difference and identity by 
marginalized groups and individuals.27  
TENETS OF A COMPLEX THEORY OF RIGHTS 
What is a Complex Theory of Rights? 
     A complex theory of rights attempts to explain empirical reality and the reasons 
why groups and individuals fail to realize their full bundle of rights in the modern 
democratic state. Further, it critically explores the impact of identity and culture on 
                                                
25 http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/index.php/Critical_legal_theory. Bruce, Thomas. 
November 2005 
26 For a more thorough discussion on this point, see Wendy Brown’s Finding the Man 
in the State (1995) 
27 A similar argument is made by Kimberle Crenshaw (1991) when she notes race, 
class, gender, and other identity categories are often treated in mainstream liberal 
discourse as vestiges of bias or domination.  
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the realization of rights and rights-claims made by individuals and groups in the 
public sphere.  
     The theory suggests the need to pay particular attention to the interaction between 
various markers of difference and the structures and institutions that govern societies. 
By linking race, class, gender, religion, sexuality, ethnicity, and other markers of 
difference to institutions and structures that inform and shape individual rights and 
freedom, we can begin to understand how marginalized groups and individuals resist 
subordination and subvert power; advance rights-claims in the political arena; and 
expose the limits of the liberal claim of political neutrality. More importantly, it is 
likely that we can begin to understand why formal equality does not necessarily 
translate into social and political equality for some groups and individuals in modern 
democracies.  
     To be clear, the account of rights and freedom in the liberal democratic state 
proposed here is not meant to replace or dismiss liberal democratic theories that tend 
to emphasize individual autonomy or the role of the state in ensuring individual 
liberties and freedom, rather it is a call for the recognition of historic racial, ethnic, 
gender, sexuality, ethnic, and cultural inequalities that limit the exercise of autonomy 
and freedom in modern democracies. Moreover, it seeks to paint a fuller and more 
accurate account of rights in the liberal democratic state.  
     As such, a complex theory of rights is both a theory and a method. It is 
simultaneously a way of understanding the reasons why and how groups and 
individuals make rights-claims in the public sphere and in turn resist subordination 
and domination. As a method of social inquiry, it points to dependent variables and 
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factors that might be driving policy outcomes, the realization of rights, and 
distribution of resources in societies.  It asks the question why doesn’t X translate into 
Z for some groups and individuals when the law clearly guarantees or protects Z.  
     Connectedly, it purports to be a direct and critical social theory. As a direct theory, 
it allows us the opportunity to substantively examine how groups and individuals 
mobilize to have their needs met and concerns heard in the public sphere. It 
demonstrates the need to look beyond the interaction between the state and the 
individual for securing or realizing rights. As a critical social theory, it concerns itself 
with the role of difference and identity in relationship to rights and justice; the entry 
point of the discourse on rights and justice for what has been excluded or included in 
narratives and history; the mystification of power relationships in society; and the 
examination of rights-claims made by individuals and groups in the public sphere.  
     Next, a complex account of rights allows for a dynamic interpretation of the liberal 
notion of individual rights, the good, and equality.  By dynamic, I mean to intimate 
there are many factors that shape individual rights, the good, and equality in society. 
Further, that the good and neutrality are determined in part by the culture in which 
these terms are being negotiated or defined.  
     Lastly, a Complex Theory of Rights in the modern democratic state presupposes 
that relations among human beings and groups are contentious. The contentious 
nature of human relations speaks to the complex marked and unmarked spaces of 
individual realities and experiences. In civil society, there exist competing moral 
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claims, values, and conceptions of the good that serve as counter-claims to others.28 
Moral claims and disputes over the good are never settled. In some instances, they 
overlap, contradict, or betray other claims. An analysis, which understands social 
relations as contentious reveals plays for power within society and the violence that is 
required in order to create a unitary, neatly threaded narrative.  
Epistemological and Theoretical Claims of A Complex Theory of Rights 
     A Complex Theory of Rights makes several epistemological and theoretical 
claims: (1) Race, class, gender, religion, age, ability, and ethnicity are markers of 
difference. These markers are socially constructed and only possess meaning or value 
in a hierarchically arranged society. They are neither good nor bad; (2) If makers are 
neither good nor bad, it becomes critical to understand the complex relationship of 
not only the individual to the state, but to institutions and structures in society; (3) 
Social relations are about the maintenance or subversion of power. In every social 
relationship, there is power. Abstract notions of the individual, deny the many ways 
individuals and groups exercise power or advance rights-claims in society; (4) There 
is no center or good that can assert itself as the entry point of discourse; and (5) the 
public and private sphere are inextricably linked. One depends on the other for its 
definition and meaning. 
     For the purposes of this discussion, I would like to examine each of the above 
claims in turn. The first assertion is that race, class, gender, religion, ability, culture, 
                                                
28 This point is made by Friedrich Neitschze in the Genealogy of Morals (1956) 
where he argues that present-day morality is not a set of duties passed down by God 
or some universal power, but an arbitrary code that has evolved over time made by 
man. Further, he asserts that the only constant is that we and everything else are 
constantly striving for power. 
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ethnicity and sexuality are markers of difference. A marker of difference is a 
defining, sometimes evident, characteristic or attribute that distinguishes groups or 
individuals from one another in society. The meaning and value of these markers are 
shaped and informed by society and gain currency in the public sphere. As such, 
markers of difference are not inherently oppressive or valuable. The value attached to 
markers of difference are socially constructed and only possess meaning in a 
hierarchically arranged society that places value on a particular race, gender, religion, 
or sexual orientation (i.e. white, male, Christian, heterosexual).   
     For example, simply being a Latina is not inherently oppressive. As a woman of 
color, she may find strength and power in both her race and gender. Further, her 
position may allow her to understand power and domination differently than those 
located elsewhere in the societal hierarchy.29 The problem is being Latina in racist 
and sexist society. Racism, classism, heterosexism, ethnocentrism, ableism, anti-
Semitism, or ageism are the forms of oppression and the manifestation of unequal 
power relations. They are the systematic and violent acts of maintaining hierarchies 
and privilege in society. Hence, it becomes crucial to examine the structures and 
institutions that inform individual subjectivity.     
                                                
29 Many Feminist scholars have challenged the entry point of traditionally masculine, 
enlightenment discourse and category of woman by creating a standpoint from which 
to articulate their experiences and deconstruct notions of womanhood and femininity 
(Moraga and Anzadula 1981, Harstock 1983, Jaggar 1983, Hooks 1984, Collins 1990, 
Harding 1991, Mohanty 1992). The starting point of standpoint theory is the idea that 
women’s different lives have been devalued and neglected as starting points for 
producing knowledge and as generators of evidence for and against knowledge claims 
(Calhoun 1995).  Standpoint theory aims to make visible the ways in which 
marginalized groups and individuals are silenced, coerced, or neglected in the process 
of knowledge production. Under standpoint theory all knowledge and views are 
situated and partial because each reflects a particular standpoint rooted in individual 
subjectivity.  
 40 
     A thorough examination of the structures and institutions that inform individual 
subjectivity reveals what Foucault (1980) notes as the changing modes and apparatus’ 
of power and domination. Structures and institutions present in society work to 
maintain hierarchies and protect the interests of the dominant group.  
      The third claim put forward is the idea that social relationships are about the 
maintenance or subversion of power. In every social relationship, there is power. 
Abstract notions of the individual deny the many ways individuals and groups 
exercise power or advance rights-claims in the public sphere.  As Foucault (1978) 
asserts, power must be understood as the multiplicity of force relations present in the 
sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization. Through 
these processes wrought with struggle and confrontation, power is transformed, 
strengthened, or reversed. Further, he goes on to argue, power is everywhere not 
because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere.  It is not an 
institution, structure, or certain strength one is endowed with, but a complex 
strategical situation in a particular society.  
     In the liberal democratic state, the gain of power of one group or individual is 
often associated with the loss of power by another group or individual. A ready 
example is affirmative action, where the gains of Blacks, women, and other 
minorities are directly associated with the loss of power and resources by Whites. 
Further, in social justice movements to end racial or gender discrimination, there is an 
acknowledgement that individuals who enjoy power because of their gender—male in 
the patriarchal society and race-white in a racist society risk the loss of power, 
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privilege, and status when advocating for fair and equal treatment of those situated 
below them in race or gender hierarchies. 
     The refusal of liberal democratic theory to acknowledge race, gender, sexual 
orientation, age, ability, ethnicity, and other markers of difference in the public 
sphere, it is as though power is diffused and shared equally between bodies regardless 
of defining characteristics. In pluralist societies and in the modern democratic state, 
individuals and groups are in direct competition for resources and cultural recognition 
is easily translated to mean power. Coincidentally, the distribution and share of 
resources seem to align with racial and gender hierarchies present in society with 
those individuals closest to the core having the most and those along the periphery 
having the least amount of resources and access.  
     The fourth claim holds that there is no center or good that can assert itself as the 
entry point of discourse. The entry point is the historical record of the origins of a 
particular discourse, society, or shared knowledge. It is a compilation of stories, 
symbols, key figures, events, writings, and turning points. The entry point constructs 
the present moment by invoking a point in time out of which it unfolds (K. King 
1994). It questions the necessity of a center or core that excludes primary tools of 
social organization such as race, class, ethnicity, ability, gender, sexual orientation or 
other markers of difference.  
    As Nancy Harstock (1997) argues, all individuals and [groups] have truth claims or 
originary tales, but the difference is that all experiences are not seen as 
epistemologically valid as a means of correcting or supplementing historical records. 
Flax (1990) concurs by noting that in order to make the whole appear rational and 
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complete, the contradictory stories [histories] of others must be erased, devalued or 
suppressed. Women, racial and ethnic minorities, Gays and other similarly situated 
groups have consistently challenged the entry point by interjecting their experiences 
in the discourse of rights and freedom in the modern democratic state.   
 Connectedly, with respect to the good in society, there is an acknowledgement that 
there exists some sort of working notion of the good present in society and that this 
good is shaped by the norms and cultural practices present in any given society 
(Geertz 1973). As Iris Young (2003) notes: 
The democratic state protects the dominant culture [the good], whether 
intentionally or not, through the language it uses, the education it 
accredits, the history it honors, and the holidays and other customs that 
it keeps. The state and the dominant public culture that it supports, 
both indirectly and directly, cannot be culturally neutral in this sense. 
Government conducts its business, public schools teach, and the mass 
media broadcast in the dominant language and in conformity with a 
culturally distinctive calendar. Family law conforms to the dominant 
culture. The civic associations with highest social status favor people 
who identify with the dominant culture (Young, 2003 p. 81).  
 
     The last epistemological claim that a complex theory of rights makes is the notion 
that the public and private sphere are inextricably linked. The public and private 
spheres depend on the other for its definition and meaning.  
Historically Constituted Meta-Spaces in the Modern Democratic State 
      Extending the framework offered by noted Critical Race Scholar Kimberle 
Crenshaw30 (1991), a Complex Theory of Rights holds that there are five meta-spaces 
                                                
30 In Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against 
Women of Color (1991), Crenshaw identifies three aspects of subordination: the 
structural dimension of domination (structural intersectionality), the politics 
engendered by a particular system of domination (political intersectionality), and the 
representation of the dominated (representational intersectionality). These 
intersections, she argues, serve as metaphors for different ways in which women of 
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that are paramount: the structural, political, representational, economic, and 
institutional dimensions of society. These meta-spaces are where the relationship 
between individuals and groups, and structures and institutions are revealed. These 
meta-spaces highlight the ways in which markers of difference interact, intersect, 
inform individual realities, and shape individual rights and freedom in modern 
democracies. As such, these sites are historically specific and materially constituted.  
     The structural meta-space encompasses the political, economic, representational 
and institutional dimensions of society. It refers to the creation and operation of 
systems and structures in society that maintain privilege for some groups while 
restricting the rights and privileges of others. The structural meta-space highlights the 
connectedness of systems and structures in society and helps us to understand how 
each system affects or impacts others.  Stated differently, the structural meta-space is 
the interlocutor where all of the other meta-spaces converge and intersect. It is not 
just a collection of independent parts, but functions as a whole that ultimately shapes 
and informs individual realities and experiences. As Crenshaw (1991) notes, any 
particular disadvantage or disability is sometimes compounded by another 
disadvantage reflecting the dynamics of a separate system or structure of 
subordination.  
     The structural meta-space speaks to the ways in which societies are organized or 
structured. This meta-space is not static and is constantly shifting and changing. 
However, it is important to note that the systems and institutions that constitute the 
structural meta-space are in some ways resistant to pressure and change and only 
                                                                                                                                      
color [and other similarly situated groups] are situated within categories of difference 
when they may be regarded as mutually exclusive. 
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really incorporates change by force or inevitability. In modern democracies, the 
systems and structures are shaped by economics (capitalism), the laws of the land at 
both the federal and state levels with an eye toward ensuring that individuals are free 
to pursue his or her own interests without interference and to protect individuals from 
harm from others or by the state, and the culture.   
     Next, the political meta-space refers to the structures and systems of laws and 
policies that govern individuals and groups in societies. It focuses on the impact of 
laws, the criminal justice system, public policies, and the role of state in shaping the 
individual's or group's sense of fairness, equality, and justice in society. The political 
meta-space highlights how laws and public policies are shaped and informed by 
dominant cultural perspectives of race, class, gender, ethnicity, age, ability, sexual 
orientation, or other markers of difference. As such, the political meta-space speaks 
directly to the ways in which rights are intimately shaped by differences that exist 
among and between groups and individuals.  
     An example of the political meta-space is the discrepancy in sentencing in the 
notorious Rockefeller Drug laws, which institute stiffer and harsher penalties for 
individuals caught in possession of “solid”31 cocaine versus cocaine in its power 
form. The mandatory minimum in sentencing for possession of  ‘solid” cocaine, 
thought to be used mostly by poor, urban dwellers, is nearly 100-to-1 in comparison 
to powder cocaine. Said differently, an individual in possession of 5 grams of “solid” 
cocaine receives the same penalty or sentence as someone caught with 500 grams of 
powder cocaine. Further, the possession of less than 500 grams of powder cocaine 
                                                
31 In the U.S. drug policy legislation, “solid” cocaine is also referred to as Crack or 
“Base.” Office of National Drug Control Policy (2006). 
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carries a less harsh sentence than 5 grams of “solid” cocaine. Another illustration of 
the political meta-space at work is the sentence discrepancy between batterers who 
murder their wives or girlfriends in comparison to women who kill their abusers. 
According to a study conducted by Pace University, women who kill their batterers or 
abusers are likely to get double or triple the number of years in prison as a man who 
murders his spouse, girlfriend, or partner. 
    The institutional meta-space focuses on the impact of institutions on the individual 
and the group. It highlights how institutions present in society restrict, limit, or deny 
access to resources by marginalized groups or individuals. Institutional oppression 
and discrimination is harmful because it is virtually invisible or hidden in society. It is 
essentially "the rules of the game." It may maintain systems of privilege and 
oppression.  
     Institutions present in society include, but are not limited to, schools, universities; 
banks, hospitals, the military, the criminal-legal system, prisons, marriage and family.  
All of the aforementioned institutions are governed by “rules” or laws that may be 
invisible depending on your social or political location. Moreover, it is possible to 
engage in one or many of these institutions and not be fully aware of the full benefits 
or repercussions of the engagement. In the modern democratic state, the institutional 
meta-space is of extreme importance because of the high premium placed on 
individual choice, autonomy, and agency. There is very little regard for the impact of 
the shape and structure of institutions that govern society on individual choice, 
autonomy, and agency. For example, it is highly unlikely that a black child in a poor 
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performing high school with very few resources will end up as the CEO of Bank of 
America.  
     The economic meta-space pays attention to the distribution of wealth and 
resources in societies; the individual's or group's access to information; and the 
impact of social class on an individual's access to resources. The economic meta-
space explores how class can impact an individual's access to resources, information, 
employment opportunities, and potential for advancement in society. In the modern 
democratic state, the economic system is capitalism, which places a heavy emphasis 
on free enterprise, free market, and individualism. Under this system, there is a severe 
gap in the distribution of resources and public goods.  
     Lastly, the representational meta-space refers to the representation of individuals 
and groups in dominant culture and society through media, texts, language, and 
images. It pays close attention to how both the dominant and marginalized groups are 
represented in society. The representational meta-space highlights the way race, class, 
gender, sexual orientation, and ethnic images in society come together to create 
unique and specific narratives that shape and inform the policies, laws, rights, and 
institutions in society. As Robin Kelly (1997) notes cultural and ideological 
constructions shape public policy, scholarship, and social movements, as such it 
important to be cognizant of the role of identity plays in key political and economic 
struggles of our time. 
     In the modern democratic state, the fore-mentioned meta-spaces are 
interdependent, intersecting and critical to any conception of rights or justice that 
seeks to accommodate rights claims made by marginalized groups or individuals.  
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Conclusion 
     In this chapter, I have outlined the components of a Complex Theory of Rights 
that attempts to explain why some groups and individuals fail to realize their full 
bundle of rights in the modern democratic state. Further, it seeks to demonstrate the 
ways in which rights and privileges are intimately shaped by difference in the public 
sphere. The theory holds that there are a variety of factors that contribute to the denial 
of rights in liberal democracies: (1) the structures and institutions that govern society; 
(2) the representation of dominant and subordinate groups in the media and culture; 
(3) Accumulated privileges gained through historic practices of exclusion and 
marginalization; and (4) the refusal of liberalism to acknowledge the role of 
difference in shaping rights and freedom in the early republic.  In the subsequent 











     As was the case in the late twentieth century, in the millennium, race continues to 
be a highly contested category of social organization or marker from which to draw 
conclusions concerning the denial of individual or collective rights in society.  Once 
seen by many political scientists and sociologists as the primary, if not most 
significant marker (DuBois 1903, King 1975, Locke 1992, West 1994) in the post-
civil rights, post-colonial era, race presents like a stale holdover from yesteryear. 
Neo-conservatives and others have attempted to move us towards a more color-blind 
society by insisting that racial mixing, legislative gains made during the 1960’s and 
1970’s and the creation of a visible racial and ethnic minority middle-class, 
underscore the need to relegate race to the private sphere (Wilson 1978, Connerly 
2003).  
     While the meaning of race has shifted over time and has increasingly become 
noted as socially constructed (Winant 2000) Race still remains a fundamental 
organizing principle of social relationships in modern democracies. As a social and 
political construct, there are direct social and material benefits or consequences 
associated with race. Moreover, the historical process of racialization of systems and 
structures present in society over time, work to ensure that race remains 
indeterminably linked to the realization of rights in modern societies. In short, Race 
 49 
not only shapes the rights one is able to enjoy in society, but the privileges and the 
share of resources one is able to benefit from as well.32  
     For example, in the United States, Race is likely to determine whether or not an 
individual is likely to live in poverty, with a total of 22% of Black and Hispanics 
living below the federal poverty line compared to only 7.8 % of all whites.33 It also 
determines the likelihood of home ownership, whites are almost two times as likely to 
own homes compared to Blacks, Latinos or Asians,34 whether or not an individual 
will become incarcerated, Blacks and Latinos represent 63% of adults incarcerated 
although they make up only 25% of the nation’s population,35 or will receive a quality 
primary and secondary education.36   
                                                
32 This point is taken up by Neil Gotanda in her article A Critique of “Our 
Constitution is Color-Blind, 44 Stanford Law Review 1 (1991). In the Article, 
Gotanda asserts that America’s system of racial categories is historically and socially 
contingent. She employs the “one-drop of blood” rule to explain how any trace of 
African Ancestry makes one Black and the classification of white signifies 
“uncontaminated” racial purity. Therefore, she goes on to argue, the socially 
constructed racial categories of Black and white are not equal in status.  Racial 
categories are highly contextualized, with powerful deeply embedded social and 
political meanings.  
33 Hispanic refers to people whose origin is Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, South or 
Central American, or other Hispanic/Latino origin, regardless of race. Poverty 
statistics exclude unrelated individuals under 15 years.  U.S. Census Bureau, Current 
Population Survey, March 2002, Racial Statistics Branch, Population Division.  
34 This percentage varies from state to state. Other issues to consider in terms of home 
ownership in relationship to race is the documented discrimination against racial and 
ethnic minorities through lending practices, red-lining, and other forms of 
institutional racism. For more information on this topic please see Oliver and 
Shapiro’s Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality 
(1995). 
35 These statistics are made stark when broken down by state. For example in twelve 
of the states in the union, black men are incarcerated at rates between twelve and 
sixteen times greater than those of white men and in six states, black youth under the 
age of eighteen are incarcerated in adult facilities at rates between twelve and twenty-
five times greater than those of white youth. Connectedly, in ten states, Latino men 
and women are incarcerated between five and nine times greater than those of white 
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     In this chapter, I use the California ballot initiative Proposition 54 to explore the 
significance of race to the realization of rights in modern democracies. In the post-
civil rights, post-colonial era, many liberals and progressives have begun to look 
sideways or become critical of the goal of attaining a color-blind society. Today, 
color-blindness has become code for the erasure of difference and a hidden 
conservative agenda to mask inequalities and disparities between groups. What this 
chapter aspires to do is to bring back into focus the ways in which race has and 
continues to shape rights and privileges in the modern democratic state.37 By 
critically noting the impact of difference on individual and group rights, we will 
better be able to understand how hierarchies are maintained and reified in societies. 
     To draw this out a bit further, I plan to demonstrate how a complex theory of 
rights that is able to account for the dynamic impact of identity, social institutions, 
social structures, and representation on individual rights is a viable alternative to 
strands of liberal democratic theory that tend to favor the static relationship between 
the individual and the state for understanding the realization of rights in modern 
democracies.  
      In this chapter, I lead with a discussion on racialization processes in the liberal 
democratic state to understand how race has shaped rights and freedom from the very 
beginning of the republic.  Then, I provide context for Proposition 54 by examining 
                                                                                                                                      
men. For more information see Human Rights Watch Report entitled Race and 
Incarceration in the United States (2002) 
36 See Howard Winant’s The New Politics of Race: Globalism, Difference, Justice 
(2004). 
37 This point is supported by Howard Winant (2003) when he notes despite claims of 
equality of opportunity and the improvement of conditions across racial and ethnic 
groups ‘by almost every conceivable indicator researchers can bring forward, the 
same racial inequalities—or structural racism—that existed in the past persist today.’  
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why it arose in the first place, in whose interest the battle was waged, and the status 
and position of racial and ethnic groups in the state at the time of the vote. Lastly, I 
conclude by suggesting that consciously or subconsciously voters rejected the idea 
that ignoring racial difference would bring the state closer to the realization of a 
color-blind society and equality.  
RACE AND RACIALIZATION PROCESESS IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 
     The process of racialization in western societies is key to formulating any critical 
understanding of the intimate relationship between race and rights in modern 
democracies. In its ideological form, the process of racialization provides context for 
the organization of social structures, hierarchies, and institutions present in society. 
Taken as always occurring, the process of racialization becomes the means by which 
we are to contextualize nation and empire building; enslavement and conquest 
(Winant 1994; Lipsitz 1998); and ultimately rights and freedom.  
     Beginning with its colonial origins, enslavement, conquest and exclusion were the 
chief means through which burgeoning democracies were racialized.38 In North 
America, for example, the extermination of Native Americans, the enslavement of 
Africans,39 and exclusionary immigration practices are crucial to the construction of 
freedom and the building of the early Republic.  As Lipstiz (1994) notes, racialization 
was solidified in the colony through early national legal systems that authorized 
                                                
38 For a more thorough discussion on this point see Howard Winant’s Racial 
Conditions (1994). 
39 Here I make the clear distinction between Africans as slaves in the political 
economy and White Europeans who served as indentured servants or contractants. 
Although some White Europeans were “unfree” in relationship to other Whites, the 
racialization of Africans worked to ensure unequal social status and treatment in 
comparison to White indentured servants.  
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attacks on Native Americans and encouraged the appropriation of their lands; the 
legitimization of chattel slavery by fashioning it as a proprietary political economy; 
and by limiting naturalized citizenship to “white” immigrants. All of which, he 
argues, provides the pretext for subsequent unequal treatment or denial of rights such 
as restricting political participation, exploiting labor, and seizing the property of 
Asian Americans, Mexican Americans, Native Americans, and African-Americans. 
     In terms of rights, the process of racialization makes it possible to institutionalize 
and normalize racial difference and hierarchies. To this end, the construction of 
difference, the creation of the Other, and the process of assigning value to difference 
are central to the racialization process. To be sure, conquest, enslavement, and 
exclusion hinge on Othering and difference. Othering, defined as the marked 
interaction between the colonizer and the colonial (Said 2003, Bhabha 1994), and the 
understanding that the ideas, beliefs, and culture of the colonizer are superior and the 
beliefs, ideas, and culture of the colonial are inferior or marginal. By constructing the 
latter as backwards, amoral, and uncivilized, and the former as opposite this, 
racialization and racial formation processes become enmeshed in struggles for 
cultural recognition and resistance to subordination (Benhabib 2002).  
     For example, the conquest of Native-Americans relied heavily on a carefully 
constructed public definition or representation of Natives as “inherently and 
permanently racially inferior” beings in need of morals, religion, and culture 
(Stannard 1992).  This public perception, in turn, fueled public laws that allowed 
genocide and the confiscation of native land rights. In his presidential address 
concerning the Removal Act of 1830, President Jackson wrote of Native Americans: 
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The consequences of a speedy removal will be important to the 
United States, to individual States, and to the Indians themselves. 
The pecuniary advantages, which it promises to the Government, 
are the least of its recommendations. It puts an end to all possible 
danger of collision between the authorities of the General and State 
Governments on account of the Indians. It will place a dense and 
civilized population in large tracts of country now occupied by a 
few savage hunters. It will relieve the whole State of Mississippi 
and the western part of Alabama of Indian occupancy, and enable 
those States to advance rapidly in population, wealth, and power. It 
will separate the Indians from immediate contact with settlements 
of whites; free them from the power of the States; enable them to 
pursue happiness in their own way and under their own rude 
institutions; will retard the progress of decay, which is lessening 
their numbers, and perhaps cause them gradually, under the 
protection of the Government and through the influence of good 
counsels, to cast off their savage habits and become an interesting, 
civilized, and Christian community…(Jackson, 1830 p. 1) 
 
     From the above address, the link between the racialization of groups and the denial 
of individual rights is quite evident. By casting Native-Americans as “primitive, 
uncivilized, savages” in comparison to Europeans, Jackson was able to use the power 
of the state to justify the denial of individual and group rights.  
     In Liberal democratic Theory, property40 is usually singled out as the most 
important factor in terms of determining whether or not one is considered free. Within 
this context, I am defining property not only as land, but the ability to own one’s self 
and labor.  Defined as such, whiteness becomes intertwined with democracy and 
fundamental to citizenship, legal protection, or freedom. When property is used as the 
sole marker for which to understand individual rights and liberty in modern 
                                                
40 Property not only consisting of land, but the ownership of one’s self. See John 
Locke (1690), Two Treatises of Government where in Section 27 of the Second 
Treatise he argues every man has property in his own person and that no person has 
any right to it, but himself. Further, he asserts that the labour of his body, and the 
work of his hands are properly his.  
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democracies,41 whiteness is displaced and not seen as fundamental to the shaping of 
rights and privileges in the public sphere. As Williams (2003) writes, race and 
ethnicity are as centrally constitutive of American life as liberal individualism and 
republicanism.  
     A useful frame for understanding the connection between racialization processes 
and property in Modern democracies is that put forth by Cheryl Harris’ in her 
provocative article Whiteness as Property (1993). In Whiteness, Harris argues that 
undergirding property rights in the United States was the right to exclude both Native 
American and Africans through conquest and enslavement respectively. Property was 
racialized and implemented by force and ratified by law. Eloquently, she writes: 
 
The hyper-exploitation of Black labor was accompanied by treating 
Blacks themselves as objects of property. Race and property were thus 
conflated by establishing a form of property contingent on race---only 
Blacks were subjugated as slaves and treated as property. Similarly, 
the conquest, removal, and subsequent extermination of Native 
American life and culture were ratified by conferring and 
acknowledging the property rights of Whites in Native American land. 
Only white possession and occupation of land was validated and 
therefore privileged as a basis for property rights. Hence, she argues 
that race and property are conflated and establishes a form of property 
contingent upon race (Harris, 1993 p. 1716)  
 
     Within a rights-based framework, Blacks and Native Americans were placed 
outside of the law and had little, if any, legal protection or rights. In fact, laws were 
passed to ensure subordination and prevent them from using laws enacted to protect 
the property rights of Whites for themselves. For example, in 1661, the state of 
Maryland enacted legislation that provided that all Negroes and other slaves shall 
                                                
41 See Thomas Hobbes and John Locke for a more thorough discussion on the 
relationship between property and freedom.  
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serve Durante Vita [for life].42 As Harris notes, between 1680 and 1682, slave codes 
appeared which denied freedom and liberty to Blacks. As law, Blacks were not 
permitted to travel without permits, own property, assemble publicly, or own 
weapons.   
     To be sure, Blacks and others brought cases before the court asserting their 
individual freedom and rights. In most every instance, the courts sided in the interest 
of Whites. To prevent further disputes and rights claims on the part of Blacks, in 1705 
the Virginia state legislature, passed a statute that would eventually serve as a model 
for other States. The statute held that “All servants imported and brought into the 
Country...who were not Christians in their native Country...shall be accounted and be 
slaves. All Negro, mulatto and Indian slaves within this dominion...shall be held to be 
real estate. If any slave resist his master...correcting such slave, and shall happen to 
be killed in such correction...the master shall be free of all punishment...as if such 
accident never happened." This code not only worked to ensure the unequal status 
and position of Blacks, but set a precedent for what would become the frame from 
which Blacks would go about struggling to attain rights naturally extended to whites 
for generations to come.  
     To be more explicit, with regard to race; freedom, rights, citizenship, and legal 
protection belonged exclusively to whites. All others were excluded and subject to 
ownership and/or exclusion. The presumption of freedom arose from color or the 
racial identity category of white. In turn “un-freedom,” its opposite, was defined by 
                                                
42 Gossett, supra note 20, at 30 
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black.43 As was the case Whites were always considered free and others who were not 
defined as white, either because of skin color or country of origin, the line 
demarcating Whites and Others is extremely critical to the formulation of rights in 
modern democracies. In the early Republic, White skin served as the marker or 
guarantor of political and legal citizenship. As such, racial identity and racialization 
processes in the modern democracies are closely tied to an individual’s proximity to 
whiteness.  
     Literature on racialization and racialization processes in the latter part of the 
twentieth century and into the millennium have emphasized the shifting hegemonic 
nature of race where the “outmoded antinomy of racial domination (the assertion of 
power of one group over another group) has been replaced by a range of racial 
projects whose formation and superceding constitutes the process of racial formation 
(Winant 1994).”  As a result, race has become a nebulous category that is constantly 
up for renegotiation or re-definition.  Whereas once the body constituted the primary 
site of racialization, today race is deeply embedded in the many institutions and 
political structures that govern our society. In short, race is everywhere and 
everything is racialized.   
     Winant (1994) defines racialization as the extension of racial meaning to a 
previously unclassified relationship, social practice or group. An historic example, he 
contends, is the creation of the racial category of Black to define Africans whose 
specific identity may have been Mande, Akan, Ovimbundo, or Ibo, among others. 
Relatedly, the creation of the category White depends on a similar kind of grouping 
                                                
43 For a more thorough discussion on this point, see Thomas R.R. Cobb, An Inquiry 
into the Law of Negro Slavery in the United States 68-69 at 66-67 (1858). 
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where, Blacks, non-Christians, and immigrants from particular countries, say Asia 
and Mexico, are excluded.  
     The literature on racialization can be classified according to three basic 
approaches— the ethnic approach which argues that race is a social category defined 
by group formation processes based on culture and descent; the class approach, which 
understands the process of racialization as a result of class relations; and the nation 
approach which emphasizes the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized 
and the organized attempts on the part of the colonized for self-definition and 
determination (Omi and Winant 1994).  
     The ethnicity paradigm of racialization rose to prominence as a direct challenge to 
biologistic and Darwinistic conceptions of race that held currency during the period 
preceding World War II. The biological paradigm had evolved to explain racial 
inferiority as part of a natural order of humankind.44 Based on taxonomies, which 
placed Europeans at the top of the racial hierarchy, Africans at the bottom, and all 
others in between,45 the paradigm was used to explain differences in intelligence, 
temperament, sexuality, and morality, among other things.  As Omi and Winant note, 
Whites were considered the superior race; white skin was the norm while other skin 
colors were exotic mutations that had to be explained.  
                                                
44 Omi and Winant’s Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 
1980s (1986). p.15 
45 See Stephen Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (1981) Gould, Stephen Jay. 1981. In 
1758, Swedish Botanist Carolus Linnaues designated the human races as biological 
categories: European whites belonged to the category Homo sapiens europaeus while 
African blacks belonged to Homo sapiens afer. Linnaeus himself added ranking to his 




     By the early decades of the 20th century, the explanation of racial differences in 
terms of biology lost most of its credibility. Proponents of the theory had been found 
to have been inflated their findings to support the taxonomic models of Linnaeus and 
other influential scientists of the time. As a result, the ethnic paradigm became seen 
as a viable alternative for understanding racialization processes and racial identity 
formation. The paradigm framed race as a social category and also introduced the 
notion of cultural pluralism to the discourse.   
     In sharp contrast to the biologically oriented models, the ethnicity based approach 
held race as one of many factors that determined group identity formation and 
classification. Culture and descent joined race to explain racial hierarchies and 
difference. “Culture in the ethnicity framework included markers such as religion, 
language, “customs,” nationality, and political identification. Descent, however, 
offered a seemingly more objective standard similar to that of the biological model, 
which involved heredity and group origins (Omi and Winant 1994).” It is important to 
note that the phenotypical or hereditary attributes of groups were not ranked or 
classified in the manner typical of the Eurocentric model of racialization processes 
present in the 16th century.   
     In line with the current historical moment, the ethnicity model tended to be 
preoccupied with problems posed by migration, immigration, and “culture contact.”  
In other words, what would become of all the free Blacks and immigrants who were 
now “milling” around the country and in direct contact with Whites?  Mounting racial 
tensions and fear resulted in riots and deaths in cities across the states, thus 
underscoring the need to critically examine the impact of racial identity on social 
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relations. What had not been given so much attention in the discussion was the ways 
in which Whiteness and white privilege had become entrenched and institutionalized 
during the 17th and 18th centuries so much so that it posed the most significant barrier 
to the exercise of freedom and rights for Blacks and others.  
     For the purposes of this project, I want to emphasize three major aspects of the 
ethnicity model for understanding racialization processes in relationship to rights in 
modern democracies: Assimilation, cultural pluralism and essentialism.  
     First, assimilation is key to the ethnicity model of racialization. In seeking out 
ways to address “the Negro problem” or the influx of immigrants, social scientists 
held assimilation to be the ticket to easing racial tension and strife. Essentially, 
Blacks and others would adopt the American Ethos of hard work, choice, 
individualism and Christianity and be woven into the fabric of society.  As Omi and 
Winant point out, assimilation was viewed as the most logical, and “natural,” 
response to the dilemma imposed by racism. Indeed, Black culture was viewed as 
morally corrupt and pathological and only full assimilation could cure (Myrdal and 
Sissela, 1944).  
     Fueled by the rhetoric of the Civil Rights Movements where Blacks demanded 
equal and fair treatment in comparison to their White Counterparts, assimilation held 
that in order for Blacks to receive equal treatment, they would have to look and 
behave like Whites. Through the lens of the ethnicity paradigm, the Civil Rights 
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Movement was a drive for Black integration and for the removal of institutional and 
structural barriers46 characteristic of the period. 
     What was not accounted for however was the entrenched nature of the social and 
institutional barriers confronting Blacks. There was no accounting for the historic 
damage that had already been done and the accumulated advantages gained by Whites 
by denying rights and privileges of Blacks and other racial and ethnic minorities. It 
was assumed that with the passing of legislation and the reluctant acknowledgement 
of racial discrimination by the federal government, the playing field was now leveled.   
     In fact, in this same period, we begin to witness representations of Blacks in the 
media and popular culture that fall in line with the assimilationist frame. For example, 
in the popular situation comedy, the Jeffersons, a Black couple who once lived next 
door to a bigoted, white family, through hard work and small business ownership are 
able to overcome racial biases to “move on up to the big time” and “get their piece of 
the pie.”  Similar, but distinct, is the situation comedy Good Times that tells of a poor 
Black family, that despite living in the housing projects, manages to work hard, pray 
daily, and maintain a two-parent household.  While these two examples may seem 
trivial or beside the point, they point to the political current of the time which stressed 
the idea that racial barriers had all but dissipated and that poverty could be attributed 
to individuals and not group failings or discrimination.  
     The emergence of a vibrant black middle class and the distancing from poor, urban 
Blacks by the Black middle class support the claims put forth by Monihyan in his 
report, entitled The Negro Family: The Case for National Action (1965), that poverty 
                                                
46 Omi and Winant’s Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 
1980s (1986). p.15 
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is a result of a pathology found in urban Black communities and what is needed to 
remedy this pathology is full integration.  
     Next, while cultural pluralism seems to be at odds with the assimilationist frame 
espoused by the ethnicity paradigm, it is indeed complimentary. Cultural pluralism 
can be defined as the acknowledgement of the presence of multiple racial and ethnic 
groups with distinct values, culture, language, and traditions in society and the belief 
that these groups can bring their distinct selves to the public sphere and participate as 
such.   
     Implicit, but not clearly stated, is that the cultural pluralism strand of the ethnicity 
model still holds that there is a superior culture that individuals and groups should 
strive to attain.  So, while there might be an embracing and valuing of cultures on 
some level they are still relational to the dominant cultural paradigm present in the 
public sphere. In the instance of the United States, it is the American Ethos 
characterized by a free-market economy, rugged individualism, Christianity, and 
freedom of association. Groups and individuals who do not buy into these values or 
beliefs are limited in terms of political participation and economic gain in the public 
sphere. 
     Lastly, I would like to turn my attention to the essentialist tone of the ethnicity 
model of racialization. In the model, racial groups are essentialized and classified 
despite differences that may exist among and between groups. While the category of 
White has expanded to include European immigrants, it has never expanded to 
include Blacks, Hispanics, Native-Americans, or Asians in its definition. In this same 
vein differences existing between Blacks and other racial and ethnic minorities with 
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regard to geographic location, class background, language, immigration patterns had 
also been suppressed. Essentialist strands of the ethnicity model paved the way for 
nationalist frameworks for social organization and the demand for rights in the public 
sphere. 
      Despite its early embrace by noted social scientists and the wide body of 
literature, the ethnicity model failed to account for the ways in which the experiences 
of racial minorities are distinct from ethnic minorities who immigrated to the United 
States.  As Omi and Winant (1994) assert the historical experience of Blacks and 
Native Americans with respect to slavery and exclusion create a wholly distinct set of 
circumstances from which one can go about attaining or ensuring rights.  
     Further, not enough attention was paid to difference between ethnic minorities that 
immigrated from European countries versus those who immigrated from parts of Asia 
or Mexico.  To this, the process of racialization that I have discussed thus far is 
important.  Expanding the category of White to include European Immigrants and the 
exclusion of other immigrants created markedly different experiences of immigration. 
After all, it was not until 1965 that all references to race were removed from the 
Immigration and Nationality Act. Finally, the “bootstrap” model and victim-blaming 
aspect of the model is most problematic because it avoids examination of structural 
and institutional barriers to equality to focus on individual failings.  
     As mentioned previously, the ethnicity model ushered in a brand of essentialized 
identity politics commonly found in the nation model of racialization. The nation-
model of racialization tends to emphasize the differences that exist between racial and 
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ethnic groups by way of culture, language, histories, and other distinguishing 
characteristics. 
As a frame, the nation-based model views the process of racialization as a complex 
series of occurrences rooted in the dynamics of colonialism.  
     The nation-based theory argues that racial dynamics and the racialization of 
groups can be understood through exploring the dynamics of colonialism and the 
relationship between the colonized and the colonizer. Colonialism, defined for our 
purposes as the exploitation of one group by another to the maximization or benefit of 
the former. By the late 1800s all nations and territories had been assigned a place in 
the global world order with Europe ranking at the crest of the hierarchy. In the nation-
based frame, racialization processes and dynamics are understood as the outcome of 
colonialism and as a result extend beyond national boundaries.47  
     Unlike the ethnicity approach, the nation-based theory explores factors such as 
historic inequalities; structural and institutional barriers; territorial and institutional 
segregation; political disenfranchisement and the legacy of colonial order in post-
colonial societies (Omi and Winant, 1989). All of which can be seen as contributing 
to the racialization of groups in the public sphere. As a result, racialization becomes 
the result of unequal and stratified power relations developed over time whereby 
racial group identity is embedded in struggles for self-definition and determination.  
     In the United States, for example, the ability of Europeans to colonize Native 
Americans through land appropriation and to enslave Africans set in motion specific 
racialization processes that defined national boundaries and laws. In fact, it was not 
                                                
47 ibid 
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until 186648 and 1924,49 respectively that Blacks and Native Americans were 
considered citizens of the state. Connectedly, by racially coding laws and institutions, 
the racialization process and the exercise of political freedom becomes intimately 
linked to racial identity. As Lopez (1996) notes, from the country’s inception the laws 
of citizenship and who could or could not become a citizen were tainted by racial bias 
and/or exclusion.  
     A significant component of the nation-based theory is the critical rejection of the 
assimilationist and integrationist tone of the ethnicity-based paradigm. In line with 
leading theories of group consciousness there is a deep rejection of the explanation of 
the group’s social condition or status rooted in individual failings. Moreover, there is 
a belief among the group that there is an unfair distribution of power within structures 
and institutions present in society and collective action will remedy these problems 
(Wilcox 1989).  
     Rather than assimilate (dissolution of group identity) or integrate into the core, the 
nation frame proposes the idea of a “nation within a nation” whereby racial identity 
groups are able define their own culture without regard for dominant cultural 
narratives or pressures.  The Black Nationalist and Pan-Africanism Movement of the 
1970s and the Tribal Sovereignty Movement50 led by Native-Americans are two 
                                                
48 In 1866, after the Civil War, the Dred Scott decision was invalidated and the civil 
Rights Act of 1866 was passed, which held that all persons born in the United 
States…are declared to be citizens of the United States. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 
U.S. (19 How.) 383 (1857) Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 
49 Prior to 1924, Native-Americans were awarded citizenship tribe by tribe. The Act 
of June 2, 1924, ch 233, 43 Stat. 253 conferred citizenship on all Native Americans in 
the United States.  
50 For a more thorough discussion on the Tribal Rights Movement in the United 
States see Charles Wilkinson’s Blood Struggle: The Rise of the Modern Indian 
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examples of this notion of a nation within a nation. Both movements sought to bring 
attention to the historic inequalities and injustices experienced by both groups and in 
the end rejected the idea that they could depend on the state for remedies or redress.51 
      Next, the distinction between the core and the periphery is key to the nation-based 
lens of racialization. The core, defined as the dominant group and the periphery as 
those situated on the margins or outside of the core, create tension and political 
struggle. On the part of the periphery, there is a constant questioning of the authority 
and legitimacy of the core in terms of cultural, moral, and political superiority. Within 
the U.S. context, struggles between the core and periphery tend to play themselves 
out in the form of identity-based movements where groups mobilize around a set of 
common experiences to address perceived social injustice.  
     As Omi and Winant (1994) note, the nation-based theory never took hold in the 
same way that the ethnicity and class frameworks did. While the frame succeeded in 
bringing necessary attention to the importance of structural and institutional barriers 
to racialization processes as well as the fundamental role of colonization in racial 
identity formation, it failed to demonstrate or theorize how one nation could exist 
within an already established nation.  Further, it never accounted for how one would 
resolve the issue of nation or race contact, if and when new nations were established.  
     Another significant drawback of the nation frame is the rigid definition of nation 
employed by some groups. The definition of nation tended to be narrow and based on 
                                                                                                                                      
Nation. (2005) In Blood Struggle, Wilkinson eloquently writes of the struggle of 
Native American to achieve tribal sovereignty.  He recounts tribal victories in major 
conflicts including Indian land claims in Maine, the "salmon wars" of the Pacific 
Northwest, the return of Blue Lake to the Taos Pueblo, and the establishment of tribal 
casinos as a way of making inroads into poverty.  
51 See also Wendy Brown’s Finding the Man in the State in States of Injury (1995). 
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some sort of common culture, values, and beliefs. However, the definition of group 
member often relied on values borrowed from the dominant culture and tended 
exclude some members.  
     For example, within the framework of Black Nationalism, the definition of nation 
is racially defined and roles of Black men and women are based on normative, 
western standards of behavior and interactions. Equality or social redress was often 
equated with Black Manhood and the redemption of Black masculinity (Marable 
2000, Oyewumi 1999, hooks 1981).  The Million Man March of 1995 is a prime 
illustration of the problem posed by nation-based theories of racialization. The March 
called for a day of atonement for the absence, in too many cases, of the Black male as 
the head of the household, positive role model, and builder of the community. Louis 
Farrakhan, the march convener urged Black Men to return to their “homes” and 
reclaim their place as the head of the household and emphasized the need for Blacks 
to assume “personal responsibility” for their own circumstances. He advised Black 
women, particularly mothers, to be with “our” children teaching them the value of 
home, self-esteem, family and unity…(Farrakhan, 1995). The narrow construction of 
nation and Blackness alienated a significant segment of the “Black community,” 
mainly women, and Black Gays and Lesbians. 
     In terms of my project, what is salvageable in the nation-frame is the critical 
understanding of the role of institutions and structures in racial formation processes in 
modern democracies. Like Critical Race Theory, the nation-based framework 
explores the advantages gained through historic exclusion and the denial of rights 
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made possible by way of national institutions and structures codified by laws. It also 
sheds light on the role of colonization on racial dynamics and formation globally.  
     The literature focusing on class-based frameworks of racialization is vast. The 
class-based theory of racial formation includes approaches that argue that social 
divisions can be explained chiefly through economic structures and processes (Hall 
2002, Omi-Winant 1994) Hence, racialization processes can be attributed or 
explained by reference to economic structures. Within the class-based discussions of 
racial formation there are three approaches that are paramount: The market relations 
approach; class conflict theory; and stratification theory. For the sake of brevity and 
the purposes of our discussion, I will focus my efforts on stratification theory.  
     Structural in nature, stratification theory stresses the significance of life chances, 
which Weber (1930) argues is a consequence of three dimensions of stratification: 
Social class (based in economic relationships to the market), status class (associated 
with non-economic qualities such as education, honour, and prestige, and party class 
(consisting of affiliations in the political domain). Within the context of racial 
formation, these dimensions are historically constituted and produce social meaning 
and relevance that in turn provide racialized meaning to group economic positioning 
in modern democracies.  For example, the economic system of slavery not only 
shaped the “polity,” but also racialized groups through the law and in the public 
sphere (Wilson 1978).  
     Further, the theory argues that individuals with similar life chances, meaning 
roughly equal incomes, equal qualities of wealth, and equal status should fare the 
same in modern democracies. As a result, individuals are assigned to groups based on 
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economic positioning in “status order” rather than racial identity group. Thus, 
emerging a hierarchy of classes, which Weber postulates as Upper Class, Middle 
Class, Working Class, and Poor. Degrees of access and mobility are formulated 
among the ranks of the hierarchy. Simply put, the higher one’s position on the 
hierarchy the more opportunities, mobility, and access one has in relation to an 
individual positioned lower in the social hierarchy. The issue with this is that very 
little consideration is given to the historic experiences of racial identity groups in 
society whereby Blacks, Latinos, Native Americans, and others groups have been 
systematically denied access to resources and equal participation in the marketplace. 
For example, in the pre-industrial period, the slave-based plantation economy allowed 
a small group of elite planters to capture enormous regional and economic power. 
This power was transferred to political and legal institutions of the day to ensure 
continued economic control and power. As Wilson notes, the economy provided the 
basis for the development of the system of slavery and the polity [the citizens] 
reinforced and perpetuated the system. As in liberal democratic theory, political 
affiliation, mobilization, and participation are crucial to stratification theory in the 
guise of relationship between classes; the dynamics of political rule or authority; and 
struggles for recognition and re-distribution of wealth and resources. 
     In The Declining Significance of Race (1978), sociologist William Julius Wilson 
employs stratification theory to explain contemporary racial dynamics in the post 
civil rights era, the period following the passage of the Civil Right Act of 1964. 
Briefly, Wilson argues while race was a salient and important marker in terms of 
social organization during the pre-industrial and industrial periods, in the modern 
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industrial period the experiences of social advantage can be more closely linked with 
economic class (Wilson, 1978). Further, he goes on to assert, in modern democracies, 
the state has developed a fair degree of autonomy in handling racial problems. Pre-
1965 Blacks life chances were determined by racial stratification. However, Post-
1965, this was no longer the case.  
     He goes on to argue, that after state-enforced racial inequality was eliminated by 
civil rights legislation, Blacks were no longer defined by their racial caste,52 but 
allowed access to the same system-wide stratification as Whites. What Wilson had 
not considered was the cumulative advantages that had been gained by Whites 
through long-standing and historic exclusion of Blacks and others from social 
institutions critical to determining and shaping one’s life chances. Nor did he take 
into account the level of resistance Blacks and others would encounter in their 
attempts to exercise their rights. As Lipsitz (1998) points out, at every stage since the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act, Whites have responded with coordinated collective 
politics characterized by resistance, refusal, and renegotiation.  
      Another significant component of Wilson’s argument is the creation of a 
prominent, but small group of Black elites or middle class whose life chances are 
more determined by class status than by racial identity. This group, he argues, is 
similar to Whites of the same class status. Consequently, the Black underclass is a 
result of individual failings and not result of racial bias or discrimination.  Implicit 
and underpinning Wilson’s argument is a tinge of the “bootstrap mentality” and 
                                                
52 See Mae King, 1975. In Oppression and Power: The Unique Status of Black 
Women in the American Political System, she argues that Blacks make up a caste and 
within the hierarchical order, skin color is what determines one’s caste or place within 
the society.  
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“victim-blaming” characteristic of the ethnicity framework. Very little attention is 
paid to the fact the achievements and gains of a small group of Blacks is the result of 
a massive group struggle and mobilization efforts that included poor and working 
class Blacks as well. In this sense, “the Black middle class remains tied to the lower 
class through racial dynamics which are structured through the U.S. economy, 
culture, and politics (Omi and Winant, 1994).” 
     The class-stratification model of racialization processes asserts that racial 
formation and racialization processes can be negotiated and understood through an 
economic lens that attempts to balance inequalities that are a result of historical 
economic relationships that have been created over time.  
     Nation-based, ethnicity-based, and class-based theories of racialization processes 
are not mutually exclusive. As Omi and Winant (1994) point out, none of these 
paradigms can stand alone. There is necessary overlapping among them. In terms of 
advancing a complex theory of rights, the relationship between the three frameworks 
are used to demonstrate the intersecting nature of nation, ethnicity, and class 
approaches to understanding complex social structures and institutions.  
    Finally, I would like to spend some time in consideration of racial formation theory 
as articulated by Omi and Winant in Racial Formation in the United States. In Racial 
Formation, Omi and Winant argue that the nation-based, ethnicity-based, and class-
based paradigms all engage race on their own terms rather than view race as an 
approach in and of itself shaped by the socio-historical processes by which racial 
categories are “created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed.”  
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     Omi and Winant assert that racial formation is a process of historically situated 
projects in which human bodies and social structures are represented and organized. 
This point is strengthened by critical race scholar Henry Lopez (1996) who notes that 
races do not exist as detached entities, but as amalgamations of people standing in 
complex relationships with other such groups. In this sense, race formation and 
racialization processes must be contextualized and understood relationally to 
geographic location; political institutions and structures present in society; and the 
historic conditions under which groups and individuals become classified.  
     Essential to racial formation theory is the inclusion of hegemony as a critical 
component of understanding racialization processes. For Omi and Winant, hegemony, 
the way in which society is structured and organized, helps us to understand “the 
nature of racism, the relationship of race to other forms of difference such as sexism 
and nationalism, and the dilemmas posed by racial identity contemporaneously.” 
     I would like to extend this a bit further by noting that hegemony not only allows 
room to negotiate past and present racial identity concerns, but reveals in the words of 
Antonio Gramsci (1929), the power of the dominant group to define reality and 
culture, whereby the perspective becomes skewed to favor those with the most 
amount of power in society.  The dominant perspective is considered good, 
normative, or proper, and comes be seen as real and as always existing. As feminist 
scholar Chris Weedon (1997) notes, not all discourse [perspectives] have the social 
power which comes from a secure institutional and [structural] location. The degree 
to which marginalized [perspectives] can increase their social power is governed by 
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wider contexts of social interest and power within which challenges to the dominant 
culture are made.  
     From a racial formation perspective, racialization occurs “through a linkage 
between structure and representation (Omi and Winant 1994).” This linkage is 
revealed through racial projects, which are interpretations, representations, or 
explanations of racial dynamics, and efforts on multiple levels to reorganize and 
redistribute resources among racial lines. Racial projects contextualize the meaning of 
race within particular discursive practices to better grasp the ways in which both 
social structures and everyday experiences are racially organized.  
     Racial formation Theory gives a significant amount of weight to the power of 
social structures and institutions to shape meanings of race, racial classification 
systems, and individual experiences of racial identity. Institutions and structures work 
at the micro and macro levels to maintain or reify racial hierarchies. In this sense, it is 
important to consider the political, economic, representational, and legal dimensions 
of racial formation and its impact on the realization of rights in modern democracies.  
     In examining California Ballot referendum Proposition 54, I rely heavily on the 
Racial Formation approach put forth by Omi and Winant because I believe it provides 
the most thorough account of the role of institutions and structures in shaping groups 
and individual’s sense of fairness and equality; the distribution of wealth and 
resources in society; and the influence of cultural and social representations on public 
policy outcomes at the federal and state levels.   
     To extend the framework and to provide context for the discussion on the 
realization of rights and equality in modern democracies, I employ a Complex Theory 
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of Rights to argue that the outcome of Proposition 54 is, in part, recognition that 
despite formal equality and state intervention, equal access and equality remains 
elusive for some groups and individuals. Further, lack of equal access and equality is 
a result of multiple factors, including, but not limited to social institutions and 
structures, but also representations of groups in society through the media, texts, and 
images; economic mobility and access; and the laws created to maintain hegemony 
and dominant social order.  
 
 RACE AND RIGHTS IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 
 
“You do not take a person who for years has been hobbled by chains 
and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then 
say, ‘you’re free to compete with all the others,’ and still believe that 
you have been completely fair. Thus, it is not enough to open the gates 
of opportunity. All our citizens must have the ability to walk through 
those gates,”  
--President Johnson, Harvard University Commencement Address, 
1965 
 
As long as race counts in America, we will count race in America. 
     --Julian Bond, Chair NAACP  
 
…An overwhelming majority of Americans embraced the vision of 
President John F. Kennedy when he said, “Race has no place in 
American life or law.” The initiative we are discussing today seeks to 
move California a step closer to fulfillment of Kennedy’s vision. 
Contrary to how it is portrayed by some, this initiative is not an 
extreme measure. It is a tempered, moderate approach to reduce the 
influence and obsession that our society has with race.  
--Ward Connerly, Statement to the UC Board of Regents on Proposition 54 
 
     The mixture of race and rights has always presented like an oxymoron in modern 
democracies. By this I mean to imply that race and racial classification systems often 
stand in direct opposition to the fundamental assumptions of liberal democratic 
theory; namely the idea that individuals regardless of race or other markers of 
difference enjoy the same basic rights and privileges in society and through laws, 
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legislation, and public polices and are free to pursue his or her own ends without 
interference from the state or others. The problem with this is that racial classification 
systems present in liberal democracies are historically and inherently unequal, thus 
making it all but impossible for racial and ethnic minority groups to realize their full 
bundle of rights in modern democracies.  
     In the case of proposition 54, the struggle to fuse the normative ideals of liberal 
democratic theory with the pragmatic reality and experiences of racial and ethnic 
minorities highlights the challenges and barriers to realizing rights in modern 
democracies despite legislative and legal gains codified in the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and set of policies and programs that collectively came to be known as 
Affirmative Action.53 
     The simultaneous denial and recognition of race by proponents and those in 
opposition respectively, point to the need to explore the continued significance of 
race to the realization of rights in modern democracies. In this section, I use ballot 
initiative proposition 54 to argue that racial identity plays a critical role in the 
attainment of rights and the exercise of freedom in modern democracies.  
Context and Background 
     In the last decade, the state of California has served as a testing ground for many 
of the racially charged issues of the country like affirmative action, immigration, and 
bilingual education.  In fact, the mid-1990s saw the passing of legislation that ended 
state-sponsored affirmative action in hiring and public universities (proposition 209); 
                                                
53 As Manning Marable (2002) points out, Affirmative Action was not a law or even a 
coherent set of government policies, rather it was a series of Executive Orders, civil 
rights laws, and governmental programs regarding the awarding of federal contracts 
and fair employment practices designed to level the playing field.  
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the end of the use of bilingual education in public schools (proposition 227) and the 
denial of public aid to undocumented immigrants (proposition 187). The passage of 
these historic pieces of legislation depended heavily on the votes of Whites54 and in 
order to be defeated almost 100% of minority voters would have had to turn out to the 
polls.  
     Studies indicate election outcomes with regard to propositions 187, 209, and 227 
were closely tied to race, geographic location, and assembly district (Ramirez 2002; 
Hajnal and Louch 2001).  For example, Tolbert and Hero (1996) demonstrate that 
support for proposition 187 was most prominent in counties with significant numbers 
of racial and ethnic minorities. Similarly, Ramirez (2002) finds that white public 
opinion regarding proposition 209, the anti-affirmative action legislation, was shaped 
by the demographic diversity in the districts where they lived and whether or not their 
assembly was in close proximity to majority-minority districts.  
      California local and state politics has become synonymous with racial and ethnic 
politics (Barreto and Ramirez 2005). In the 2001 Los Angeles Mayoral election, for 
example, the promise of an African-American police chief turned out Black voters for 
Gray Davis while support for an imprisoned Latino drug dealer hurt the chances of 
the Latino Candidate by alienating moderate White Voters.   
     Connectedly, in 2003, the prominence of race and racial identity in the recall 
election was noticeable.  Disappointment across race and ethnic lines with then 
                                                
54 See Ronald Walters’ White Nationalism, Black Interests (2003) where he deftly 
notes “at the beginning of the twenty-first century, we are living in an era when a 
dominant sector of the White Majority seems to have lost confidence in the promise 
of America as a liberal democratic state and has been recoiling from this vision. 
Instead, the White Majority is proceeding to concentrate economic and social power 
within its group, using its control over political institutions of the state. 
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Governor Gray Davis prompted the election and the candidates for his replacement 
resembled a rainbow of racial and ethnic diversity. In the free for all that became the 
California recall election; conservative Ward Connerly seized the opportunity to place 
the Racial Privacy Initiative known as proposition 54 on the ballot. Banking on the 
large Republican turnout to oust Davis, the proposition would finish the work that had 
been initiated by proposition 209 which banned affirmative action in state.  
     Proposition 54 emerged within a national political context fraught with angst over 
race and the significance of racial identity to rights and privileges in society. “The 
liberal vision of the country that resulted in the civil rights laws of the 1960s and 
1970s (Walters 2003), and many of the policies collectively referred to as Affirmative 
Action, was now being chipped away and or challenged at the local, state, and 
national levels by conservatives.55 The gains of Conservatives in every level of 
government from the White House down to State legislatures created a political 
environment hostile towards difference and the goals and ideals captured during the 
Civil Rights Movement. Further, in line with individual liberalism, conservatives 
strategically maneuvered to frame race as an issue of privacy or argued that to take 
race into consideration in hiring or education was to give preferential treatment to 
racial and ethnic minorities. In the state of California, the recall election presented the 
perfect opportunity to push through a referendum like Proposition 54 for two reasons: 
(1) There was much distraction and media focus on the gubernatorial race, thus 
decreasing the likelihood that individuals, citizens and community organizers alike, 
would have focused on defeating the initiative until it was too late. In fact, in polls 
                                                
55 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)  
 77 
leading up to the election less than 30% of voters had heard of the Racial Privacy 
Initiative;56 and (2) the dissatisfaction with democratic governor Gray Davis ensured 
a high republican turnout for the election.  
Race-baiting and the Recall Election 
       In the recall election, race was used to strengthen and weaken credibility in a way 
uncharacteristic of racial identity politics. For example, then Lieutenant Governor 
Cruz Bustamante was accused of membership in a “racist” organization. Upon 
examination, the purported racist organization turned out to be MeChA, a Latino 
student group that promotes Mexican-American awareness and is open to anyone. 
Bustamante’s Republican opponent argued that he had a hidden Latino agenda that 
would exclude Whites. Similarly, Native Americans who held high positions in the 
state government were accused of currying favor with Democratic leaders and as a 
result were not paying their fair share in taxes. The ads around propositions related to 
Native-American casinos insinuated that by not “paying their fair share of taxes” 
because of preferential treatment Native Americans were the cause of the state’s 
financial crisis (Barreto and Ramirez 2005).  
     The racial identity and background of the gubernatorial candidates was key in the 
recall election with four out of five publicly identifying as immigrants or children of 
immigrants. In the media, the racial and ethnic background was used to portray the 
“positive aspect of the immigrant work ethic” as embodying the American Dream. 
This, however, stands in sharp contrast to the public debates and perceptions around 
immigration in the state during the time of the recall election where many argued that 
                                                
56 For more information see, Plurality Still Favors Prop. 54 But Margin of Support 
Narrows by Mark DiCamillo and Mervin Field. August 2003.  
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illegal immigrants “were stealing and committing a crime” by being in the state.57 As 
conservative commentator Jane Chastain (2003) notes, “Breaking and entering 
remains a crime in your state.” However, once someone breaks into your home, you 
are responsible for taking care of the person for the rest of his or her life.” Chastain 
equates the border as the home of the American citizens and immigrants as criminals 
who are breaking into the home and asking to be taken care of. The contradictions 
between the representations of immigrants in the public sphere as simultaneously a 
burden as well as a relief is crucial in terms of the realization of rights in modern 
democracies. To the extent that there is a disconnect in the understanding of the role 
of immigrants in the state, the likelihood is high that public perception or 
representation of immigrants will continue to drive public policy outcomes.  
     In California, the meaning of racism has been distorted or maligned. Conservatives 
and in some cases, liberals have come to understand racism to mean the alleged 
preferential treatment of one group over another regardless of race, status, power, or 
history of past discrimination or unequal treatment. Employing this definition, 
Latinos, Native-Americans, Blacks, Asians who advocate for their interests, rights 
previously denied to them, or redress for past discrimination can be considered racist. 
Never mind that the living conditions and social status of these groups in many 
instances does not yield any of the real social or political power often associated with 
Whites.  
     Further, this definition of racism has fueled many of the race-focused public 
policies in the State, the latest in a string being Proposition 54. California Board 
                                                
57 Also see advertisement campaigns for proposition 187, the anti-immigrant 
legislation that portrayed Latinos illegally crossing the border. 
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Regent, Ward Connerly using the definition above, relying on public representations 
of race, and using the rhetoric of the civil rights movement was able to mobilize 
voters first in the passage of proposition 209 and second with Proposition 54.  
Race-ing the State of California 
     California is one of the most diverse states in the Union with the 2000 Census 
reporting among the majority of Californians, 53% identified as non-White. Over the 
last twenty years, the state has experienced large growth in its non-White population, 
particularly Asians and Latinos (Lopez 2002). In fact, during the 1980s the state had 
higher rates for its Asian, Latino, and Black populations than the U.S. overall. 
Conversely, over the last twenty years, the percentage of Whites in California has 
declined. In general, as Lopez points out, Los Angeles has the smallest percentage of 
Whites, and the Eastern Mountains and Northern Regions of the state have had the 
largest percentages.  
     The racial and demographic composition of California as well as the fact that it is 
a majority people of color state provides a unique opportunity for understanding the 
significance of race to the realization of rights in modern democracies. It could be 
hypothesized that high numbers of racial and ethnic minorities present in the state 
would lead to higher levels of political participation which would in turn translate 
into direct social and material benefits like lower rates of poverty, quality schools, 
and pro racial and ethnic minority or immigrant public policies. However, this has not 
been the case. Despite the racial and ethnic demographic composition of the state, 
California has witnessed a backlash against immigrants and racial and ethnic 
minorities that is characterized by restrictive and racist public policies like 
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proposition 187, proposition 209, and proposition 54 that seek to ease the racial 
anxiety of Whites caused by the shift in demographics over the last twenty years.  
     Restrictive public policies create institutional and structural barriers for racial and 
ethnic minorities to realizing their full bundle of rights in the state and maintain 
unequal power relationships. Further, public policy outcomes are a result of the 
perception of the social or economic well being of the group, rather than the reality. 
For example, although Whites make up the minority in the state, they make up 40 out 
of 53 members of the House of Representatives. However, the public perception is 
that a large number of racial and ethnic minorities enjoy political power in the state. 
For the purposes of this discussion, I will focus on poverty, education, health, and the 
criminal legal system to demonstrate the impact of race on the realization of rights in 
state of California. 
     According to the 2000 Census, 14.2 percent of Californians live below the poverty 
line set by the federal government,58 a slightly higher rate than the overall U.S., 
12.4%.  Despite declines in the poverty rate nationally since 1990, California’s rate 
has increased by 2%. When race is taken into consideration, poverty rates in the State 
are highest among American Indians, Blacks, Latinos, and people identified on the 
census as some other race. In the State, those identifying as some other race had the 
highest rate of poverty at 24.0%, followed by Blacks at 22.4%, Latinos at 22.1, and 
American Indians at 21.9%.  Poverty rates were lowest for Whites (7.8%) and 
Asian/Pacific Islanders (12.9%).  
                                                
58 According to the Department of Health and Human Services the federal poverty 
level for a family of four is $18,850.00. The federal poverty threshold/lines helps to 
determine eligibility for government aid and programs for families. Source: Federal 
Register, Vol. 69, No. 30, February 13, 2004, pp. 7336-7338. 
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     Regionally, poverty rates are highest in the Central Valley with 20.5% of the 
residents living below the federal poverty line, Los Angeles (17.9) and Northern 
Regions of the state at 16.9%. The lowest levels of poverty by region are found in the 
San Francisco Bay Area (8.6), Sacramento Metropolitan (12.7%), Coastal (11.7), and 
the Eastern Mountain at 11.6%.  It is important to note that in the regions with the 
lowest poverty rates, they also have the lowest levels of racial and ethnic minority 
populations. Conversely, in regions with high levels of poverty, the percentage of 
racial and ethnic minorities is high.  
     In terms of poverty in the state of California, there is a strong correlation between 
one’s racial and ethnic background and the likelihood one will live in poverty. In the 
public sphere and in relationship to rights, poverty directly impacts one’s quality of 
life and life chances. Within the frame of a complex theory of rights, the intersections 
of race and class highlights the economic meta-space that pays close attention to the 
distribution of wealth and resources in societies; the individual’s or groups access to 
information; and the impact of social class on an individual’s access to resources. The 
economic meta-space explores how one’s class position directly impacts an 
individual’s ability to attain rights and material resources; access information and 
resources; employment opportunities and potential for advancement in society.  
     In terms of education, in the state of California, there is a dramatic concentration 
of the worst conditions of schools attended primarily by low-income children, 
African-American and Latino Children, and English Language Learners. In a state-
wide survey, schools with a high percentage of racial and ethnic minority students 
were 11 times more likely to employ under-credentialed teachers, 40% more likely to 
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be negative on textbooks or instructional materials, and 3.3 times more likely to 
report teacher turnover as a serious problem.59 Relatedly, on average Whites and 
Asians attend higher quality schools where about half of the students score above the 
national median on the math exam of the Stanford Achievement Test. Conversely, 
Blacks and Latinos are in schools where only about 35% of students score this well. 
     Racial and ethnic disparities were also present in the drop-out and number of high 
school graduates who go on to attend college. The dropout rates for Native American, 
Latino, and Black students were twice as high as the dropout rate for White students. 
With regard to college enrollment for the same period, although blacks represented 
7.3% of high school graduates in the state, only 3.3% of students enrolled in 
California colleges and Universities were Black.  
     Lastly, in a recent suit filed against the state on the 46th anniversary of Brown v. 
Board of Education concerning the disparities in condition of public schools with 
high populations of racial and ethnic minorities, plaintiffs point to the fact that 
students from five classes share on set of Spanish textbooks, students lack desks, and 
teachers must pay for gas for field trips out of the their pocket the suit alleges.  
      If we look towards an explanation rooted in a complex theory of rights and 
employ the institutional meta-space to provide a more comprehensive understanding 
of the disparities experienced by racial and ethnic minority students in the state, we 
can see that the dynamics at play extend further than the simple interaction between 
the state and the individual. The institutional meta-space focuses on the impact on 
                                                
59 See Report on the Status of Public School Education in California 2004 with 
Special Emphasis on the Status of Equality in Public School Education by Louis 
Harris. 
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institutions on the individual in the group. It highlights how institutions present in 
society restrict, limit, or deny access to resources to marginalized groups. Institutional 
discrimination and barriers are harmful because they are virtually invisible or hidden 
in society. It is essentially the “rules of the game” and either you know the rules or 
you don’t. It may maintain systems of privilege and hierarchies in society. 
     In the case of the disparities experienced by racial and ethnic minority students, 
their disadvantages hinges on inequalities embedded in the institutions and structures 
that govern society that have happened over time. And despite formal legislation such 
as Board v. Education, inequalities still persist.  
     Further, knowing or not knowing the “rules of the game” is very important in 
terms of the realization of rights in modern democracies. Because the rules of the 
game are not always explicit and for groups who have not been able to participate 
because of exclusion or because of laws prohibiting them to do so, they are at a 
particular disadvantage compared to the dominant group.  
     Let me provide a ready example of what I am trying to get at in the guise of a 
poker game. Say there’s a group of people who have been getting together for several 
years to play poker and over those several years they have established the rules of 
engagement and gained quite a bit of wealth through playing. One day, I am invited 
to play. I arrive to the table and I notice that I am not prepared; I don’t know the rules 
and as I look around the table and I notice my stack of chips is significantly smaller 
than the stack of others around the table. Rather than take the time to explain the 
rules, they start to deal the cards. Over the course of the game, I lose my chips 
because I’m trying to play and learn the rules at the same time.  
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     With regard to race and health outcomes for the state, the infant mortality for 
Black infants in state is two times that of White infants60.  When broken down by zip 
code, the highest number of infant deaths in the first year of life where in 
neighborhoods occupied by Blacks and Latinos with the worst infant mortality rate 
covering the Crenshaw neighborhood of South Central Los Angeles. In this 
neighborhood, Babies died at a rate of 13.8 for every 1,000 births more than double 
the state average of 6.1%. The high infant mortality rate and poor health outcomes 
can be contributed to concentrated levels of poverty, environmental pollution, and the 
stress of urban living. It is important to note, that Whites occupied areas and 
neighborhoods with the least number of infant deaths at an average of 3.7 per 1,000 
live births in the wealthiest counties in the State.61  
     Lastly, the rates of incarceration and arrest in the state of California are directly 
correlated to race. For the purposes of my project, I will use the Three Strike’s Law, 
passed in 1994 to highlight the ways in which race have become embedded in 
institutions and structures that govern society and ultimately restrict individual rights. 
The Three Strike Law holds that if an individual is convicted of three felonies there is 
strong possibility that he or she could end up with a term of twenty-five years to life.  
     On its face, the law appears to be unaffected by race. However, its implementation 
demonstrates otherwise. An analysis of California Department of Corrections’ data 
shows that Blacks and Latinos are imprisoned under the Three Strikes Law at far 
higher rates than Whites by nearly 25%. According to a study issued by Justice Policy 
Institute (2004), in the state of California, Blacks make up 6.5% of the total 
                                                
60 State of California Health and Human Services Statistics Report 2001 
61 ibid 
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population, but they make up nearly 30% of the prison population, 36% of second 
strikers, and 45% of third strikers. Similarly, although Latinos comprise 32.6% of the 
population in California, almost 36% of the prison population is Latino and 32.6% are 
Strikers. In sharp contrast, while Whites make up 47% of California’s population, 
only 29% of the prison population is White, as is 26% of second strikers, and 25.4% 
of Third Strikers.  
     The high level of incarceration of Blacks and Latinos in the state is a prime 
illustration of the political meta-space at the intersection of race and the criminal legal 
system. The political meta-space refers to the structures and systems of laws and 
policies that govern individuals in societies. It focuses on the impact of laws, the 
criminal legal system, public policies, and the state in shaping the individual’s or 
group sense of fairness, equality, and justice in society. The political meta-space 
highlights how laws and public policies are shaped and informed by dominant 
cultural perspectives of race, class, gender, ethnicity, age, ability, or sexual 
orientation. 
     In the case of the California Three Strikes law, it disproportionately affects racial 
and ethnic minorities, not because of its design, but because of its implementation in 
the public sphere. Further, practices in the public sphere like racial profiling and the 
dominant representations or perceptions of Black and Latino men in the Media as 
criminals and deviants also contribute to the overrepresentation of racial and ethnic 
minorities in the criminal legal system.    
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RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE STATE 
     In the Wake of proposition 54, race discrimination and race relations was still a 
relevant issue for voters in the state of California. In a statewide survey conducted by 
the Tomas Rivera Institute,62 over 50% of those surveyed believed racial 
discrimination was still an important issue.  56% of Whites interviewed believed race 
was a significant issue and 34% believed race relations were improving in the state. 
Among racial and ethnic minorities, the numbers were significantly higher. Among 
Blacks and Latinos, over 80% believed race discrimination was still an issue. 86% of 
Blacks agreed the issue of racial discrimination was important and only 24% believed 
that race relations was improving.  Similarly, 80% of Latinos surveyed agreed racial 
discrimination was a very important issue, and like Blacks only 24% believed that 
race relations were improving. Among Latinos, 27% believed that race relations had 
worsened. While Asians agreed in larger numbers than Whites that racial 
discrimination was still an issue, the numbers were significantly lower than Blacks or 
Latinos at 68%.  Further, the percentage of Asian surveyed who believed race 
relations were improving was almost double that of Blacks and Latinos at 44%. Of all 
groups surveyed, Blacks were most pessimistic above the improvements of racial 
relations in the state.  
     When asked about individual and familial experiences of racial discrimination 
78% of Whites surveyed answered that they had never experienced racial 
                                                
62 The survey was designed and conducted by a partnership of four organizations: the 
Institute for Justice and Journalism, Pew Hispanic Research Center, New California 
Media, and the Tomas Rivera Policy Institute. The survey contacted 1,608 registered 
voters between September 6-16, 2003.  
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discrimination compared to 52% of Blacks, 59% of Latinos, and 57% of Asians. It is 
important to note that 18% of Whites interviewed believed that they had been victims 
of racial discrimination. For blacks and Whites, there is a direct correlation between 
one’s experience of racial discrimination at the individual and family level and one’s 
opinion of race relations in the state. Blacks tended to view experiences of racial 
discrimination as evidence that race relations were worsening and Whites tended to 
view their lack of experience of direct racial discrimination as evidence that race 
relations had not worsened. Among Latinos and Asians, there is no direct correlation. 
 
Question: How important is the issue of racial discrimination?63 
 Whites Asian Latino Black 
Very important 56% 68% 80% 86% 
Somewhat 32% 21% 14% 9% 
Not at all 8 7% 4% 4% 
 
Question: Have you or family experienced racial discrimination 
 White Asian Latino Black 
Yes 18% 39% 40% 44% 
No 78% 57% 59% 52% 
 
Question: Race relations in California 
 White Asian  Latino Black 
Improving 34% 44% 44% 24% 
Worsening 16% 4% 10% 27% 
Staying Same 41% 42% 42% 44% 
Don’t know 9% 10% 4% 4% 
 
 
     The overall position that racial discrimination was still an issue in the state helped 
to defeat proposition 54. Further, in relation to proposition 54 and those propositions 
preceding it, race was in the public sphere and carried significant weight in terms of 
the realization of rights by individuals and groups. Statistics in the state demonstrate 
                                                
63 ibid 
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that economic well being, health outcomes, education, and housing are all intimately 
tied to race despite formal intervention by the state to ensure that discrimination 
based on race or any other marker of difference does not occur.  
Before Proposition 54: The End of Affirmative Action in the State 
     Before turning my focus to proposition 54, I would like to spend some time in 
consideration of proposition 209 often referred to as the big brother of proposition 54. 
Proposition 209 also known as the California Civil Rights Initiative was intended to 
end Affirmative Action in California’s government hiring, public school admissions, 
and public contracting by eliminating preferential treatment on the basis of race, sex, 
color, ethnicity, or national origin. I believe a thorough discussion of Proposition 209 
and affirmative action is important because it provides state and national level context 
for Proposition 54.64  
     Proponents of the initiative argued, “special interests hijacked the civil rights 
movement. Instead of equality, governments imposed quotas, preferences and set-
asides.”65 In fact, they argued that proposition 209 would move us toward the color-
blind society so envisioned by Civil Rights leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr., 
Thurgood Marshall, and President John F. Kennedy and embodied in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 by affirming that “The state shall not discriminate against or grant 
preferential treatment to, any group, on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or 
national origin.”  
                                                
64 The reason why I chose to focus my case on Proposition 54 is that unlike 
Proposition 209, it directly challenged the idea that racial was not a significant 
predictor of the realization of rights, quality of life, or life chances in the modern 
democratic state. Proposition 209 focused on ideas of preferential treatment and 
reverse discrimination.  
65 vote96.ss.ca.gov/vote96/html/BP/209yesarg.htm 
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     To make their case, supporters of proposition 209 pulled on the idea of reverse 
discrimination and tapped into the anger and anxiety of whites that believed that they 
had lost a job, status, contract, or position to racial and ethnic minorities or women.  
They argued that students were being denied admission from public universities 
based on race and state contracts were being awarded to individuals based on race or 
gender. The subtext to all of this is that Blacks, other racial and ethnic minorities, or 
women were unqualified or under qualified to attend these schools in the first place or 
undeserving of public contracts. This underlying assumption proved effective because 
on the one hand it mobilized Whites who believed that they were being discriminated 
against on the basis of race or gender and racial and ethnic minorities who believed 
they could compete with Whites and that race or gender had very little influence on 
one’s life chances.  
     What was interesting about the framing of the initiative was that fact that it rarely 
mentioned who was bearing the brunt of this “reverse discrimination”. In the 
literature in support of the initiative the specific race or gender of the individual is 
never mentioned. However, the person is understood to be a white male. In fact, the 
first lawsuit alleging reverse discrimination was that brought forth in California by 
Allan Bakke (1978), a white male who had been rejected to Medical School two years 
in a row in favor of “less qualified minority applicants.” Spokespersons, however, in 
favor of Proposition 209 tended to be racial and ethnic minorities with Ward 
Connerly, an African-American male taking the lead on the initiative. Hence, the 
public perception of the legislation looked like hardworking “deserving” minorities 
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on one side of the debate and “lazy, freeloading, victim-mongers” on the other side 
attempting to get a free ride on the system.  
      From the very beginning, affirmative action was instituted to redress 
discrimination that had persisted despite civil rights legislation, laws, and 
constitutional guarantees. Although not included in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it 
was developed by the Johnson Administration to help ensure the active enforcement 
of the Act. A complex set of policies and federal programs, it mandated that measures 
be taken to ensure that Blacks, women, and other racial and ethnic minorities as 
defined by the Civil Rights act of 1964 enjoyed the same opportunities for 
promotions, salary, increases, career advancement, school admissions, that had been 
nearly exclusive to Whites. It was envisioned as a temporary remedy that would end 
once there was a level playing field.  
     By the mid-to-late 1990’s there had been an enormous backlash against 
affirmative action in practice and in theory. Those against the policy argued that it 
opened doors for minorities, but closed doors for Whites. The terms “quotas” and 
“preferential treatment” came to be viewed with contempt or resentment by Whites 
and some minorities.  
     In a 1995 Washington Post article entitled Americans Vent Anger at Affirmative 
Action, men and women across racial and ethnic lines were equally divided on the 
relevance and effectiveness of Affirmative Action. A housewife from Angleton, 
Texas noted “Blacks…walk around with a chip on the shoulder, like we owe them 
something. I don’t feel like we do.”  Similarly, a white male in his mid-thirties 
believes “[Everything] is equaled out, there’s no need for [affirmative action] 
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anymore. It just makes me upset when this subject gets thrown down your throat. I 
am a white single man and they try to make you feel guilty because they’re not 
getting jobs and that’s it our fault.” 
     On the other end of the continuum, racial and ethnic minorities were clear that 
affirmative action had fallen short of its expectations or promises of creating a level 
playing field. As one woman notes, “We [Asians] don’t have the same opportunities 
as Whites. If we are discriminated against, we keep quiet…You accept what their 
decision is. You are content with what you have.” Another interviewee concurs by 
noting “ [Affirmative Action] is needed because of the serious disadvantages that 
Blacks and other minorities have suffered in the workplace and in education, even 
today. You have white managers in the majority of high-level positions making 
decisions on promotions, pay raises and management positions. In my experience, 
they tend to hire and promote and favor those who are most like them either in ethnic 
background or in educational background.” 
     There are two points that I would like to make regarding the above statements. The 
first is that in the statements, the gain of power, influence, or economic stability of 
racial and ethnic minorities, and women has been linked to the loss of power, 
influence, and economic stability of Whites. This link clouds the issue of entrenched 
institutional and structural racism or discrimination that continue to keep the playing 
field unleveled and the historic and cumulative gains by Whites as a result of slavery, 
exclusion, and colonialization.  Secondly, there is a gross failure to acknowledge the 
racial coding of public policies and politics in the public sphere and the impacts it has 
on policy outcomes and remedies available at the local, state, and national levels.  
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     In a 1997 national Gallup poll, over half (51%) of Americans believed that white 
men had been adversely affected by preference programs. When the results were 
divided by race, the results varied significantly with 63% of white males reporting 
that affirmative action had hurt white men. This was shared by only 26% of all Blacks 
polled.  
     In the same poll, 79% of whites believed Blacks to have an equal chance of getting 
jobs as whites, while only 46% of Blacks agreed. 44% of those interviewed across 
race and ethnicity believed that whites were highly prejudiced and 63% of those 
interviewed considered themselves to hold little or few prejudices.  
     Further, in a similar study on Affirmative Action that included racial stereotypes 
and biases, researchers discovered in relation to Affirmative Action 43% of all whites 
interviewed said Blacks were “irresponsible” and 31% identified Blacks as lazy66.” 
     The above statistics and comments tie the representational and political meta-
spaces together quite well. The public representation of racial and ethnic minorities 
and women present in the media and the public sphere directly shapes the opinions 
and terms of the grounds under which to argue for or against affirmative action. 
Framing Blacks and others as lazy and irresponsible makes them out to be 
undeserving or seen as attempting to “get a free ride on the American system,” as 
opposed to individuals situated within systems and structures that have historically 
worked against them attempting to get a fair and equal shake. This works out well for 
those seeking to dismantle affirmative action policies because the representation of 
poor blacks are often juxtaposed to middle class blacks, The Cosby Show versus 
                                                
66 Morin, Richard. 1997. “The hidden truth about affirmative action.” Washington 
Post, 21, September 1997. 
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single black mothers living in inner city neighborhoods. And Asians67 as the 
designated “model minority” in most of the debates were juxtaposed to Latinos and 
Blacks.  In this sense, failure is attributed to individual failings, rather structural or 
institutional barriers to achieving full equality and rights.  
     Spurred by proposition 209, affirmative action was a key platform issue for both 
Democrats and Republicans in the 1996 presidential election. President Clinton 
voiced his opposition to the initiative, his concerns for ending affirmative action 
outright and outlined a commitment to four standards of fairness: (1) no quotas in 
theory or in practice; (2) no illegal discrimination of any kind, including reverse 
discrimination; (3) no preference for people who are not qualified; and (4) as soon as 
a program has succeeded, it must be retired (Democratic National Committee, 1997).”  
Conversely, Republicans stated their support of proposition 209 in the 1996 
Republican Platform and endorsed the Dole-Canady Equal Opportunity Act, which 
proposed to end discrimination by the federal government. The political and 
ideological divisions were clear in terms of support for proposition 209 at the state 
level and a move toward federal legislation that would have the same spirit and intent 
as the state-level proposition. 
     More importantly, Race was used as a wedge issue by Republicans to gain 
political support and create division among liberals and progressives with regard to 
                                                
67 During the debates on Affirmative Action, conservative Newt Gingrich argued that 
Asians were an example of how old-fashioned hard work and values still open the 
door to success in the USA. He also expressed concern that affirmative action was 
discriminating against Asian-Americans. For a more thorough discussion on the 
Asians and the Model Minority Myth see Tuan, Mia "Unraveling the "Model 
Minority" Stereotype: Listening to Asian American Youth." Journal of Asian 
American Studies 1:2 (June): 198-201 
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Affirmative Action and the California Civil Rights Initiative. A wedge issue is 
defined as issues used by candidates of one party to attract voters who usually support 
another party in effect driving a wedge between the opposition and its normal 
supporters (Cain and MacDonald, 1996). With regard to proposition 209 and the 
national election, Republicans targeted white male democrats and Independents. 
What was not anticipated was the debate and divisions that would result within racial 
and ethnic minority communities and among white progressives and liberals. 
     The issue of Affirmative Action codified in Proposition 209 put the Democrats 
and liberals in a difficult position. The Right had appropriated language used to 
secure rights and end discrimination based on race, gender, or ethnicity by the Civil 
Rights Movement and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to argue that discrimination was 
wrong across the board even if the individual affected by the alleged discrimination 
was a white male.  They relied heavily on the speeches of civil rights leaders to 
support their call for an end to Affirmative Action and other forms of discrimination 
based on race or gender.  
     By evoking potent social and political images such as the NAACP, the Civil 
Rights Movement, and Martin Luther King Jr., Conservatives were able to manipulate 
the goals and aims of the civil rights movement, understood as an end to racial 
discrimination and unequal treatment to their benefit.  More significantly, they were 
able to disarm progressives and liberals who had not seriously examined the viability 
or desirability of a color-blind society.  
     To be sure, this is not the first time liberal concerns have been used towards 
conservative ends. As Manning Marable (2002) points out, on issues of equal 
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opportunity under the aegis of the Nixon-Ford Administrations of 1969-1977 the set 
of policies, which we identify as “Affirmative Action”, was implemented and 
codified in the Philadelphia Plan, which both strengthened and refined affirmative 
action (Hardisty 2000) The Plan required that federal contractors set specific goals for 
minority hiring. As a result the number of racial minorities increased from 1 to 12 
percent. On the surface, the plan appeared to be step in the right direction in terms of 
remedying past racial discrimination, but in deed it helped to create class stratification 
among racial and ethnic groups thus weakening the possibility of collective action or 
organized resistance. Again, the lack of progress on the part of racial and ethnic 
minorities came not to be seen as a result of institutional or structural racism or the 
complete denial of rights, but the result of individual failings.  
     Critics of Affirmative Action used the gains by some racial and ethnic minorities 
and women to argue that situations for Blacks and others had vastly improved. They 
employed studies that asserted 40% of Blacks considered themselves members of the 
middle class, 42% owned their own homes, and a third of the population lived in 
suburbia (Thernstrom, 1999).  The gross overstatement of gains experienced by 
Blacks post passage of the civil rights led Former California Pete Wilson to argue 
“Those who benefit from Affirmative Action today are granted preferential treatment 
‘based not on past discrimination, but simply by being born into a protected group.” 
Connectedly, conservative Ward Connerly (2003) argues, “It is really hard to defend 
affirmative action preferences. The only arguments you can use are either that we 
need diversity for the sake of diversity, or that America is still racist. You have to 
embrace one of those two.” 
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     What critics of Affirmative Action failed to consider was the ways in which 
racism and racial biases had been institutionalized through the laws, public policies, 
institutions and structures that govern society over time. While Blacks were not 
experiencing discrimination characteristic of the Jim Crow Era, explicit racism had 
been replaced with institutional and structural racism that was difficult to prove and 
to trace (Winant 1994).  
     As Bell (1992) points out the slow advances made by Blacks during the 1960s and 
1970s in terms of poverty, unemployment, and income have been reversed. This point 
is echoed by Lipsitz (1998) who asserts that at every stage over the past fifty years, 
whites have responded to civil rights laws with coordinated collective politics 
characterized by resistance, refusal, and renegotiation.  
     At the time of the introduction of proposition 209, the Glass Ceiling Commission 
reported that 97% of senior managers at the Fortune 1,000 corporations were white 
males while 57% of the country’s workforce was either a female, a minority or both.  
     Proposition 209 was approved by California Voters in November 1996. 55% of 
voters supported the measure. The approval of the measure was hypothesized to be a 
mixture of racial division fueled by a fear of arbitrary exclusion prompted voter 
support for Proposition 209. With respect to race, Whites, who potentially are the 
affirmative action losers, were more likely to support the initiative compared to racial 
and ethnic minorities who are typically viewed as the beneficiaries of affirmative 
action policies (Alvarez and Butterfield, 1998).  
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DOING AWAY WITH RACE: THE CALL OF PROPOSITION 54 
 
“If you can’t discriminate and you can’t give preferential treatment, 
we don’t believe that you even need to be gathering data and 
classifying people. I believe categorizing human beings is immoral, 
and I want to squeeze race out of the equation.” 
--- Ward Connerly, 2003 
 
“What is your race? African-American? Mexican-American? White? 
Native-American? Or the mysterious “Other?” If you are like most 
Californians, you’re getting tired of that question…..When you’re 
asked to check a government form with row after row of these rigid 
and silly little “race” boxes, have you ever wanted to say, “None of 
your business; now leave me alone?”….The advocates of racial 
categorization maintain that you have no right to privacy concerning 
your ancestry and racial background. They see no problem if your 
employer or school officials label you AGAINST YOUR WILL—
often without telling you—or charge you with “racial fraud” if their 
“racial” definitions are different from yours. 
--Ward Connerly, 2003 
 
     Unlike proposition 209, proponents of proposition 54 framed racial classification 
as an issue of privacy.  Named the Classification by Race, Ethnicity, Color, or 
National Origin Initiative (CRECNO) or the Racial Privacy Initiative, proposition 54 
would have prohibited the state and local government from collecting data on a 
person’s race, ethnicity, color, or national origin. By situating race as a privacy issue 
and relegating it to the private sphere, the authors of the legislation pulled on a 
familiar strand of liberal democratic theory that argues that race, gender or other 
markers of difference have very little bearing on political or material outcomes in the 
public sphere.  
     The relegation of race to the private sphere ignores what Carole Pateman (1988) 
describes as the complex multi-faceted structure of domination in modern 
[democracies] that are held together by civil and state law. She argues the 
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construction of difference, [sexual, racial, gender or otherwise], as political difference 
is central to civil society. Proponents and supporters of proposition 54 sought to deny 
this reality and relied heavily on the oversimplified relationship between the state and 
the individual or group to account for the realization of rights in modern democracies.  
     Fueled by the 2000 Census, which allowed Americans to classify themselves into 
at least 63 racial categories, proponents of proposition 54 argued that it would move 
California and the nation closer to realizing a color-blind society and their American-
ness. In this context, race is replaced with nation. The only issue with this is that 
one’s American-ness or citizenship has historically been tied to race or ethnicity in 
the United States in the public sphere. Since the founding of the new world, race, 
gender, and ethnicity have played a significant role in citizenship, rights, and freedom 
in the liberal democratic state. As Pateman (1988) notes, although the private and 
public spheres are opposed, they gain their meaning and significance from the other. 
What it means to be an individual and be civilly free is revealed in part by the 
subjection of groups within the private sphere. As such, the private and public spheres 
are interdependent. 
In Whose Interest Was the Battle for Proposition 54 Waged: 
     Proponents of the referendum argued that winning Proposition 54 would benefit 
all Californians and the Nation by helping individuals to realize their “American-
ness” and move us toward a more-color blind society where race wouldn’t matter.  
Funds in support of Proposition 54 were funneled through the American Civil Rights 
Coalition, a conservative organization. The cadre of individual donors making up the 
bulk the financial support for proposition 54 reads like a list of who’s who of the 
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economic elite with over 1.2 million dollars in contributions coming from this group, 
most of which, unsurprisingly were white men.68  In fact, according to the San 
Francisco Chronicle, “1.3 million of the 1.7 million dollars in undisclosed 
contributions came from six contributors, each of which gave hundreds of thousands 
of dollars of their own money to ACRC to fund the initiative.”  This make sense 
given the backlash against affirmative action has been led in part, by white men who 
believe their status and position in society have been comprised because of programs 
like Affirmative Action.  
    A surprising ally in support of proposition 54 was a number of multi-racial 
coalitions and organizations. Responding to frustration around living in a racially 
diverse society that recognizes individual races and identities, but not the mixture of 
two or more races or ethnicities, the group championed the Racial Privacy Initiative 
as a move away from “racial policing” through classification by the government.  In 
fact, James Landrith, a white male69 in an interracial marriage and of the Multi-Racial 
Activist70, argued “these nasty little classification systems have been contributing to 
America’s ‘racial’ problem from the beginning of our nation’s history. [Racial 
Classification] is government-coerced segregation of the mind, body, and spirit 
(Landrith 2001). 
                                                
68 The American Civil Rights Coalition was sued by the state of California for 
violation of campaign finance rules for failure to disclose the names of contributors to 
the Campaign. ACRC argued that “ donors believed that the disclosure of the 
contributions was an ‘invasion of their privacy’—an assault on their right to assemble 
without fear of retaliation.” 
69 Mr. Landrith says that he could identify as multiracial if he wanted to, but chooses 
not to because of the arbitrariness of race. 
70 The Multi-Racial Activist is a libertarian activist journal covering issues of interest 
to biracial/multiracial individuals, and interracial couples and family. 
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     On the other side of the campaign, “No on Proposition 54” was funded and 
supported heavily by Civil Rights organizations such as the NAACP and the ACLU, 
health care organizations like Kaiser Permanente, and student organizations. These 
organizations and individuals contributed over 10 millions dollars to defeat the 
referendum. The “No on 54” campaign received a considerable boost with support for 
defeat by gubernatorial candidate Cruz Bustamante who contributed over 3.8 million 
dollars of his campaign funds to bury the initiative.71  
Framing the Debate on Proposition 54 
       Detractors of proposition 54 argued that although color-blindness is an ideal goal, 
the reality of racism or the prominence of race in the institutions and structures that 
govern society make it a normative, rather than a pragmatic solution (Winant 2003). 
In an article in the San Francisco Gate, writers point to recent data on racial profiling 
in the States of New Jersey and Maryland and the attainment of home loans by Blacks 
in comparison to Whites. In both instances, racial and ethnic minorities fare worse in 
comparison to their white counterparts despite the federal and state mandates that 
prohibit discrimination. By linking race to political and public policy outcomes, it 
becomes increasingly more difficult to argue for a normative, constitutive model of 
equality that ignores the relevance of institutions and representation to the realization 
of rights in modern democracies.  
     The privacy advocated by supporters of proposition 54 fails to account for the 
lived experiences of racial and ethnic minorities or their day-to-day reality. While it is 
                                                
71 Nasser, Haya. 2003. “California Candidates Seize Proposition 54 Issue.” USA 
Today. 8, 8, September 2003. 
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true that race is socially constructed, the meaning and signification of race in the U.S. 
context, makes it real and meaningful in terms of rights.72  
     Next, while proponents of Proposition 54 framed the Initiative as a privacy issue, 
those in opposition chose to frame it as a health issue. In advertisements and literature 
about the initiative, detractors argued that Proposition 54 was “bad for health care, 
bad for public safety, and bad for education.” Rather than focus on classification as an 
issue of racial identity politics, detractors held that classification is what allows for 
the identification of groups most at risk for infectious diseases, closes the 
achievement gaps in public schools by creating systems of accountability; and 
provides law enforcement with the tools it needs to solve crimes. There was a clear 
deemphasizing of race by those arguing against Proposition 54.  The public face of 
opposition to Proposition 54 included organizations like the Academy of Family 
Physicians, The American Academy of Pediatrics, the California Health Care 
Association, The American Heart Association, and the Breast Cancer Alliance. 
Groups like the NAACP, the National Urban League, ACLU, and others represented 
a second tier of organizing efforts that escaped mainstream media attention in the 
state, but emphasized the racialized element of the initiative to its constituents whom 
they believed would be directly impacted by its passage.   
     The decision to limit “race talk” in relation to proposition 54 was deliberate and 
based on lessons learned from the campaign against 209. One such lesson, Riku Sen  
                                                
72 For a more through discussion on the permanence of racism, see Derrick Bell’s 
Faces at the Bottom of the Well (1992) where he offers a irrefutable proposition that 
Blacks will never gain full equality in [the United States]…. because short-lived 
victories slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain white 
dominance. 
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(2003) notes is that Whites and Asians think they lose out when policies are 
racialized. During the 209 struggle, for example, a television advertisement conflating 
an attack on affirmative action with the KKK may have offended, rather than won 
over white conservatives who opposed affirmative action, but hardly considered 
themselves white supremacists, Sen points out.  
     Major television advertisements in opposition to proposition 54 featured former 
Surgeon General C. Everett Koop who declared in his message that proposition 54 
“was bad medicine” The messages of the “No on 54” campaign focused on the idea 
that diseases aren’t colorblind, even if people are. As a result, the heated debates and 
in-fighting characteristic of the ‘No on 209’ campaign was notably absent. The public 
perception was Proposition 54 was an initiative about health care outcomes rather 
than racial identity politics or preferences. This framing resonated with voters across 
racial and ethnic lines. 
     In the end, a majority of racial and ethnic minorities and an overwhelming number 
of Whites voted against proposition 54 by a nearly 2-1 margin (64% to 36%). In a 
exit poll survey conducted by the Los Angeles Times, 58% of Whites, 79% of Blacks 
and 70% of Latinos voted against the initiative Support was highest among older 
voters of all races at 69% for those 65 and older compared to 58% of 40-44 year 
olds.73  
 
                                                
73 Nasser, Haya. September 8, 2003. California Candidates Seize Proposition 54 
Issue. USA Today. 
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CONCLUSION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PROPOSITION 54 IN TERMS OF 
THE REALIZATION OF RIGHTS IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 
 
      Despite the passage of proposition 209 in 1996, which outlawed affirmative 
action in the state, California voters rejected the idea that ignoring difference would 
bring the state closer to the realization of a color-blind society. By voting against 
Proposition 54, Californians rejected the liberal democratic notion that the realization 
of rights in modern democracies is the product of the relationship between the 
individual and the state, rather the failure of Proposition 54 suggests an 
acknowledgement that the realization of rights in the public sphere on the part of 
racial and ethnic minorities is complicated by historic inequality characterized by 
exclusion, racial projects that shift to maintain white hegemony, and resistance.  
     I have attempted to demonstrate that in the state of California, race and ethnicity 
play a critical role in terms of the realization and attainment of rights in the public 
sphere. Race also influences one’s life chances, freedom, and opportunities in society. 
I have also shared the ways in which a complex theory of rights that is able to account 
for the way in which differences, in this case racial difference, impacts the realization 
of rights in modern democracies despite formal equality gained through legislation or 
public policies. Moreover, the state of California and Proposition 54 highlights the 
ways in which the political, structural, institutional, representational, and economic 
meta-spaces converge to shape rights and liberties in liberal democracies. It is not 
clear, however, whether or not voters understood a complex theory of rights, but I 
believe the defeat of the referendum suggests that voters understood in some way the 
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impact of race on rights and privileges in society. Such an inquiry would be beyond 






Complex Subjectivity, the Promise of Neutrality, and the Attainment of Rights 






Marriage cannot be severed from its cultural, religious and natural 
roots without weakening the good influence of society….America is a 
free society, which limits the role of government in the lives of our 
citizens. This commitment of freedom, however, does not require the 
redefinition of one of our most basic social institutions. Our 
government should respect every person, and protect the institution of 
marriage. There is no contradiction between these responsibilities. 
      ----President George W. Bush, 2004 
 
Government should not affirm, through its policies or laws, any 
particular conception of the good life; instead it should provide a 
neutral framework of rights within which people can choose their own 
values and goods. 
      -----Michael Sandel,74 1996 
 
    Liberal democratic theory holds that the state must remain neutral with respect to 
values and the common good of society. Under liberalism the common good, is 
“optimal amount of preferences, each of which is given equal consideration, within 
the limits of respecting each person’s rights (Johnson 2003).” It requires that the 
individual be unencumbered by its social roles—as a mother, father, racial or ethnic 
minority, woman, man-because individuals are free to reject or accept the values 
associated with any of these roles (Sandel 1996). However, rights for Gays and 
Lesbians, most recently in the guise of marriage, test liberal notions of neutrality and 
                                                
74 For a more thorough discussion on this point, see Michael Sandel’s America’s 
Search for a New Public Philosophy in the Atlantic Monthly, March 1996 
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the unencumbered self by raising significant questions concerning the weight of 
societal values and norms to the realization of rights in the modern democratic state.  
     Laws against or in favor of Gays and Lesbians turn on interpretations of privacy as 
articulated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Those arguing against laws and protection 
for Gays and Lesbians often appeal to some set of moral values said to be guided by 
the history of the state and the preservation of bedrock social institutions. As such, 
they tend to call for a narrow interpretation of the fourteenth amendment through the 
exercise of judicial restraint. Conversely, those advocating for rights for Gays and 
Lesbians often promote a broad interpretation of privacy and appeal to liberal tenets 
of toleration and neutrality (Sandel 1989).  
     In last decade, those working to secure rights on the behalf of gays and lesbians 
have won significant victories. In early 2003, the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. 
Texas75 issued a landmark decision invalidating the criminal prohibition of sodomy in 
the state of Texas overturning Bowers v Hardwick.76 Later that same year, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled in Goodridge v. the Department of Health that 
the commonwealth had failed to identify any constitutionally adequate reason for 
denying civil marriages to same-sex couples.77  
      The Massachusetts court decision to extend the right to marriage to Gays and 
Lesbians signals the recognition of complex identities and groups in civil society. In 
                                                
75 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472; 156 L. Ed. 2d 508 
76 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. (1986) 
77 For a more thorough discussion on this point, see the court’s opinion in Goodridge 
v. Department of Health 440 Mass. 309, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Nov. 18, 2003) 
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essence, the decision constituted Gays as bearers of rights under the law.78 It 
embodies the liberal ideal that “a person belongs to himself and not to others nor to 
society as a whole.”79 By constituting Gays as individuals under the law, the court 
recognizes the existence of a social group or individuals that until recently had fallen 
outside of the law and discourse.  
     In this chapter, I will use the issue of same-sex marriage to argue that liberal 
democratic state fails to deliver on its promise of political neutrality and that there 
exists a notion of “the good” that operates in society that makes it difficult for some 
groups and individuals to realize their full bundle of rights. Further, I will contend 
that under liberal democratic theory, individuals must be embodied as subjects under 
the law before they can make rights claims in the public sphere. I contend that even 
the most advanced liberal democratic theories fail to adequately account for the ways 
in which individuals and groups enter society or become recognized as bearers of 
rights.  
      I use a complex theory of rights to demonstrate that in the case of same-sex 
marriage, not only does difference impact the realization of rights in modern 
democracies, but also institutions and structures shaped by dominant cultural norms 
and values influence the attainment of rights as well.  
                                                
78 There is still reluctance by the courts to identify lesbians and gays as a suspect class 
under the law and in society. Designating gays and lesbians as a suspect class would 
elevate their status in society to that most closely often associated with race, gender, 
or ethnicity. Suspect class is defined as a class of individuals marked by immutable 
characteristic (as of race or national origin). A classification that does not impact a 
suspect class or impinge upon a fundamental constitutional right will be upheld if it is 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest. 
79 See Goodridge v. Department of Health 440 Mass. 309, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Nov. 18, 
2003) 
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    I will proceed by examining the meaning of subjectivity, neutrality, and the good in 
the modern democratic state. Then, I will briefly discuss the meaning of marriage as a 
social contract and as an institution before turning my full attention to the issue of 
same-sex marriage as examined through the lens of Goodridge v. the Department of 
Public Health.  
Complex Subjectivity and Rights in the Modern Democratic State 
     “The question of  ‘the subject’ is crucial for politics because juridical subjects are 
produced through certain exclusionary practices that do not show once the juridical 
structures of politics has been established”(Butler 1999). The subject, loosely defined 
as the object, individual, or thing that is produced through discourses and 
relationships, is critical to the attainment of rights in the modern democratic state. 
The creation of a subject of rights under the law and in society is constructed through 
apparatus’ governed by the state that include various political institutions and entities 
all operating within a masculinist, patriarchal, and racialized framework.  As Butler 
notes, the construction of the subject is political and legitimated through certain 
exclusionary practices and aims that naturalizes and conceals the juridical structures 
of the foundation as the grounds for exclusion or inclusion.  
         Under liberalism, before groups and individuals can make rights-claims in the 
public sphere, they must first be embodied as subjects under the law. As previously 
stated, the remedies available to marginalized groups and individuals in society 
depend in part on the political recognition of difference or differentiated subjectivity, 
and the demonstration that it is the cause for the denial of rights and privileges in the 
public sphere. This, however, poses problems for Gays and other similarly situated 
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groups because the recognition of differentiated subjectivity under liberalism is 
incommensurate with liberal doctrines of abstract individualism.   
       The notion of an abstract subject of rights under liberalism obscures what 
Foucault calls “dividing practices.” Dividing practices are those in which “the subject 
is objectified by a process of division either within himself or from others,” and in 
turn the processes of exclusion or isolation are normalized or made real. In this 
process of categorization and objectification, individuals are given both a social and a 
personal identity, either as an insider or outsider (Lorde 1984). To be sure, the 
creation or constituting of the subject in the modern democratic state is shaped, 
implicitly or explicitly, by dominant cultural norms and values with those individuals 
most closely aligned with dominant cultural norms and values constituting Insiders 
and those differentiated by race, class, sexual orientation, or gender constituting 
Outsiders.  If it is true that the sexualized subject of rights and citizenship is 
undoubtedly heterosexual (Brandzel 2005) then the denial of rights is predicated on 
the exclusion of the sexualized80 other in law and discourse.  
      Next, I would like to suggest that the sexualized subject of rights in the liberal 
democratic state is different from the gendered or racial subject of rights because it is 
possible for individuals identifying as Gay or Lesbian to be situated within other 
social hierarchies present in society as well. In liberal democracies, rights-claims tend 
to be dichotomous and rely on oppositional binaries such as male/female; 
                                                
80 Here, it is easy to confuse or to conflate the sexualized other with Gender rather 
than sexual orientation. I am reluctant to use Queer as the term to signify gay and 
lesbian subjectivity because of the complexity of the term. For a more thorough 
discussion of this point see Jacinth Samuels, Dangerous Liaisons: Queer Subjectivity, 
Liberalism, and Race in Cultural Studies 13(1) 1999 91-109  
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black/white; proletariat/bourgeoisie, all of which deny the complexity of social 
relations and identity in society. As a result, Gays and others situated within multiple 
hierarchies have difficulty advancing rights-claims or articulating a both/and 
framework that is not seen as threat or as undermining single-identity based claims.81  
     In this dissertation, I suggest that rights-claims made on the part of women of 
color, multi-racial individuals, gays, and others situated within multiple hierarchies 
are radically different from those made by Blacks or Women during the 19th and 20th 
centuries. Historically, women of color, gays, and others situated within multiple 
hierarchies have relied on legally recognized affinity groups to make rights-claims in 
the public sphere. In the case of women of color and multi-racial identities, it has 
been race or gender and for gays it has been gender. However, race and gender 
frameworks do not accurately reflect the experiences or account for the ways in 
which the intersections of race, class, sexuality, gender, and other markers of 
difference significantly alters rights-claims made in the public sphere. As Legal 
Scholar, Kimberle Crenshaw (1995) notes, the discourses often used to highlight 
gender and race biases in law and society are often oppositional and contradictory. 
Further, she goes on to say that in many instances, racism as experienced by people of 
color who are a particular gender—male-- tends to determine antiracist strategies, just 
as sexism experienced by women who are of a particular race—white tends to 
dominate the women’s movement. The both/and status of individuals situated within 
                                                
81 In the case of Baker v. Nelson, the court in its opinion chastised the plaintiffs for 
using the Equal Rights Amendment, a law intended in their eyes to protect women 
from sexual discrimination, to argue for same-sex marriage or rights for gays and 
lesbians.  
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multiple hierarchies leave them exposed and bereft of a discourse in which to situate 
themselves.  
     In a manner of speaking, rights-claims made on the behalf of these groups or 
individuals within the public sphere are constitutionally indefensible because they are 
not constituted as individuals under the law. In the instance of Gays and Lesbians, 
they are recognized as subjects under the law as heterosexual men and women 
operating under the cultural norms and values of a heteronormative state, not as 
queer, homosexual, or any other term that signifies same-gender loving or suggest 
that there is a sexual Other operating in the public sphere.  
      The reach of the issue of same-sex marriage is far and extends beyond the right to 
marry, rather at its core it is about redefining and renegotiating the terms of 
citizenship in the modern democratic state and making visible the moral assumptions 
embedded in the institutions and structures that govern our society. As such, what 
continues to be necessary is an analysis of power, history, and the liberal investment 
in maintaining the abstract of rights under law and in the public sphere. In the words 
of Foucault, we need to map the genealogy of these discourses to create opportunities 
for transgression and disruption.82 We must pull on the political imaginary to create a 
theory of rights that is firmly rooted in the lives and experiences of differently 
situated individuals that is embedded in the social and material reality of our society. 
 
The Role of the State in Ensuring Rights in Modern Democracies 
 
      Leading political theorists and social scientists differ with respect to the role of 
the state in the attainment of rights in modern democracies. Some argue that the state 
                                                
82 See Paul Rabinow’s The Foucault Reader (1994).  
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is an autonomous entity whose actions are not reducible to or determined by forces in 
society (Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997) In this sense, the state is coherent, rather 
than fragmented and follows its own set of interests not to be swayed by internal 
interests or pressures. In this characterization, the state is separate from society and 
there is very little accounting for the impact of culture, identity, history, or other 
factors that shape the state.  
      In the above framing the state is viewed as the “fount of freedom” and as the 
protector against danger or intrusion from without and the domestic manager of 
difference and conflicts. As feminist theorist Wendy Brown (1995) notes, the state is 
associated with maintaining order and stability in society, not necessarily arbitrating 
difference or injuries against its citizens.  Under the traditional lens of liberal 
democratic theory, difference and injury fall squarely within the private realm and the 
state works to maintain the sharp line between the public and the private spheres.  
      At once, the role of the state in relationship to the attainment of rights is both 
general and specific. General in the sense that its reach and scope is vast and covers 
the entire citizenry, and specific in that it purports to only be concerned with stability 
and order and ensuring the exercise of freedom by individuals. There is very little 
consideration for the ways in which difference or identity shapes one’s individual 
freedom and the role of the state in mitigating the impact of difference or identity on 
the realization of rights in society.  Race, class, and gender, sexuality, culture, 
religion are seen as private motivators which drive individual choices or decision, 
rather than having currency in the public sphere that in turn shapes individual rights 
and autonomy.  
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     In sharp contrast, others argue that the state is largely a product of a grand 
historical narrative and is one of many actors. Foucault (1978), for example, argues 
for a diffused state influenced by local interests and struggles for power. From a 
Foucauldian perspective, the state is understood as fragmented, weak and not 
reflective of the social and material dynamics that shape individual rights or freedom 
(Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997). 83 As such, he argues for the study of the nature of 
power and the apparatus’ of the state [institutions, structures, and bodies], and the 
ideologies that accompany them. He urges us to focus on the study and the tactics of 
domination.  
      Wendy Brown (1995) concurs by noting ‘what we call the state is at once an 
incoherent ensemble of power relations and a vehicle of massive domination. She 
goes on to say, the contemporary democratic state is modern and postmodern, highly 
concrete and an elaborate fiction, decentered and decentralized and despite the most 
unavoidable tendency to speak of the state as “it,” the domain we call the state is not a 
think, a system, or subject, but a significantly unbounded terrain of powers and 
techniques.  
     Foucault’s and Brown’s vision of the state is a slippery slope. In attempting to 
proffer an alternative frame for which to map histories, the realization of rights, and 
power in modern democracies, they sidestep the role of the state in governing 
societies. While it is true there must be a fair degree of negotiation between the 
universal and the local, there must also be a clear understanding of the role of the 
                                                
83 See Wendy Brown’s States of Injury (1995) for a more thorough discussion of this 
point.  See also Thomas Hobbes’ The Leviathan (1660) where he describes the all 
powerful state or sovereign power. 
 114 
state in protecting individual liberties and freedom. The question then becomes how 
this gets carried out, which is the local part of the equation, what I believe Foucault 
and Brown are talking about in their renderings of the state. As such, we must 
understand the State as both coherent and fragmented in order to understand the ways 
in which we avoid anarchy, i.e. if the state is fragmented and fictitious then why 
should anyone obey the laws, and coherent in that the individual relies on the state to 
resolve disputes or infringements against individual rights or exercise of freedom. 
     Next, feminists and critical legal scholars have continued to note the masculinist 
and racist nature of the state.  The masculinism of the state refers to those features of 
the state that signify, enact, sustain, and represent the masculine power as a form of 
dominance (Brown 1995). This dominance, Brown contends, expresses itself as the 
power to describe and run the world and the power of access to women. Said 
differently, it is the power to define the core and determine the terms under which 
women can go about attaining rights and securing freedom84. In the instance of Gays 
and Lesbians, I would like to extend this frame by noting the heterosexism of the 
state, whereby “ the state has constructed heterosexuality as a prerequisite to 
citizenship, [the attainment of rights], and as a unspoken norm of membership and 
national belonging,” (Brandzel 2005). 
    Connectedly, Brown problematizes the issue of relying on an apparatus, the State, 
which has consistently acted in a masculinist, patriarchal, or heterosexist way to 
protect and ensure the rights of women and for the purposes of our discussion Gays. 
She goes on to note there is danger in “looking towards the state as provider, 
                                                
84 See Carole Pateman’s The Sexual Contract (1988) 
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equalizer, protector and liberator,” (Brown, (1995).  Critical Race scholars raise 
similar suspicions by noting that the is state is racially coded and entrenched, thus 
making it difficult to rely upon when disputes arise or when there is a need for 
protection against harm or injury.   
    For the purposes of this dissertation, I believe Max Weber’s (1930) definition of 
the state is useful. Weber asserts that the state is a [set] of compulsory organizations 
claiming control over territories and the people within them. True to this framing of 
the state, Alfred Stepan85 (1978) concurs by observing that the state must be 
considered as more than government. It is the continuous administrative, legal, and 
bureaucratic and coercive systems that attempt not only to structure relationships 
between civil society and public authority in a polity, but also to structure crucial 
relationships within civil society as well.”  In this way, the state does not become 
everything. It is one of many factors that shape rights and freedom along with other 
organizations and agents that “pattern social relationships and politics (Skocpol 
1985).” 
                                                
85 See also: Alfred Stepan, The State and Society (1978); Juan J. Linz and Alfred 
Stepan (eds.), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (1978) 
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The concept of the “Good” in the Modern Democratic State 
 The [state] requires a cultural frame in which to define itself and 
advance its claims, and so does opposition to it. We cannot look at the 
bricks of the state, taken to be its institutions and structure, without 
understanding the mortar.86  
     ----Clifford Geertz 1980 
 
     With regard to the issue of same-sex marriage the concept of the Good is of 
extreme importance. In the modern democratic state, the Good has never been 
explicitly marked or rendered visible. This is highly problematic in terms of the 
attainment of rights because there is a denial of dominant cultural values and norms 
present in society and the ways in which these values and norms inform and shape 
individual rights and freedom. For example, the idea that the nuclear family is the 
norm or valuable has informed social and public policies that demonize single 
mothers (Gordon 1994 Ross 2005)87 and limit their autonomy and exercise of 
freedom.  Current social policies that emphasize marriage as a way to curb poverty or 
decrease the number of out-of-wedlock births hint at a notion of the Good that is not 
only motivating, but also driving action at the state and federal levels.   
      For the purposes of discussion, I define “The Good” as dominant cultural norms 
and values present in any given society that prevail or rise to the top above others. 
The Good is historically constituted and can be traced through the laws, customs, and 
traditions present in liberal democracies (Guttman 2003). While this definition stands 
in direct conflict with those offered by ancient philosophers like Aristotle, who for 
                                                
86 Geertz 1980: 19 Geertz 1983: 142-143 
87 See Loretta Ross’ A Feminist Perspective on [Hurricane] Katrina.  October 10, 
2005 
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example believed that the Good was objective or independent of wishes [desires] and 
Plato who believed that the Good was something abstract to be aspired to as an end in 
itself, I contend that the Good as it relates to rights in modern democracies is 
subjective and connected to deeply entrenched societal values and norms.  
    Over the last decade, conservatives have been bold in articulating a particular 
“good” for and in society. They have attempted to define the good in relationship to 
morality and the “common good.” In fact, in the 2004 presidential election, the 
Republican incumbent George W. Bush ran on a platform of restoring morality and 
family values to the White House.88 Family values understood as a moral concept to 
define the structure and role of a family and its members. Appeals to family values 
are rooted in tradition and historical precedence. In its current usage, "family values" 
is employed as a code word to imply a social position that firmly reinforces 
conventional gender roles, heteronormativity, and the patriarchal family structure. 
Under liberalism, one could view this emphasis on morality as one of many sets of 
values competing for attention in the public sphere, but historically and increasingly 
the privileging of  “family values” has come to constitute the dominant hegemonic 
confluence of an exclusionary and non-neutral state.   
      Next, what comes to constitute the Good in society necessarily entails a counter-
definition of what is considered bad or undesirable within the same context. This 
point is made more poignant by Eve Sedgwick (1990) who asserts that the categories 
distinguishing between good/bad, desirable/undesirable, acceptable/unacceptable 
                                                
88 The 2004 Republican Party Platform: A Safer World and a More Hopeful America 
was aligned with the social conservatives in the party. It called for federal 
amendments to ban abortion and gay marriage. It also emphasized family values and 
marriage. See: http://www.gop.com/media/2004platform.pdf 
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“actually subsist in a more unsettled and dynamic tacit relation according to which, 
first term B is not symmetrical with, but subordinated to term A; but second the 
ontologically valorized term A actually depends for its meaning on the simultaneous 
subsumption and exclusion of term B; hence, third, the question of priority between 
the supposed central and the supposed marginal category by the fact that term B is 
constituted as at once internal and external to term A (Sedgwick 1990).  
     As such, the Good is a highly contestable category and constantly up for (re) 
negotiation in the public sphere. In the case of same-sex marriage, heteronormativity 
and the traditional male-headed, two-parent (male and female) family is the norm or 
the Good being articulated in the public sphere. Homosexuality and alternative family 
structures is the undesirable. When we link this to the attainment of rights, it is clear 
that in this instance of same-sex marriage the Good triumphs over the right.   
     The public discourse on same-sex marriage seems to be framed around the 
definition of the Good proposed above. For example, in his call for a ban on same-sex 
marriages, President Bush argued that marriage cannot be severed from its cultural, 
religious, and natural roots without weakening the good influence of society. Our 
government, he goes on to say, should respect every person and protect the institution 
of marriage. There is no contradiction between these responsibilities.  Implicit in 
Bush’s comments is a definition of the Good and the desirable that is linked to 
heterosexuality, the nuclear family structure to the exclusion of Gays and Lesbians.  
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     Connectedly, in public polls conducted in 1996, 2000, and 200389 respectively, a 
majority of Americans surveyed believed same-sex marriage to be incompatible with 
“family values” and their own religious beliefs. In the latest survey conducted in 2003 
by the Pew Research Center for the People 63% of respondents agreed with statement 
“ allowing gays and lesbians to marry would undermine the traditional American 
family.”90     
     In the case of same-sex marriage, the concept of the Good present in the public 
sphere and the representation of gays and lesbians as deviant or amoral directly 
shapes the attainment or denial of rights. In the media and in dominant culture, Gays 
and Lesbians tend to be portrayed as hypersexualized and promiscuous. In fact, 
Eskridge (1996) identifies promiscuity among gay men as a reason why Americans 
are reluctant to grant them equal marriage rights. The repercussions of this framing is 
two fold: (1) Gays and Lesbians resist this portrayal by attempting to assimilate to 
dominant cultural values and norms via marriage and commitment ceremonies; child 
bearing and rearing; and/or monogamy or attempts to become asexualized, thus 
denying the complexity of Gay and Lesbian identity and culture and (2) it renders 
invisible heteronormativity and the dominant cultural norms and moral judgments 
that are impacting the framing. Connectedly, it obscures the fact that promiscuity 
among heterosexuals exists or occurs in a way that has yet to make lawmakers 
                                                
89 See Brewer and Wilcox’ The Polls—Trends: Same Sex Marriage and Civil Unions 
in Political Science Quarterly Volume 69, No. 4, Winter 2005 pp. 509-516  
90 However, it is important to note that in public opinion polls with individuals under 
30, there is widespread support for same-sex marriage. The Center for Information 
and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE) reported in a 2004 
survey that close to 60% of respondents interviewed believed that gays and lesbians 
should be able to legally marry. 
 120 
question the validity or sanctity of marriage.  This point is made by Ross (2002) when 
she notes, “ straight male promiscuity is not seen as a reason to deny marriage rights 
to heterosexual men and the [representation in the media and the public sphere] of 
gays as promiscuous is a symptom of the majority culture’s sexualization of gays.” 
Hence, it becomes clear that promiscuity while at issue is not the issue; rather the 
morality of sex between two women or two men is the cause for concern.  
     As Sandel (1989) argues, despite the more sophisticated and enlightened liberal 
view that denies the role of values, norms, and morals in the public sphere, laws 
against homosexuality depend in part on the morality or immorality of the practices.  
As such, he argues that there is a need for consideration of the role of substantive 
moral discourse in political and constitutional argument. In the instance of Gay rights 
and same-sex marriage, morality, the norms of society, and dominant culture has 
always factored in to their ability to attain rights in the liberal democratic state.  
     Next, I would like to turn my attention to the meaning of marriage in the liberal 
democratic state as a backdrop for understanding the issue of same-sex marriage and 
the struggle for Gays and Lesbians to attain rights and privileges in the liberal 
democratic state.  
Marriage: Contract, Institution, or Both in the Modern Democratic State 
     As of late, marriage has appeared on the public agenda at both the federal and state 
levels in terms of the creation of public policies to promote marriage and the nuclear 
family structure as well as a mechanism for securing rights and autonomy by Gays 
and Lesbians. In the 2004 presidential election, the undeniable use of marriage as a 
wedge issue and as a tool to mobilize moral conservatives to the polls by Republicans 
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was clear. During the election cycle, 11 states, four of which were identified as 
“battleground states” voted on whether or not to ban same-sex marriage in the state. 
The measures passed overwhelming with some states reporting close to 80% of voters 
voting against same-sex marriage.91 
     In the modern democratic state, marriage has been defended as both an institution 
and a contract. As an institution, marriage is seen as a conduit by which individuals 
are able to gain full citizenship and recognition in society. In the liberal state, 
marriage is defined through state laws and public policies that attempt to shape the 
parameters and boundaries of the institution. The evolution of marriage as a political 
institution was not natural92 and happened over time through government sanctions 
and policing of the citizenry. The federal government created a standard of marriage 
based on dominant cultural desires and in opposition to marginalized practices like 
polygamy. As Brandzel (2005) notes, as an institution, “marriage was constructed as 
heterosexual, monogamous, and intraracial through discourses of morality, 
righteousness, and the need to control sexuality.” As such, the institution became 
exclusive to heterosexuals and relies on the citizenry to maintain its boundaries as 
always existing and natural.  
    In the liberal democratic state, both the private and public spheres of society define 
the institution of marriage. In the public and private spheres, marriage is intimately 
tied to the maintenance of gender roles and expectations; economic mobility and 
                                                
91 See www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/ballot.measures/ 
92 Brandzel (2005) notes of marriage law and public policies “Marriage was informal 
in the colonial era, states began to assume authority over it by instituting laws 
outlining whom one could marry, how to dissolve marriage, and the repercussions 
(particularly financial ones) of these actions. 
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resources; and social status and citizenship. The public “face” of the institution of 
marriage is shaped by dynamics occurring in the private sphere or the decisions 
individuals make regarding how they value and understand the institution. As such, 
marriage is a social institution93 comprised of relationships, both intimate and 
familial.  
       Next, Carole Pateman in the Sexual Contract (1988) argues that marriage has 
been seen as a contractual relationship since at least the fourteenth century. The 
appeal to framing marriage as a contract is that under liberal democratic theory a 
contract is entered in to by equal parties who negotiate the terms that are mutually 
beneficial. It also as Pateman notes, presupposes the idea of the individual as owner. 
This stands in sharp contrast to marriage as in institution where the roles of 
individuals, men and women, are determined within the context of a society that 
structures relationships in patriarchal and heterosexual ways. Marriage in the early 
republic gave men ownership over women. This point is echoed by Brandzel (2005) 
when she notes women’s ability to immigrate, emigrate, and/or naturalize has been 
linked to marital status thus linking women’s citizenship and autonomy to her 
husband. As such, she goes on to say, marriage was one of the primary tools for 
controlling women’s access to the public sphere.  
                                                
93 According to Joseph McGrath and Janice Kelley in Time and Human Interaction: 
Toward a Social Psychology of Time (Guilford Press, 1986), social institutions are the 
broadest organizers of individuals' beliefs, drives, and behaviors. Evolving to address 
the separate needs of society (e.g., the military institution out of the need for defense; 
the family out of the social needs for procreation, socialization, and intimacy), social 
institutions are free-standing social units with their own inner dynamics and rhythms. 
Like separate musical scores, each has its own melodies, harmonies, and rhythms. 
The more powerful a given institution is in any given society, the more likely its 
times influence everyday life. 
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     For the purposes of this dissertation, I suggest that it is necessary to view marriage 
as both an institution and contract. As a social and political institution, marriage 
carries with it certain values, traditions, and history that have currency and weight in 
the public sphere.  Within the institutional context, it is important to understand 
marriage as a custom that has become important, if not defining, feature of society. 
As such, it is not difficult to imagine that there will be resistance to changing its 
structure and feature because its reach is beyond the creation of intimate relationship 
in the private sphere of life.  
     Viewed as a contract, marriage can be both limiting and liberating. It is limiting in 
the sense, it is still operating within a patriarchal and heterosexual frame whereby 
negotiating the terms of the contract is within a societal context that understands the 
definition of marriage in a way that values men over women. It is liberating in the 
sense of offering the most possibility for divorcing marriage from the values, morals, 
and traditions that it has come to represent and extending the contract to same-sex 
partners. In any case, marriage as both a contract and institution tends to inscribe 
heteronormativity and patriarchal order of society; this is a truth that cannot be 
sidestepped or denied. 
       Anxiety over the challenge to the institution of marriage by Gay and Lesbians in 
1996 prompted Congress to pass the Defense of Marriage Act. Citing the full faith 
and credit clause94 of the Constitution, the Act defined marriage as the lawful union 
between a man and a woman and defined spouse as the person of the opposite sex 
                                                
94 The full faith and credit act of the U.S. Constitution allows a state to determine for 
itself whether it must recognize same-sex marriages or unions recognized by other 
states and jurisdiction.  
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who is a husband and a wife. The Act, in swift response to the state of Hawaii’s move 
to legalize same-sex marriage,95 goes against more than one hundred years of 
American law which presumes that marriages validated in one state would be 
validated in another. The Language of D.O.M.A. states: 
 
No state or territory, or possession of the United States, or 
Indian tribe, shall be required to give affect to any public act, 
record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, possession 
or territory respecting a relationship between persons of the 
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such 
other state, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim 
arising from such relationship.96 
 
     Defenders of D.O.M.A. at the local, state, and national levels argued that the 
Institution of marriage needed to defended and protected from activists courts, judges, 
and “the homosexual lobby” that has “created the shaky ground that has prompted 
this legislation.”  Proponents of D.O.M.A. appealed to the tradition and history of 
marriage in the liberal democratic state by noting “while marriage had always been 
unequivocally, irrevocably heterosexual, recent case law had challenged this 
presumption,” (Brandzel 2005). In one fell swoop, Congress acting on the behalf of 
the state, spoke loudly regarding the status and rights of gays and lesbians in society. 
It made a clear and discernable distinction between individuals based on difference 
and sexual orientation and then preceded to restrict and deny rights based on that 
distinction.  
                                                
95 In 1996, the Hawaii court ruled that refusing marriage licenses to same-sex couples 
is sex discrimination that violates the equal protection clause of the Hawaii 
Constitution. See Baehr v. Miike 80 Haw. 341; 910 P.2d 112; 1996 Haw. On 
December 11, 1999, the decision was reversed and remanded without a published 
opinion. See 92 Haw. 634; 994 P.2d 566; 1999 Haw. 
 
96 Defense Of Marriage Act 5/96 H.R. 3396 
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Privacy and the Public/Private Distinction and Gay Rights 
    The right to privacy has been evoked in the public sphere and through the law to 
both limit and protect individual freedom and liberties. In the case of abortion, for 
example, the constitutional right to privacy guarantees a woman the right to decide 
for herself whether or not to terminate her pregnancy (Sandel 1989). With regard to 
abortion, the courts interpretation of the right to privacy is broad and restrains the 
moral opinion of the state over the freedom of the individual. With regard Gays and 
Lesbians, the courts have until recently held a narrow interpretation of the right to 
privacy and used it to limit the rights of Gays and Lesbians in the public sphere 
(Goldstein 1988).  
    Framing rights-claims around the constitutional right to privacy asks the court to 
remain neutral with regard to competing moral interests and beliefs present in society. 
However, with regard to Gays and lesbians, the right to privacy, in this instance 
defined as the right to consensual sexual relations without interference from the state 
or others,97 is directly tied to the identity and recognition of gays in the public sphere.  
Further, the recognition of Gays and Lesbians as subjects under the law and as 
citizens challenges gender roles and expectations; notions of masculinity and 
femininity; as well as the sexual division of labor (Ross 2002). In this way, the public 
and private spheres are intimately linked and inform the rights and liberties of 
individuals and groups in civil society.  Examples of this contradiction can be found 
in the Bowers v. Hardwick case and Don’t Ask Don’t Tell policies in the Military98 
                                                
97 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1973) 191-194. 
98 Implemented under President Bill Clinton, Don't ask, Don't tell is the common term 
for the current U.S. military policy which implements Public Law 103-160, codified 
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which denies Gay Lesbian identity in the public sphere and intimates that there is 
shame or something that is morally corrupt in being Gay or Lesbian. In recent years,99 
advocates for rights for gays and lesbians have turned down the volume on the 
privacy argument in favor of one that stresses individual liberties and rights under the 
liberal framework.  
Sexing Rights: Same-Sex Marriage in the Modern Democratic State 
     Over the last two decades the issue of Gay rights, most recently in the guise of 
marriage, has been a highly debated and divisive topic for politicians, legislators, 
legal scholars and ordinary citizens. Whereas once the struggle for Gay rights took a 
back seat to racial and gender equality during the civil rights era, in the millennium 
the rights of Gays and Lesbians tend to be at the center of legal and moral discussions 
around individual rights, autonomy, equality, and freedom in the liberal democratic 
state. Many have argued that the issue of Gay rights would be resolved in the 
legislature rather than the courts  as was the case in Bowers v. Hardwick, but  the 
issue of same-sex marriage has created national interest and conflicting rulings at the 
state level that promise that the issue will have to be tended to at the federal level.  
                                                                                                                                      
at 10 U.S.C. Sec. 654. The policy prohibits gays and lesbians from disclosing their 
sexual identity or sexual orientation and prohibits the military from investigating an 
individual’s sexual orientation. It also prohibits individuals in the military from 
talking homosexual relationships, including marriages or other familial attributes, 
while serving in the United States armed forces.  For a more thorough discussion on 
this point see: Gay Rights, Military Wrongs; Political Perspectives on Lesbians and 
Gays in the Military (Garland Reference Library of Social Science, Vol 1049) by C. 
Rimmerman (1996). 
99 See Baker v. Vermont 170 Vt 194, 215 n 13 
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     In many ways, the question of same-sex marriage is reminiscent of the 1967 case 
of Loving v. Virginia,100 which overturned a Virginia law prohibiting marriage 
between Blacks and Whites. On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the Virginia 
statute violated both the equal protection and the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The court argued that the Virginia’s miscegenation statutes rest solely 
upon the distinction according to race and therefore violates section one of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which holds that any state should not deny any person within 
its jurisdiction equal protection under the law. Similarly, laws that deny Gays rights 
and equal protection, depend almost exclusively on distinction according to sexual 
orientation.  
     In this section, I will proceed by attempting to explain why advocates chose the 
issue of same-sex marriage as the issue to assert rights-claims in the public sphere. 
Next, I will provide a brief overview of the critique of same-sex marriage. Then, I 
will turn my focus to the history of same-sex marriage in the liberal democratic state 
                                                
100See Loving v. Virginia, 388 US 1; 87 S. Ct. 1817; 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010; 1967. 
However, unlike the Loving case, there were no Massachusetts statutes explicitly 
prohibiting the marriage of same-sex couples or anyone for that matter. In June 1958, 
two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, an African-American, and Richard Loving, a 
white man, were married in the District of Columbia pursuant to its laws. Upon 
returning to Virginia and establishing themselves in Caroline County, the two were 
jailed for violating Virginia’s ban on interracial marriages. On January 6, 1959 the 
Loving pleaded guilty and were given a suspended one -year sentence on the 
condition that they leave the State and not return for 25 years. In November 1963, the 
Loving’s filed a motion in United States District Court to vacate the judgment 
alleging that the statutes violated their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
court denied the motion to vacate the sentences. The Supreme Court of Appeals 
upheld the constitutionality of the anti-miscegenation statutes and after, modifying 
the sentence, affirmed the convictions. The decision was overturned on Appeal on 
June 12, 1967.  
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and end with a discussion of the landmark case of Goodridge v. the Department of 
Public Health. 
Why the issue of Marriage:  
     Public opinion polls increasingly show that the American public is far more 
supportive of antidiscrimination laws that protect Gays and Lesbians against housing 
and employment discrimination than they are of same-sex marriage (Brewer and 
Wilcox 2005).  Close to 70% of respondents in a study conducted by the Pew 
Research Center agreed that gays and lesbians should not be allowed to marry or 
afforded the same rights as “traditional” marriage. Like the Equal Rights 
Amendment, Same-Sex marriage challenges dominant societal and political norms 
and values. As political scientist Jane Mansbridge (1986) cautions “Americans have 
always favored ‘rights’ in the abstract, but they support the principle of equal rights 
insofar as they think it is compatible or [does not stand in contradiction] to the status 
quo.” 
      The reason for choosing the issue of same-sex marriage as the issue for which 
resources and mobilization efforts are directed by Gay and Lesbian organizations and 
advocates are many. The first and probably most compelling reason for the focus on 
marriage is that in the modern democratic state, marriage is viewed as a legitimate 
and fundamental institution that has and continues to shape citizenship and rights 
(Cott 2000). Additionally, there is a clear appeal to the rationality of the court and the 
reliance of the state’s promise to remain neutral with regard to competing conceptions 
of the good or the promotion of one set of value of others in society. And unlike many 
of the other landmark cases such as Bowers and Lawrence, which appealed to issues 
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of privacy or community organizing efforts around health crisis issues like HIV or 
AIDS,101 marriage could not be separated out or dismissed as something specific to or 
only affecting the gay and lesbian community.  
       Connectedly, appeals by advocates in favor of same-sex marriage rest on liberal 
notions of fairness and equality under the law. To the extent that the state recognizes 
marriages between heterosexual couples, there is very little reason to deny the same 
recognition to gays and lesbians. As David Mayo (2000) argues, the claim of gays 
and lesbians to a right to marry is a substantive moral right that rests on the moral 
procedural right to be treated fairly.  
     Secondly, the permitting of same-sex marriage recognizes the sexual other in the 
public sphere.  Public and social policies have constrained gay and lesbian identity by 
refusing to acknowledge the sexual other in the public sphere. Policies like the “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” military policy enacted by President Clinton places homosexuality 
within the realm of the private sphere of intimate relations, rather than as an identity 
with distinct norms, values, and culture.  
       Lastly, in its most radical moment, same-sex marriage may “dismantle the 
structure of gender in every marriage” and broaden or displace the center of the 
discourse on marriage. If for example, as Brandzel (2005) points out, “marriage has 
supported and reified a hierarchical relationship between man and woman as husband 
and wife and as a breadwinner and homemaker, then same-sex marriages will trouble 
these equivalences.” Further, she goes on to say, “if marriage has been a central 
                                                
101 In the early 1980s HIV was considered a “gay disease” and some religious 
conservatives argued that it was punishment for being gay. This framing of HIV 
perpetuated homophobia and affected the treatment and attention paid to the epidemic 
in the public sphere. 
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vehicle by which the state has gendered, racialized, and sexualized its citizenry, then 
same-sex marriage will certainly disrupt this process.” 
     Leftist critics of same-sex marriage argue that rather than liberate gays and 
lesbians, marriage will force gays and lesbians to assimilate into the dominant culture 
and destroy the possibility for social justice (Ettelbrick 1989); and it “would most 
likely benefit those gays and lesbians who are well off and would exacerbate 
inequalities within the gay and lesbian community,” (Duclos 1991). Ettelbrick, for 
example, argues that same-sex marriage would undermine more important goals of 
LGBTQ movements, specifically “the affirmation of gay identity and culture in the 
public sphere.” Far from empowering gays, in Ettelbrick’s view same-sex marriage 
would make them invisible, constrain them, and force their assimilation into the 
mainstream. Further, she goes on to argue it reinforces the view that marriage is the 
only legitimate form of family.  
     While all of aforementioned critiques are certainly valid, they are certainly lost 
when placed within a rights-based framework that holds regardless of outcomes, 
perceived benefits, or disadvantages, there is no compelling reason to deny 
individuals rights granted to others in society.  Further, under liberal democratic 
theory and in the modern democratic state, choice is paramount whether or not it 
hurts or harms the group as a whole. As Mayo (2000) eloquently writes, “ even if 
claiming one’s right to same-sex marriage would compromise desirable social 
reforms, this would not show that doing so was unjustified. In fact, he goes on to say, 
“even if claiming one’s right to same-sex marriage would result in the violation of 
 131 
someone’s rights, it might still be justified so long as the persons claiming that right 
were not themselves violating the rights of others.”  
History of Same-Sex Marriage in the Modern Democratic State 
     While the issue of same-sex marriage has been the subject of hot debate since the 
decision in Goodridge v the Department of Public Health was handed down in 2003, 
there were several previous cases that laid the groundwork. In the early 1970’s fueled 
by the feminist movement and challenges to gender role expectations, same-sex 
couples began to challenge marriage laws. Baker v Nelson, marks the first time a 
same-sex couple, in this instance two men, had attempted to obtain a marriage license 
with an intent to wed. The plaintiffs in Baker argued that the denial of their 
“fundamental right” to marry was the equivalent to sex discrimination. The court 
swiftly rejected their claim by noting the common usage of the term marriage in law 
and society was the union of a man and a woman. The now familiar argument of 
marriage as a social institution intended for procreation and the rearing of children 
was also invoked as intuitive reason enough why their claim should be denied, after 
all biologically two men could not procreate.  
    Next, Singer v. Hara102 represents a second attempt by gays and lesbians to win the 
right to marry. In 1974, two gay rights activists filed a lawsuit against the state of 
Washington arguing that the prohibition of same-sex marriage violated the Equal 
Rights Amendment of the Washington Constitution. They argued that they were 
denied their petition to marry because of sexual classification. The court, unmoved, 
replied by noting that since both gay men and lesbians were equally denied, there was 
                                                
102 Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash.App. 247, 253-55, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191-92 
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no disparate treatment. Further, it noted that the petitioners’ claim had been rejected 
not because of their sex, but because of their type of relationship.  The court held that 
in the case of the Equal Rights Amendment:   
Individuals are protected from denial of existing rights or 
responsibilities solely because of their sex. No new rights are created 
and laws, which differentiate between the sexes, are not invalid when 
they are based on unique characteristics of one sex rather than upon 
membership in such sex per se. The limitation of marriage to persons 
of different sex does not offend due process or equal protection 
clause.103  
 
      Similarly, around the same time of the Singer case, two women filed suit in the 
state of Kentucky because a court clerk had denied them a marriage license. In the 
court of appeals, the Kentucky Court held that “no constitutional issues were involved 
because marriage by definition involves a man and a woman. Further, they held that 
the prohibition of same-sex marriage was invidiously discriminatory. The court 
distinguished between the Loving v. Virginia case by noting there is a clear distinction 
between a marital restriction based on race and one based on the fundamental 
difference in sex.     
     While widely unknown outside of the gay and lesbian community, these cases 
delivered devastating blows for the possibility of same-sex marriage. In the cases, 
morality, tradition, and dominant cultural norms and values influenced the decision of 
the courts. It would not be until 1993, in Baehr v. Lewin104 that the issue of same-
same sex marriage in the states would be revisited.   
                                                
103 ibid 
104 Baehr v. Lewin 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44 (1993). For a thorough discussion on 
this case see Richard Nunan, Legal Aspects of Gay and Lesbian Studies Volume 97, 
Number 1 (Fall 1997) Newsletter on Philosophy and Law 
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      In the landmark case that set into motion federal acts and legislation such as the 
Defense of Marriage Act, the Supreme Court of Hawaii ruled that the state had failed 
to demonstrate an adequate reason for restricting marriage to heterosexual couples. 
The court held “A state statute barring same-sex marriages is presumed 
unconstitutional unless the state can show that (a) the statute’s sex based 
classification is justified by compelling state interests and (b) the statute is narrowly 
drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement….of constitutional rights.” In this case, the 
defendants had failed to demonstrate either of these points, thus making the ban on 
same-sex marriages unconstitutional in the state.  It is important to note that one-year 
after the Baehr ruling, the governor of Hawaii signed into law a bill which prohibits 
same-sex marriage in Hawaii by defining marriage as existing only between two 
people of the opposite sex.  
     In 1997 two lesbians couples and one gay couple brought a lawsuit to obtain a 
marriage licenses and to subsequently have their marriages recognized by the state of 
Vermont. The Supreme Court of Vermont ruled that current state law unfairly 
discriminated against gay and lesbian couples. As a result, the court ordered the state 
to create legislation to correct the problem. The ruling was vague, however, on how 
this oversight would be corrected. The ruling held that the legislature would expand 
the right to marry to include couples of all sexual orientations or would set up a 
parallel “domestic partnership” status that would allow gays and lesbians to receive 
the same rights as heterosexual couples. To date, gays and lesbians are not allowed to 




The Great Purple Hope: Goodridge v the Department of Public Health 
     Years from now, Goodridge v. the Department of Public Health will be considered 
one of the seminal cases and turning points for the LGBTQ movement in terms of 
attaining rights and recognition in the public sphere. Unlike the cases before it, 
Goodridge arose in a political climate wrought with questions over morality, family 
values, and the government’s role in promoting a particular set of values and norms. 
The blanket of conservative thinking that had resurfaced at the end of the Clinton 
Presidency105 under President George W. Bush had become political currency used to 
promote a vision of a “common good” that among other things emphasized the 
patriarchal and heterosexual family structure.106  
       The decision handed down by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in the 
Goodridge case affirms the priority of the right over the good in the liberal 
democratic state. The Court ruled, “Barring an individual from the protections, 
benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because that person would marry a 
person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution.” In the decision the 
court observed the Massachusetts Constitution “affirms the dignity and equality of all 
individuals and forbids the creation of second-class citizens.”  In the Goodridge case, 
the plaintiffs relied on the promise of neutrality under liberalism and hoped that the 
state would deliver.   
                                                
105 Although a democratic president, President Clinton signed into legislation some of 
the most conservative public policies including the 1996 Welfare Reform Bill and the 
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell legislation. 
106 See Ronald Walters’ White Nationalism, Black Interests (2003) on this point 
regarding the rise of conservatism in the state. 
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    In the Goodridge Case, the Court did deliver on its promise to remain neutral on 
competing conceptions of the good present in society and ruled to the benefit of the 
plaintiffs. Many hailed the Massachusetts ruling as a major victory for gay rights and 
hoped that the decision would have a rippling effect across the country. However, 
within months after the ruling, fourteen states had adopted constitutional measures 
prohibiting same-sex marriage bringing the total number of states in the union to ban 
same-sex marriage to seventeen. In the state of Massachusetts, opposition and 
mobilization against the ruling was swift.  Shortly after the ruling, a proposal was 
crafted by conservative legislators to ban gay marriage and as early as 2006 the state 
could see a vote that could possibly reverse Goodridge.107  
       Although the victory of Goodridge is not lost, certainly there are questions raised 
concerning whether or not gays and lesbians in the state will be able to exercise their 
rights fully without interference. More importantly, whether or not the victory is a 
hollow or symbolic one that does not significantly alter the rights of gays and lesbians 
in the public sphere. I suggest that the answers to these questions can be found by 
exploring the Goodridge case through the lens of a Complex Theory of Rights.  
        With regard to the Goodridge Case, a Complex Theory of Rights would require 
us to look beyond the simple interaction between the state and individual for an 
explanation of the attainment of rights in the liberal democratic state and toward an 
                                                
107 The initiative to ban same-sex marriage in the state of Massachusetts despite the 
Goodridge ruling has been led by the Massachusetts Family Initiative (MFI). MFI 
delivered 170,000 signatures to the secretary of state, moving one step closer to 
having the initiative placed on the ballot. The initiative received another boost when 
Reilly, a democratic legislator in the state certified the ballot question as being 
permitted under the state constitution. For more information see: 
www.boston.com.news/local/massachusetts/articles/2005/09/07/reilly_certifies_gay_
marriage_ballot_initiative?mode=PF     
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explanation rooted in the interaction between various markers of difference and the 
structures and institutions that govern society. Further, it brings into focus the politics 
that may be undergirding concerns or squabbles over same-sex marriage in the public 
sphere. Going beyond the simple interaction between the individual and the state, it 
becomes clear that what is at stake is related to some sort of conception of the good or 
normativity present in society. In the case of same-sex marriage, it is the protection of 
the heterosexual family as defined by the presence of a man and woman; neatly 
delineated and proper gender roles; and protection against perceived sexual deviancy.  
     The constitutional question before the Court in Goodridge v. The Department of 
Health was “whether consistent with Massachusetts Constitution the commonwealth 
could deny those protections, benefits, and obligations to two individuals of the same 
sex who wish to marry. Further, whether as defendants claim the government action 
that bars same-sex couples from civil marriage constitutes a legitimate exercise of the 
State’s authority to regulate conduct, or whether, as the plaintiffs claim this 
categorical marriage exclusion violates the Massachusetts Constitution.”108  
                                                
108 Many have argued the state has a legitimate government interest in protecting   
marriage. They contend that primary purpose of marriage is pro-creation and the state 
has a compelling interest in the promoting birth. This narrow definition of marriage is 
problematic on two accounts: (1) it assumes that all individuals marry in order to pro-
create. Thus, making marriage a utilitarian arrangement to meet the ends of the state, 
and (2) It denies the fact that many married people choose not to have children or for 
medical reasons cannot conceive. Such a narrow definition of marriage leaves open 
the door for nonsensical claims that one is not truly married until one produces a child 
from the union. To date, proof of child has never been required to validate marriage. 
The court noted in the “modern age,” heterosexual intercourse, procreation, and child 
are not necessarily conjoined.  
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       Key to the Goodridge ruling was the Court’s decision to cast marriage as a civil, 
secular institution.  It noted that in Commonwealth v. Munson,109 statutes of the 
Colony, Province, or Commonwealth have regulated the requisites of a valid marriage 
and that no religious ceremony or stated beliefs had ever been required to substantiate 
a Massachusetts marriage.110 It concluded that the right to marry means little if it does 
not include the right to marry the person of one’s choice.111 By casting marriage as a 
civil institution and right created by the government, the court was able to maintain 
its neutrality and remain silent concerning the ethical, moral, and religious issues 
surrounding Gay marriage. Further, it was able to respect the autonomy of the 
individual to choose and pursue her own good. As such, the court’s obligation and 
duty was to define the liberty of all, not to mandate a moral code.112 
        With regard to the question of whether civil marriage enhances the ‘welfare of 
the community’ the court concurred with the defendants by noting that civil marriage 
anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships and bestowing 
benefits and privileges to those who choose to marry.  The rights granted to married 
couples that meet the minimal requirements are some 1, 059.113  
     The court remarked that the marriage ban works a deep and scarring hardship on 
same-sex couples for no rational reason. Further, it argued that the decision does not 
disturb the fundamental value of marriage in our society. That same-sex couples are 
                                                
109 Commonwealth v. Munson, 127 Mass. 459, 460-466 (1879) 







willing to embrace marriage’s solemn obligations of exclusivity, mutual support, and 
commitment to one another is a testament to the enduring place of marriage in our 
laws.114 
     To the issue of whether or not the state had a compelling interest in protecting the 
institution of marriage by defining it as the union between a man and a woman, the 
Court ruled the defendants had not sufficiently established that excluding gays and 
lesbians from the marriage would enhance the welfare of the state. The court, argued 
instead, that the decision to deny gays and lesbians the right to marry violated the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment and worked an undue burden upon gays 
and lesbian couples.  
        While the state of Massachusetts can be applauded for its clear interpretation of 
its Constitution in favor of individual rights and autonomy, the decision in Goodridge 
is overshadowed by conflicting decisions made at the federal level and in most other 
states concerning same-sex marriage and the still lively moral debates around 
homosexuality. For example, the Defense of Marriage Act, which defines marriage as 
the lawful union between a man and a woman, still weighs heavy on the Goodridge 
decision and is the grounds for which conservative groups have sought to overturn the 
decision.  The Act also gave the states discretion in deciding whether or not to 
recognize a union recognized by other states or jurisdictions. Again, this goes against 
over 100 years of law and tradition that assumes that marriage validated in one state 
would be valid in the others.  
                                                
114 Ibid 
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      D.O.M.A. as way of undermining the Goodridge case is an excellent example of 
the political and structural meta-spaces of complex theory of rights because it 
demonstrates the ways in which dominant social and political institutions influence or 
constrain individual rights and liberties in the modern democratic state.  For example, 
although the State of Massachusetts chooses to define marriage broadly to include 
gays and lesbians, the federal tax law and code still defines marriage as existing only 
between a man and a woman. At the federal level, the material benefits supposedly 
captured in the Goodridge case, had all but been diminished for gays and lesbians 
because the union is not recognized under federal law. I suppose the next lawsuit 
could be against the IRS after gay and lesbian couples have tried to file joint federal 
tax returns.  
       Next, a complex theory of rights holds that there is a notion of the good operating 
in society that makes it difficult for gays and lesbians to realize their full bundle of 
rights in the modern democratic state.  In this chapter, I have demonstrated that the 
good in relationship to marriage has been defined as the union of a man and a woman 
and the privileging of the heteronormative and patriarchal family structure. To the 
extent that this is the case, the attempt of gays and lesbians to broaden the center or to 
at least provide a competing moral or value frame is met with resistance because 
heterosexuality and homophobia are embedded in most, if not all of the institutions 
and structures that govern society. Attempts to attain rights or make rights-claims in 





     The significance of difference to the attainment of rights and the exercise of 
freedom in the modern democratic state is made transparent through the examination 
of the issue of same-sex marriage. In this chapter, I have argued that before 
individuals or groups can make rights-claims in the public sphere they must first be 
embodied as subjects under the law. In essence, the Goodridge case constituted gays 
and lesbians as bearers of rights under the law and in the public sphere. However, this 
recognition has not yet translated to political and social equality in the public sphere 
for gays and lesbians. 
      Moreover, I have suggested that the ability to attain one’s full bundle of rights in 
the society is not only a result of the relationship between the state and the individual, 
but the dynamic interaction between markers such as race, class, gender, sexual 
orientation and the institutions and structures that govern society or shape individual 
rights and liberties. I have also worked to demonstrate that there is a concept of the 
Good that is shaped by the laws, customs, and traditions present in any given society 





Violence Against Women and Gendered Citizenship in the Modern Democratic 
State: The impact of differential experience and social location on the realization 
of rights in liberal democracies. 
 
Introduction: 
It is nevertheless true that the personal is political and there’s no area 
in which that is more true than violence. 
   Patricia Ireland, Former President of NOW 
 
Given the racist and patriarchal patterns of the state, it is difficult to 
envision the state as the holder of solutions to the problem of violence 
against women of color. How can one expect the state to solve the 
problem of violence against women, when it constantly recapitulates 
its own history of colonialism, racism, and war? 
Angela Davis   2002 
 
     In the modern democratic state, women’s citizenship and rights are shaped not 
only by her ability to pursue her own ends and values, but also by her ability to do so 
without harm or injury. In fact, it has only been in the last twenty years that women’s 
experiences of violence in the public and private spheres of society have come to be 
recognized as an impediment to her freedom and autonomy (Bern 2001). Laws 
against sexual harassment and coercion to landmark legislation such as the Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994 point to the ways in which full citizenship and the 
attainment of rights are predicated upon gender differences.  
     The mainstream anti-violence movement has relied upon essentialized notions of 
gender and sex to contextualize women’s experiences of violence in the modern 
democratic state (Crenshaw 1995, Smith 2002). They have framed claims to 
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protection and rights to resources around the understanding that the root causes of 
violence against women are patriarchy and sexism. As such, the subject of violence as 
well as the beneficiaries of protection in the state is without regard for race, sexual 
orientation, ethnicity, or any other distinguishing markers outside of gender.  
     Women of color have long taken issue with the definition of violence perpetrated 
against women as solely a gender issue as well as the over reliance on the state for 
protection against violence by women (Crenshaw 1995 Smith 2003).  Women’s 
experiences of violence and relatedly their ability to exercise their rights is shaped not 
only by gender hierarchies present in society, but race, ethnicity, class, sexual 
orientation, hierarchies as well. Further, these hierarchies intersect (Crenshaw 1995) 
and mutually construct one another (Collins 2000) to inform individual rights and 
liberties in the modern democratic state.  
     In this chapter, I explore how gender has impacted the realization of rights in the 
modern democratic state and how the intersections of race, class, and other markers 
of difference alter rights-claims or what women define as equality or freedom in the 
public sphere. I employ the issue of violence against women to demonstrate the ways 
in which race and class qualitatively alters the right-claims presented by women in 
the public sphere. Further, I will mark the ways in which a complex theory of rights is 
better able to explain why despite formal equality, women have yet to achieve full 
social and political equality. 
     I will proceed by defining the gendered citizen in the modern democratic state. 
Then, I briefly discuss the impact of difference and social location on the attainment 
of rights in the public sphere by women of color. I will discuss the ways in which 
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race, class, sexual orientation, and ethnicity shapes and informs women’s experience 
of violence and her ability to attain her full bundle of rights in the public sphere.  
Specifically, I will use the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 to argue that despite 
the legislation’s significance it failed to account for the impact of racial, ethnic, and 
sexual differences in women’s experience of violence and the historic role of the state 
in victimizing communities of color.  
Defining Gendered Citizenship in the Modern Democratic State 
     Much has been written about what constitutes a woman’s right in the modern 
democratic state. The struggle to attain and secure rights on the part of women has 
been closely tied with not the protection of rights, a kind of negative freedom, but by 
the denial of rights or privileges based on gender or sex (Lister 1997). As such, a 
woman’s right is defined contextually within the masculine public sphere and towards 
securing protection and freedom long extended to men in the liberal democratic state 
(Brown 1995).115  
     The contemporary U.S. Women’s Movement has tended to define rights civilly 
and root rights claims in the language of equality, autonomy, access, and the economy 
(Brown 1995, Donovan 1996). Rights-claims focus on the unequal status of women in 
the public and private spheres; access to spaces and opportunities long denied; and 
the economic position and well being of women in comparison to their male 
counterparts (Rubin 1975, Hartmann 1981). The framing of rights-claims on the part 
of women is usually  “We have a right to or A life free from.”  A few ready examples 
of what I am talking about can be found in early and current women’s rights 
                                                
115 See Wendy Brown’s Finding the Man in the State in States of Injury (1995) 
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campaigns or efforts that emphasize ideas or tenets like  “Women have the right to 
vote, a right to hold property, a right to work, a right to privacy, a right to earn equal 
pay for equal work, or women are entitled to a life free from violence, coercion, or 
harm. Historic and current legislation ranging from the Nineteenth Amendment to the 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 are instances of claims made on the part of 
women to secure the full bundle of rights guaranteed to all, but not delivered in the 
liberal democratic state.  
     In the modern democratic state, the exclusion of women has been pivotal to the 
historical theoretical, and political construction of citizenship (Lister 2001). The 
exclusion of women was not accidental or a result of oversight, but integral and 
intentional to both the liberal and republican traditions of freedom. Hence, women’s 
claims to rights in the public sphere is simultaneously a recognition of the impact of 
gender on the realization of rights in the public sphere, meaning that the rights one is 
able to enjoy in society is mediated by gender or sex, and the backdoor request on the 
part of some feminists that this recognition be denied in order for women to achieve 
full autonomy and freedom in society.116   In both instances, the masculine subject of 
rights is left in tact.  
     Recent feminist critiques of citizenship have only modestly brushed upon the topic 
of the impact of difference on the realization of rights in the modern democratic state. 
Most critiques have focused on the gendered subject of rights without regard for 
racial, class, or ethnic differences that exist between and among women that 
dramatically alters rights-claims or what women deem as valuable or movement 
                                                
116 See Josephine Donovan’s Feminist Theory: The Intellectual Traditions of 
American Feminisms  (1996) 
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towards equality in the public sphere (Yuval-Davis 1997).  Efforts to resolve this 
tension tend to get lost in discussions around the universal and the particular, i.e. the 
promise of the universal to measure the claims for inclusion on the part of women 
versus the disintegration of the category woman into differentiated parts that cannot 
be measured or quantified. As Iris Young (2000) puts it, it is distinction between 
universality as partiality where the adoption of a general point of view that leaves 
behind particular affiliations, commitments, and desires is favored and universality of 
moral commitment where there is a commitment to the equal moral worth and 
participation and inclusion of all persons.  
     In the introduction, I led with an originary tale of rights which argued that in 
society there exists two groups, one group who has rights from the beginning, for the 
sake of argument let say this group consists of property holding, heterosexual, white 
men and the other group consists of women, racial and ethnic minorities and other 
similarly situated persons who upon entering society go about securing rights already 
bestowed upon members of the first group.  As such, we can imagine that meaning of 
citizenship for each group will be different.  If we use this example for thinking about 
the gendered nature of citizenship, we can conclude that men and women have always 
had different relationships to citizenship and rights whereby women are at a distinct 
disadvantage because the very definition of citizen in the early republic was exclusive 
to men. As Lister (1997) notes, women’s gradual achievement of civil, political, and 
social rights often followed a different pattern than men. To date, I cannot recall a 
point in history where heterosexual, white men have had to fight for a right 
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guaranteed to women and racial and ethnic minorities, although, I can certainly recall 
the reverse.  
     Feminist theorists have lifted, what Lister (1997) refers to as the veil of gender-
neutrality that has tended to obscure the masculine subject of rights under liberalism. 
By lifting the veil, there is an acknowledgment of the historical existence of women 
as non-citizen and exposure of the differential relationship between men and women 
with regards to rights and citizenship in the modern democratic state. Liberalism clear 
insistence of an abstract subject of rights fails to take into account the historical 
exclusion of women and how this exclusion impacts rights-claims in the public 
sphere. 
     Feminist accounts of the origins of the exclusion of women from civil society lead 
back to the sexual division of labor and the sharp distinction between the public and 
private spheres under liberalism (Pateman 1988).117 The sexual division of labor 
defined as work performed by women, which usually takes place in the private 
sphere, such as, child care and household activities and the worked performed by men 
usually in the public sphere in exchange for commodities. This division of labor, 
many liberal feminists argued made women dependent upon men and devalued, since 
work performed in the private sphere was outside the meaningful sphere of public 
economic production (Freidan 1963).  This critique of the sexual division of labor, I 
contend, formed the cornerstone of gendered citizenship in the United States.  
                                                
117 In The Sexual Contract (1988) Carole Pateman argues that civil society is divided 
into two opposing realms, each with a distinctive and contrasting mode of association. 
The political sphere brings the public world of civil law, civil freedom, and equality, 
contract, and the individual into being.   
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     By calling attention to and disputing the sexual division of labor and by extension 
the public/private split, feminists were able to articulate the status and position of 
women that was separate and distinct from that of men. Also, it revealed the 
patriarchal and masculinist nature of the public sphere and proffered that it might be 
hostile towards women (Pateman 1988, Brown 1995). However, rather than 
emphasizing the impact of gender on the realization of rights, liberal feminists, as a 
strategy chose to emphasize the moral equality of individuals found in the liberal 
tradition.  
     Following the liberal tradition, early feminists argued that men and women were 
naturally and ontologically the same. Indeed, feminist pioneer Sarah Grimke argued 
that it was pernicious to look upon a woman a female first and a person second. 
“Nothing, she argued, has tended more to destroy the true dignity of woman, than the 
fact she is approached by man in the character of a female (Donovan 1996).”  
     From a rights perspective, feminists working within the liberal framework argued 
against difference and believed that the realization of rights within the modern 
democratic state would come by stressing the inalienability of natural rights and 
appealing to claims of political neutrality found under liberal democratic theory. As 
Drucilla Cornell (1998) notes, following Kant, we should privilege the freedom of 
every member of society as a human being. For women, it is this freedom that had 
been historically denied. Hence, rights-claims made in the public sphere on the behalf 
of women were based on the belief that women as a group had been denied their full 
bundle of rights and the reliance of the state to deliver on its promise of neutrality in 
helping women to secure those rights.  
 148 
     Needless to say the road to equality for women has been paved with lawsuits, 
protests, and resistance. Within the liberal framework, women have relied in earnest 
on the state to secure rights and freedom in the public sphere. The thought being that 
securing rights and liberties in the public sphere would translate to social and political 
equality across the board.  As Wendy Brown (1995) notes, nineteenth-century 
feminists appeals to the state include campaigns for suffrage, protective labor 
legislation, temperance, birth control, and marriage law reform. She goes on to say 
that in the twentieth century the list was expanded to include equal opportunity, equal 
pay, equal rights, comparable worth; reproductive rights and public day care; reform 
of rape, abuse, marriage and harassment laws; and in the last decade, labor legislation 
concerned with maternity, as well as state regulation of pornography, surrogacy, and 
new reproductive technologies (Brown1995).  As such, in thinking about gendered 
citizenship, the care and treatment of these issues have come to be equated with the 
realization of rights in the modern democratic state for women.  
     The problem, however, with this framing of rights-claims made on the part of 
women under liberalism in the public sphere is threefold: (1) it fails to account for the 
accumulated privilege of men gained through the historical and ideological exclusion 
of women from the public sphere; (2) it overemphasizes the relationship between the 
group and state for realizing rights; and (3) it denies the ways in which social 
location, experience, racial, ethnic, and class differences impacts one’s understanding 
of freedom and equality. I will examine each of these points in turn. 
     The appeal to equality and sameness by feminists under liberal democratic theory 
fails to account for the accumulated privilege gained by men through the historical 
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and ideological exclusion of women from the public sphere. Under liberalism, it is 
assumed that once women enter society or are embodied as subjects under the law, 
they are moral and political equals with men. However, the laws, institutions, 
discourses, and structures present in society are all “inextricably bound, however 
differently, with the prerogatives of masculinity and manhood in a male dominated 
society,” (Brown 1995).  As such, women are at a distinct disadvantage because the 
terms under which to advance or assert rights-claims in the public sphere are male-
centered. For example, the nineteenth amendment guaranteed women suffrage, but 
did not account for the ways in which men had come to dominate the public sphere so 
much so that the representation of women in politics was so dismal that the likelihood 
that the status of women would change because women gained the right to vote was 
highly unlikely.  
     Connectedly, women must rely on the recognition of their subordination by the 
state to assure remedies, attain rights, or collect for injuries. On the first level, they 
must be embodied as subjects under the law and must gain full recognition as free and 
equal persons. On a separate, but related level, there’s a demand for equitable 
treatment whenever gender difference is a consideration to ensure one’s equal ability 
to “make use of the basic liberties guaranteed to all citizens and would require fair 
access to opportunities, resources, or capabilities,” (Cornell 1998).  
     Under liberalism, the burden of proof is not on the state, but women or the 
disenfranchised group to prove unequal or disparate treatment, i.e. the state is not a 
protector of rights until it realizes or believes a right has been violated. This would be 
fine if the originary tale read like some version of Rawls’ Theory of Justice, whereby 
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everyone is cloaked behind a veil of ignorance, but pragmatically it poses problems 
for women and other similarly situated groups attempting to realize their full bundle 
of rights in society. The historical and material experiences of groups cannot be 
erased upon entering the public sphere. These experiences shape and inform not only 
rights-claims, but also the standpoint from which these claims are made (Williams 
1991).118 Liberalism fails to account for the many positions and standpoints from 
which right-claims are articulated in the public sphere (See Collins 2000, Dill and 
Zinn 2003).  
     Next, the over emphasis and over reliance on the relationship between the state 
and the individual under liberalism is problematic for women because it fails to 
account for other dynamics present in the public sphere and civil society that might be 
impacting the realization of rights or ability to attain full equality. Chief among these 
dynamics is a concept of the good present in society that defines women’s roles and 
capacities in society; institutions and structures present in society that are male 
dominated or male centered; and the representation of women present in dominant 
culture.  As such, gendered citizenship or the realization of rights on the part of 
women relies heavily on our ability to manage not only the relationship between 
women and the state, but also the dynamics that influence the outcomes of rights-
claims in civil society.  
    A prime illustration of what I am talking about can be found in the pursuit of the 
passage of the Equal Rights Amendment by feminists and women’s rights advocates. 
                                                
118 For a more thorough discussion on this point see Patricia Williams’ The Alchemy 
of Race and Rights (1991) where she articulates how critiques of rights in the modern 
democratic state are shaped by the historical experiences and legacies of individuals 
and groups in society.  
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Introduced in every session of Congress between 1923 until 1972, The ERA119 called 
for equality of rights under the law for women and for protection or enforcement of 
these rights by the state. To date, the ERA is the clearest demonstration of women’s 
demand for equality and their full bundle of rights under the liberal framework. It 
embodies the spirit and tone of liberal democratic theory that individuals are moral 
and political equals in the public sphere. At the deadline for ratification on June 30, 
1982 only thirty-five of the required thirty-eight states had ratified the amendment. 
Thus, it was never passed. The failure of the ERA,120 I argue, is due in large part to 
the aforementioned dynamics that extend beyond the simple relationship between the 
state and the individual under liberal democratic theory.  
     The ERA, although purporting to secure equal rights and freedom for women 
challenged the patriarchal and masculinist state by calling into question the role of 
women and men in society. As Drucilla Cornell (1998) notes patriarchy connotes the 
state-enforced and culturally supported norm of heterosexual monogamy as the only 
appropriate organization of family life. This norm, she goes on to say, as it has been 
traditionally defined tends to cast the father as the head of the line and define women 
mainly by their reproductive capacity in the private sphere and as such women are 
                                                
119 The ERA was last introduced in the 108th Congress (2003-2004) with no imposed 
deadline for ratification. The text of the legislation reads: Section 1. Equality of rights 
under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on 
account of sex. Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. Section 3. This amendment shall 
take effect two years after the date of ratification. 
120 For a provocative and thorough discussion on the Equal Rights Amendment, see 
Why We Lost the ERA (1986) by Jane Mansbridge. Mansbridge also makes the point 
the failure of the ERA was also a result of the framing of the reach and scope of the 
Amendment by proponents and the passage of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 which captured elements of the ERA.  
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denied the right of self-representation.  This norm, Cornell speaks of, I argue has 
come to constitute a sort of good in civil society and to the extent that the ERA or 
similar efforts challenge this good, there is conflict and the possibility that efforts will 
fall short.  This point is supported by Jane Mansbridge in her ground breaking book 
Why We Lost the ERA (1986), when she notes in relation to the failure of the ERA 
that the American public did not want any significant change in gender roles, whether 
at work, at home or in society at large.  At once, we can begin to see a more complex 
explanation of the realization of rights in the modern democratic state begin to 
emerge with regard to women where there are many factors that influence whether 
groups or individual with attain full autonomy and freedom.  
     Lastly, the denial of the impact of social, experiences, racial, ethnic, and class 
difference by liberal feminists under liberalism is problematic because it fails to 
account for the ways in which women’s relationship to the state and the public sphere 
is intimately shaped by their social status and position. For example, Roe v. Wade 
guarantees a woman’s right to choose an abortion, but failed to consider how the right 
to choose is mitigated by access to economic resources and information. It also failed 
to consider the ways in which women of color’s reproductive autonomy and freedom 
in the country had been shaped by colonial legacies of forced sterilization and 
enslavement (Roberts 1997 Smith 2003). Further, when legislation121 was introduced 
                                                
121 Three years after Roe v. Wade was decided, Congress passed the first "Hyde 
Amendment" to the fiscal 1977 Medicaid appropriation. Introduced by anti-choice 
Congressman Henry J. Hyde, the Hyde Amendment barred the use of federal 
Medicaid funds for abortion except when carrying the pregnancy to term would 
endanger the life of the woman. A 1984 study conducted by researchers from The 
Alan Guttmacher Institute showed that 44 percent of women on Medicaid who 
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and subsequently passed to prohibit the use of government funds for abortion, which I 
argue disproportionately affected the rights and autonomy of poor women and women 
of color, white feminists failed to use their resources and efforts to counter the 
attacks.122  
The Impact of Difference and Social Location on the Attainment of Rights in the 
Modern Democratic State 
 
Women of Color have long challenged the hegemony of feminisms 
constructed primarily around the lives of white middle-class women. 
Since the late 1960s U.S. women of color have taken issue with 
unitary theories of gender… Speaking simultaneously from “within 
and against” both women’s liberation and antiracist movements, we 
have insisted on the need to challenge systems of domination, not 
merely as gendered subjects, but as women whose lives are affected by 
our location in multiple hierarchies.  
 --Bonnie Thornton Dill and Maxine Baca Zinn 2003  
     The challenge posed in understanding the impact of difference and social location 
on the attainment of rights in the modern democratic state is that rights-claims made 
in the public sphere by women or by racial and ethnic groups tend to be centered 
around essentialized notions of gender and race respectively. This is problematic 
because often times, political and discursive practices relating to race and gender 
often silence or erase the experiences of women of color. Under liberalism, the 
gendered subject of rights becomes even narrower when the experiences of women of 
color are taken under consideration.  
                                                                                                                                      
obtained abortions that year paid for them with money earmarked for living expenses, 
such as food, rent, and utilities.  
122 For a more thorough discussion on this point see, Silliman et al, Undivided Rights: 
Women of Color Organize for Reproductive Justice (2004). 
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     For this discussion, Dill and Zinn’s theory of multi-racial feminism is of critical 
importance.  In Theorizing difference from Multi-racial Feminism123 (2003), Dill and 
Zinn argue that “gender is constructed by a range interlocking inequalities or what 
Patricia Hill Collins calls ‘a matrix of domination.’ The idea of the matrix, they go on 
to say, “is that several systems work with and through each other” to shape individual 
subjectivity in the public sphere. Further, they assert individuals experience race, 
class, gender, and sexuality differently depending upon their social location in 
hierarchies of race, class, gender, and/or sexual orientation. As such, the matrix of 
domination is able to recognize and accounts for the different ways that individuals 
enter the public sphere and the discourse on rights, as simultaneously race, class, 
sexed, or gendered subjects.  
     Like a complex theory of rights, multi-racial feminism emphasizes the relationship 
between social structures and institutions present in society and women’s exercise of 
autonomy and freedom. Multi-racial feminism acknowledges and is able to account 
for the ways in which women of color are able to maneuver through racist, 
patriarchal, or classist institutions and structures to “shape and define their own 
lives.” This is especially true in terms of defining women’s rights and what is 
considered equality or justice in the public sphere, where women of color have 
created institutions and organizations of resistance to advance rights-claims that are 
reflective of their experiences and political agendas.  Examples of these organizations 
include the Combahee River Collective, the National Black Feminist Organization, 
The National Black Women’s Health Project, Black Feminist Caucus of the Black 
                                                
123 Dill and Zinn highlight six components of multi-racial feminism in the article, but 
for the purposes of the discussion I have chosen to highlight only a few.  
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Radical Congress, The National Asian and Pacific American Women’s Forum, 
INCITE, National Latina Institute for Reproductive Health, and the National 
Women's Alliance.124 
     With regard to the realization of rights in the modern democratic state, difference 
and social location are extremely relevant because what one deems valuable as a right 
is directly informed by race, class, gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation. The 
position produced out marginality automatically entails a vision of justice and 
equality that is broader and in some instances more complete than those positioned at 
the center of discourse and knowledge production (Harstock 1997, Collins 2000).  
During the second wave of feminism, for example, the primary concern of feminists 
or gender activists was that of economic equality and the attainment of civil rights. 
Much of the literature coming out of the period on women’s position in society 
centered around the sexual division of labor, the impact of capitalism on women’s 
lives (Hartmann 1981), and the political economy of “sex” (Rubin 1975). Other issues 
included reproductive autonomy and freedom and violence against women.  
     To illustrate my point regarding the relevance of difference and social location to 
rights-claims made in the public sphere, I would like to take the issue of “the right to 
work” as articulated by liberal feminists. Liberal feminists believed that a woman’s 
right to work outside of the home was key to dismantling the sexual division of labor 
and achieving full equality in the public sphere. The claims made in the public sphere 
under the rubric “the right to work” were related to issues of equal pay for equal 
                                                
124 All of these organizations are women of color led and were created out of or in 
recognition of the marginalization of women of color in mainstream movements for 
social and political change. 
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work, access to jobs and careers long held by men, child care, and harm from sex 
discrimination in the work place. While it is certainly reasonable to assume that 
attaining these rights in the public sphere would affect the daily lives of all women, 
the “right to work” rights-claims in the public sphere tended to reflect the experiences 
of middle-class white women.  
     Women of color’s historic relationship to work in the public sphere and in society 
might effectuate a different list of right-claims with regard to “the right to work” in 
the public sphere that would be reflective of their lives and experiences and have a 
clear race and class analysis that would understand women’s different relationship to 
work125 Histories of forced labor through enslavement, domestic servitude, and the 
fact that many women of color worked outside of the home (sometimes in the homes 
of white families) during the period when white women were demanding the right to 
do so, calls into question the gendered lens of citizenship within liberal democratic 
state under which women make claims in the public sphere.  To this point, feminist 
historian Elsa Barkley Brown notes:  
Middle class white women’s lives [and their concerns] are not just 
different from working-class White, Black, and Latina women’s lives. 
It is important to recognize that middle-class women live the lives they 
do precisely because working class women live the lives they do. 
White women and women of color not only live different lives, but 
white women live the lives they do in large part because women of 
color live the ones they do…. White middle class women moved from 
a primary concern with home and children to involvement in voluntary 
associations when they were able to have homes and children cared for 
by the services—be they direct or indirect—of other women. White 
middle-class women have been able to move into the labor force in 
increasing numbers not just differently from other women but 
                                                
125 For a more thorough discussion on this point, see Sister Circle: Black Women and 
Work, specifically Bonnie Thornton Dill’s “Our Mothers Grief.” 
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precisely because of the different experience of other women and 
men.126 (Brown 1992, p.  . 
 
      With regards to rights, Black women, Latina, and Native-American women enter 
the public sphere and the discourse on rights and citizenship in ways dramatically 
different from white women. Women of color enter the discourse on rights and 
citizenship as not only gendered subjects, but also raced and classed subjects as well. 
Again, all reflective of histories of enslavement, exclusion, and conquest that denied 
the human dignity and worth of individuals and groups based on race or ethnicity in 
the early republic. With regard to work, women of color understood on a fundamental 
level that work could not only be liberating, but oppressive as well. Liberal 
democratic theory fails not to only adequately account for difference in the public 
sphere, but leaves little, if any room, for the accommodation of individuals situated 
within multiple hierarchies within the groups. Difference and social location alters 
rights-claims made in the public sphere made by groups and individuals. However, 
under liberalism that is a tendency to deny these differences and dichotomize groups 
and claims in the public sphere.  
     Next, I would like to turn my attention to the issue of violence against women as a 
way of understanding right-claims made in the public sphere by women and the ways 
in which the intersections of race, class, gender, and sexual orientation shape 
women’s experiences of violence and ultimately rights in the liberal democratic state.   
                                                
126 See also Grace Chang’s Disposable Domestics (2000) where she provides a 




Engendering Violence in the Modern Democratic State 
     For the purposes of this dissertation, I define violence against women as a broad 
social justice issue that happens in public and private and across race, class, gender, 
sexuality, ethnicity, religion, ability, and other markers of difference. Further, I 
understand violence as harm or injury that affects an individual's sense of emotional, 
economic, physical, and mental wellbeing.127 Under this broad umbrella, I will focus 
on domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking as defined under the Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994.  
       The passage of the Violence Against Women Act in 1994 catapulted the issue of 
violence against women into the mainstream like no efforts before it had. The 
landmark legislation marked a turning point for addressing domestic violence, sexual 
assault, and stalking128 in the United States.  It not only allocated funding for violence 
prevention efforts, but also outlined legal and judicial consequences for perpetrators. 
The Act was a culmination of organizing efforts at the local, state, and federal levels 
by violence against women advocates129 to recognize the ways in which gender 
                                                
127 Defining violence against women as a social justice issue allows us to examine the 
structural and institutional causes of violence against women as well identify societal 
supports for violence. And like many women of color violence against women 
activists, I understand racism, classism, ethnocentrism, sexism, ageism, heterosexism, 
and ableism as acts of violence. Collectively and separately these forms of oppression 
hinder collective and individual progress. See also INCITE!, women of color against 
violence principles of unity (2006).  
128 Stalking was not in the 1994 version of the Violence Against Women Act. It was 
added in the reauthorization bill in 2000.  
129 For a discussion on the history and the development of the violence against 
women’s movement see: Women’s Movements and State Policy Reform aimed at 
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impacts the rights, citizenship, and mobility of women in the modern democratic 
state.  
     VAWA was passed as title IV, of the Violent Control and Law Enforcement Act130 
and its first four years provided 1.6 billion dollars to enhance the investigation and 
prosecution of violence crimes perpetrated against women. The Act was authorized as 
a valid exercise of congress’ power to enforce the fourteenth amendment to ‘remedy 
state action that denies individuals the equal protection of the laws. Congress found 
that the state justice systems routinely treat violent crimes motivated by gender less 
seriously than other crimes.” Since its passage, the bill has been reauthorized twice.  
     VAWA, I contend, highlights the problem of gendered citizenship in the modern 
democratic state. While the legislation grew out of the demands in the public sphere 
by feminists and gender activists, the framing of the issue was primarily constructed 
around the experiences and lives of middle-class white women. The movement 
preceding the Act tended to frame violence against women as a result of cultural and 
structural systems of gender-discrimination—a patriarchal system that includes other 
forms of violence and discrimination against women (Berns 2001)131.” As such, it is 
not surprising that redress or remedies in the public sphere in terms of legislation and 
public policies with respect to violence would reflect the social location and 
                                                                                                                                      
Domestic Violence Against Women: A comparison of the Consequences of 
Movement Mobilization in the U.S. and India by Diane Bush, Gender and Society 
Vol. 6. No. 4 (Dec 1992) 
130 VAWA and the 1994 crime bill in general was supported by Congressional 
Democrats and President Clinton 
131 Bern also notes that there was a split occurring among advocates with regard to the 
causes of violence against women with some advocates choosing to emphasis the 
“psychological” and “clinical” causes and remedies for violence against women. 
 160 
positionality of middle-class white women.  In the 1994 legislation, the recognition of 
race, class, ethnicity, and sexual orientation as factors that intimately shape women’s 
experience of violence was noticeably absent.132 In fact, it would not be until the 
reauthorization of VAWA 2005, nearly 11 years later, that the impact of race, culture, 
and ethnicity on women’s experience of violence would be taken seriously under the 
act.133 
     In the modern democratic state, the center of gendered citizen is the white, 
heterosexual, middle class woman.  As such, rights-claims in the public sphere tend to 
reflect her interests, concerns and political agenda.  I would also suggest that there is 
a constant de-emphasis of race, class, sexuality, ethnicity, or other markers of 
difference in the public sphere because it troubles the core of gendered citizenship in 
liberal democracies. A prime illustration of what I am talking about can found by 
examining the issue of sexual harassment in the liberal democratic state.  
     The case that established sexual harassment as a practice of sex discrimination by 
the United States Supreme Court was Vinson v. Taylor.134 Vinson, a Black woman 
had filed a suit against her former employer, Meritor Bank, under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming that during her employment at the bank she had 
                                                
132 See Violence Against Women Act of 1994 
133 The push for the inclusion of special provisions of VAWA 2005 to reflect the 
experiences of women of color was made by the People of Color Caucus, Sisters of 
Color Ending Sexual Assault, Representative Hilda Solis, and the National Women’s 
Alliance. This inclusion was met with resistance and was debated in communities and 
in congress. In fact, there was a Manager’s Amendment submitted by House Judiciary 
Committee Chair James Sensenbrenner (R-WI). The amendment proposed to strip 
away language from the reauthorization of VAWA Act that provides for adequate 
services for racial and ethnic communities. 
134 See Meritor Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)  
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been subjected to sexual harassment by her direct supervisor. Vinson argued that over 
her nearly three years of employment at the bank she had been forced to have sex 
with her direct supervisor in order to keep her job. The law against sexual harassment 
is the first law to be written on the basis of women’s experience and the first to 
recognize that sexual abuse can violate an individual’s rights under the fourteenth 
amendment.135  
     Vinson’s claim to protection under the law was based solely on sex or gender 
discrimination in the public sphere. While sufficient, it failed to account for the role 
race and the historic construction of Black women’s sexuality as having shaped her 
experiences of violence and they ways in which access to her body may have been 
assumed by her white male perpetrator (A.Y. Davis 1983 Roberts 1997 Collins 2000 
A. Davis 2002).136 Sexual harassment activists and lawyers chose to frame the issue 
as strictly gender-based. As Barkley Brown (1997) notes “the National Organization 
for Women, feminist legal scholar Catharine MacKinnon, and others spoke 
forcefully, but in doing so often persisted in perpetuating a deracialized notion of 
women’s experiences.” 
     Another example with regard to the issue of sexual harassment and in the 
difficulty in accommodating a multiply situated gendered citizen under the law and 
                                                
135 See Catharine A. Mackinnon’s Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A case of 
sexual discrimination and the Reader’s Companion to Women’s U.S. Women’s 
History (1998), ed Wilma Mankiller. 
136 Also see NO! a documentary on Black women and sexual violence by Aishah 
Shahidah Simmons which provides a historical context for Black women’s 
experiences of rape and sexual assault during slavery and its impact on Black 
women’s sexuality and rights today.  
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the public sphere can be found in the Hill-Thomas hearings of 1991 where Anita Hill, 
a Black woman publicly announced that she had been sexually harassed by Clarence 
Thomas, a Black man up for an appointment to the Supreme Court of the United 
States.  
     Much has been written about the Hill-Thomas hearings exploring the dynamics of 
race, class, and gender in relation to power in society . What has not been explored, as 
much is how Hill’s position as a Black woman, situated within multiple hierarchies, 
radically alters her rights-claims in the public sphere. When Hill makes her claim of 
sexual harassment against Thomas, she is not constituted as an individual under the 
law. Her protection under the law is either as woman or as an African-American. 
Consequently, Hill’s both/and status as a Black woman leaves her exposed and bereft 
of a discourse in which to situate herself. In a matter of speaking, her position is 
constitutionally indefensible. She had to not only had to prove discrimination based 
on gender, but on race as well. Her status as a Black woman severely limits the 
remedies and protection available to her under the law.  
     The Hill case illustrates the difficulty in articulating publicly and through 
discourse a theory of rights that extends beyond single identity markers and is able to 
grasp the impact of social associations, history, competing narratives, and political 
investments on right-claims in liberal democracies. Hill’s claims are further 
complicated by the historic representation of Black women in society137 and the fact 
that her claim was against a Black man. As Crenshaw (1995) notes, the discourses 
                                                
137 See Patricia Hill Collins’ Black Feminist Thought (2000). 
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used to highlight gender and races biases in laws and society are often oppositional 
and contradictory. 
       For many, there was no language to speak to the “history routinely ignored or 
played down138 concerning the representation and status of Black women in society 
and how it shaped the hearings and the outcome of the Hill-Thomas trials. Feminists 
who championed Anita Hill did so because they saw it as a gender issue and 
challenge to Patriarchy.139 Detractors of Hill portrayed her as race traitor and refused 
to see her Blackness in concert with her gender.  As Crenshaw (1995) notes, racism 
as experienced by people of color who are a particular gender—male—tends to 
determine antiracist strategies, just as sexism experienced by women who are of a 
particular race—white tends to ground the women’s movement . What became 
painfully clear in the aftermath of the trial was that many in the Black community 
were perplexed as to how to address issues of accountability or violence against 
Black women without airing dirty laundry or revealing cleavages. Further, white 
feminists, as Barkley Brown (1997) notes were unable to deal with the racialized and 
class-specific discussion when it emerged. The Anita Hill example highlights the 
ways in which limited political and discursive practices relating to the simultaneous 
recognition of the impact of race, class, and gender alters rights-claims and remedies 
in the public sphere. In the case of sexual harassment, both Vinson and Hill were 
constructed as what Barkley Brown (1997) refers to as a “generic or universal women 
                                                
138 For a more thorough discussion on this point see Toni Morrison’s Race-ing Justice 
Engendering Power: essays on Anita Hill, Clarence Thomas, and the construction of 
social reality (1992). 
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with no race or class.”  
     Employing a complex theory of rights, the intersections of race, class, gender, 
sexual orientation, and ethnicity are simultaneously recognized as shaping women of 
color’s rights and autonomy in the public sphere. The additive models that layer race, 
gender, sexuality, or other markers of difference are inadequate (Dill and Zinn 2003) 
for understanding the complexity of violence in the lives of women. Further, the 
historically constituted meta-spaces of a complex theory of rights intersect with these 
markers to inform and shape women’s mobility, access to resources and how she 
experiences of violence.  Crenshaw (1995) concurs by noting women of color are 
differently situated within these [meta-spaces] and when rights-claims are made, 
legislation enacted, or reforms undertaken on the behalf of women, “women of color 
are less likely to have their needs met than women who are racially privileged.  
Conclusion 
     In this chapter, I outlined the tenets of gendered citizenship to argue that gender 
impacts the realization of rights in the public sphere. Further, I employed the issue of 
violence against women to problematize the gendered citizen in the modern 
democratic state to demonstrate the ways in which race, class, gender, sexual 
orientation, and other markers of difference shape women’s experience of violence 
and ultimately rights in the public sphere. I also demonstrated the ways in which 
social location and difference shapes what women define as valuable and as a right in 










      
Revisiting the Central Questions of the Research 
     This dissertation started out with a set of provocative questions: (1) What is the 
impact of race, gender, sexuality, and other markers of difference on the realization of 
rights in the modern democratic state; (2) Does even the most complex account of 
multi-cultural identity under liberal democratic theory accurately account for the 
impact of difference on the realization of rights in liberal democracies; and (3) Why 
doesn’t formal equality, say the right to vote, translate into social and political 
equality for some groups and individuals. These questions form the central inquiry of 
my investigation and provide me the opportunity to theorize a rights framework that 
extends beyond the static relationship between the individual and the state. In this 
chapter, I present a summary discussion of the dissertation’s findings and explore 
avenues for future research.  I also explore the implications of my findings for public 
and social policy outcomes; community and mobilization organizing efforts; and for 
understanding rights-claims made by groups and individuals in the public sphere.  
Contribution to the field 
     The main contribution of this dissertation to the field of political philosophy is that 
it suggests the need for a more complex understanding of the dynamics that influence 
individual rights, autonomy, and freedom in the modern democratic state. I proffer a 
complex theory of rights that I believe is able to fairly and accurately account for the 
impact of identity and culture on the realization of rights by individuals and groups in 
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liberal democracies. This dissertation begins with an originary tale of rights in 
modern democracies, which is intended to re-frame the discussion on rights to take 
into consideration how individuals and groups enter society. It also attempts to chip 
away at claims of neutrality and equality set forth in liberal democratic theory.  
 
 
The impact of race, class, gender, sexuality, and other markers of difference on 
the realization of rights in the modern democratic state 
 
     One of the central aims of this project was to discern whether or not race, class, 
gender, sexuality, or other markers of difference had a direct influence on the 
attainment and realization of rights in civil society. The findings based on the three 
case studies suggest that there is a significant correlation between an individual’s 
race, class, gender, sexual orientation, or any other distinguishing characteristic and 
the rights and privileges she is able to enjoy in the public sphere. In all of the cases 
studied, formal or civil equality, did not necessarily translate into social and political 
equality for groups. In fact, in the cases focusing on racial and ethnic minorities and 
gays, formal gains of legislative or civil equality were often met with resistance and 
attempts to negotiate the terms of equality by whites or heterosexuals respectively.  
     The study also found that remedies available to marginalized groups depended in 
part of the political recognition of difference and the demonstration that it is the cause 
for the denial of rights and privileges in the public sphere. This was found to be true 
for all three of the case studies in that each group studied had the burden of proving 
that they were fit for citizenship and demonstrate that they were denied citizenship 
rights was because of their race, gender, or sexual orientation. The study also 
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demonstrated that the subject of rights under liberal democratic theory fails to 
accurately account for the differences that exist between individual and groups. 
 Does even the most complex account of multi-cultural identity under liberal 
democratic theory accurately account for the impact of difference on the 
realization of rights in liberal democracies? 
 
     My findings suggest that even the most advanced theories of difference under 
liberalism does a poor job of providing an integrative and historical understanding of 
how difference among and between groups shape rights-claims, privileges, and the 
distribution of resources in the public sphere. Rawls original position and theory of 
overlapping census fail to tend to the pragmatic and core concerns of marginalized 
groups with regard to securing their full bundle of rights in the modern democratic 
state which continues to be the lack of social and political equality. In an effort to 
harmonize claims by groups within the liberal framework, difference is relegated to 
the private sphere thus leaving the masculine subject of rights in tact.  
     Further, oppositional frameworks like Critical Race theory, while useful for 
beginning the conversation about the impact of difference on rights, remain at a 
theoretical level that demands further exploration and extension into the more 
concrete and practical implications of this awareness.  
 
Why doesn’t formal equality, say the right to vote, translate into social and 
political equality for some groups and individuals? 
 
     Employing a complex theory of rights, this study concludes that there are a variety 
of factors that influence the realization of rights in the modern democratic state. Chief 
among them are: (1) A notion of the good operating in society that is connected to 
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deeply entrenched societal values and norms and that privileges the dominant culture; 
(2) the structures and institutions that govern society are enmeshed in race, class, 
sexuality, and ethnic hierarchies; (3) the accumulated advantages gained through 
historic practices of exclusion, conquest, and enslavement; (4) the representation of 
the dominant group and subjugated groups in the public sphere through texts, the 
media, and discourse; and (5) whether or not individuals or groups are recognized as 
bearers of rights under the law. 
     Further, the findings suggest that formal equality, whether legislated or through 
voting is only as effective as the climate or context in which this equality is bestowed. 
In the case of same-sex marriage, for example, although the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, the victory was overshadowed by conflicting 
decisions at the federal level and the still lively moral debates around homosexuality 
in the public sphere. Shortly after the Goodridge ruling, a proposal was crafted by 
conservative legislators to ban gay marriage in the state and as early as 2006 the state 
could see a vote that could possibly reverse Goodridge.  
 
Case Studies 
     The case studies chosen for the study did an adequate job in helping to answer my 
central questions of concern. I was able to examine the struggle for the attainment of 
rights at different levels of government—local, state, and federal, and to demonstrate 
how these various branches had played significant roles in shaping individual rights 
and freedom in the liberal democratic state. Further, the cases demonstrated attempts 
to realize full freedom and autonomy through practices of direct democracy, the 
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California Referendum Initiative; appeal to the courts, the issue of Gay Marriage; and 
the creation of public policies and landmark legislation, the Violence Against Women 
Act. The findings of my research suggest that at all levels of government, race, class, 
gender, sexual orientation and other markers of difference shape the realization of 
rights in the modern democratic state.  
       The dissertation also revealed that each Group studied has its own unique history 
in relationship to citizenship and rights, its relationship to the state, and the internal 
conflicts and quarrels. The case studies are fastened together by their capacity to 
demonstrate the limitations of liberal democratic theory with regard to the 
accommodation of difference in the public sphere; interrogation of liberal claims of 
neutrality and equality; and shed light on the reason why despite legal equality, social 
and political equality remain elusive for some and not others in the liberal democratic 
state. 
Chapter III: The Mixture of Race and Rights in Modern Democracies 
     My findings suggest that although the meaning of race has shifted and has 
increasingly become noted as constructed, race still remains a fundamental organizing 
principle of social relationships in modern democracies. In the state of California, my 
study found that race is likely to determine the quality of education a child will 
receive with schools with high concentrations of Latinos, Blacks, or English 
Language Learners 11 times more likely to employ under-credentialed teachers; the 
infant mortality rate with highest levels of infant mortality among poor Black and 
Latinos covering the Crenshaw neighborhood of South Central Los Angeles; and the 
likelihood that you will become incarcerated under the notorious three strikes law 
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with Blacks and Latinos comprising 66% of those in prison although collectively they 
make up only 44% of the population in the state.  
     Using ballot referendum Proposition 54 initiated by California Regent Ward 
Connerly, I argued that race was significant to the realization of rights in modern 
democratic state. I thought it beneficial to provide a context for the discussion by 
providing an overview of race and racialization processes in the liberal state. From 
the discussion, I concluded that the process of racialization is key to formulating any 
critical understanding of the intimate relationship between race and rights in modern 
democracies. In its ideological form, the process of racialization provides context for 
the organization of social structures, hierarchies, and institutions present in society. 
Taken as always occurring, the process of racialization becomes the means by which 
we are to contextualize nation and empire building; enslavement and conquest; and 
ultimately rights and freedom.  
     Despite the passage of proposition 209 in 1996, whites and racial and ethnic 
minorities rejected the idea that ignoring difference would bring the state closer to the 
realization of a color-blind society. My study suggests that by voting against 
proposition 54, Californians rejected the liberal democratic notion that the realization 
of rights in modern democracies is the product of the relationship between the 
individual and the state. Employing a complex theory of rights, the failure of 
proposition of 54 suggest an acknowledgment that the realization of rights in the 
public sphere on the part of racial and ethnic minorities is complicated by historic 
inequality characterized by exclusion, racial projects that shift to maintain hegemony, 
and resistance.  
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Chapter IV: Complex Subjectivity, the Promise of Neutrality, and the 
Attainment of Rights in Modern Democracies: An Examination of Same-Sex 
Marriage in the Liberal Democratic State 
 
     In this chapter, I used the issue of same-sex marriage to argue that the liberal 
democratic state fails to deliver on its promise of political neutrality and that there 
exists a notion of ‘the good” that operates in society that makes it difficult for some 
groups and individuals to realize their full bundle of rights in the modern democratic 
state. I also suggested that under liberal democratic theory, individuals must be 
constituted as the subjects of rights under the law before they make rights-claims in 
the public sphere.  
     In the Goodridge case, the court did deliver on its promise to remain neutral on 
competing conceptions of the good in society and ruled to the benefit of the plaintiffs. 
However, this victory, I suggest should be contextualized and understood in light of 
the public discourse surrounding same-sex marriage in the modern democratic state. 
The study suggests, that the decision in Goodridge was overshadowed by conflicting 
decisions made at the federal level and in most other states concerning same-sex 
marriage and the still lively moral debates around homosexuality. For example, 
within months after the ruling fourteen states had adopted constitutional measures 
prohibiting same-sex marriage bringing the total number of states in the union to ban 
same-sex marriage to seventeen. In the state of Massachusetts, opposition and 
mobilization against the ruling was swift.  Shortly after the ruling, a proposal was 
crafted by conservative legislators to ban gay marriage and as early as 2006 the state 
could see a vote that could possibly reverse Goodridge.  
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       Lastly, my findings also suggest that by employing a complex theory of rights, 
we can understand the ways in which dominant social and political institutions 
constrain individual rights and liberties in the modern democratic state. Further, I 
conclude that there is a notion of the good that defines marriage as the union of a man 
and a woman and that privileges the heteronormative and patriarchal family structure. 
I have also demonstrated that there is a concept of the good present that is shaped by 
the laws, customs, and traditions present in any given society that work to limit 
individual rights and freedom. To the extent that this is the case, the attempt of gays 
and lesbians to broaden the center or to at least provide a competing moral or value 
frame is met with resistance because heterosexuality and homophobia are embedded 
in most, if not all of the institutions and structures that govern society. Attempts to 
attain rights or make rights-claims in the public sphere must be understood within this 
context.  
Chapter V: Violence Against Women and Gendered Citizenship in the Modern 
Democratic State: The impact of differential experience and social location on 
the realization of right in liberal democracies. 
 
     My last case study explored the nature and meaning of gendered citizenship in 
modern democracies through the lens of violence against women. It suggested that 
the intersections of race, class, gender, sexuality, and other markers of difference alter 
rights-claims in the public sphere. My findings suggest that liberal democratic theory 
fails not only to adequately account for difference in the public sphere, but leaves, 
little if any room, for the accommodation of individuals situated within multiple 
hierarchies within groups. I also demonstrated under liberalism there is a tendency to 
deny intra-group differences and dichotomize groups and claims in the public sphere.  
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     In this chapter, I also explored the gendered nature of citizenship and found that 
with regards to rights, Black women, Latinas, and Native American women enter the 
public sphere and discourse on rights and citizenship in ways dramatically different 
from white women. I suggest that women of color enter the discourse on rights and 
citizenship as not only gendered subjects, but also raced and classed subjects as well.  
     With regard to the Violence Against Women Act, my findings suggest that the 
initial legislation and policy reflected the social location and positionality of middle-
class white women.  As such, I conclude that the center of gendered citizenship is the 
white, heterosexual, woman, and rights-claims in the public sphere tended to reflect 
her interest, concerns, and political agenda. I also suggest that there is a constant de-
emphasis on race, class, sexual orientation, ethnicity, or other markers of difference in 
the public sphere because it troubles the core of gendered citizenship in the liberal 
democracies.  
     Lastly, I used a complex theory of rights to examine the ways in which women’s 
experience of violence are intimately shaped by race, class, gender, sexuality and 
other markers of difference. I link these markers to the institutions and structures 
present in society to understand how women of color resist subordination and subvert 
power; advance rights-claims in the public sphere; and expose the limits of political 
neutrality.  
Towards a Complex Theory of Rights in the Modern Democratic State: 
     As demonstrated throughout this study, liberal democratic theory does an 
inadequate job of addressing the impact of difference on the realization of rights in 
the modern democratic state. Under liberalism, difference is relegated to the public 
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sphere in favor of an abstract subject of rights. Attempts by political theorists to 
resolve the conflict of difference and liberal claims of neutrality and equality have 
failed because there is a refusal to acknowledge the ways in which race, class, gender, 
sexuality, ethnicity, and other markers of difference has shaped individual rights and 
autonomy since the founding of the republic.  
     In chapter I, I provided an allegory of the story of rights in the modern democratic 
state. The story of rights I offered differed from the one that has traditionally been 
told and emphasizes the moral and political equality of all individuals. In the 
traditional telling of the story, all individuals are equal partners in the moral dialogue 
when it comes to asserting and defending rights-claims in the public sphere.  
     In the re-telling of the story, I ask the reader to consider the possibility of two 
distinct classes of people. The first class consists of those who have rights from the 
beginning (property holding, heterosexual, white men) and as members of the group 
go about ensuring the state or others do not infringe upon those rights. Conversely, 
the second class consist of those who enter the into the group with essentially no 
rights and use the mechanisms and laws set up by the founding members to secure or 
advance rights claims. In the dissertation, I use this allegory to shape the discussion 
on rights, to lay the foundation for a complex theory of rights, and to provide a 
historical context for the ways in which groups previously excluded enter into society 
and the set of circumstances under which they must engage.  
     In this dissertation, I laid out a complex theory of rights that attempts to account 
for the impact of identity and culture on the realization of rights in the modern 
democratic state. As stated previously, a complex theory of rights is not meant to 
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displace liberal democratic theories that emphasize individual autonomy or the role of 
the state in ensuring individual liberties and freedom, but to call for the recognition of 
historic racial, ethnic, gender, sexual orientation, ethnic, and cultural inequalities that 
limit the exercise of autonomy and freedom in modern democracies.  
     Using the theory and through the case studies, I have demonstrated that there are 
indeed many factors that shape the realization of rights in the liberal democratic state: 
(1) A notion of the good operating in society that is connected to deeply entrenched 
societal values and norms and that privileges the dominant culture; (2) the structures 
and institutions that govern society are enmeshed in race, class, sexuality, and ethnic 
hierarchies; (3) the accumulated advantages gained through historic practices of 
exclusion, conquest, and enslavement; and (4) the representation of the dominant 
group and subjugated groups in the public sphere through texts, the media, and 
discourse; and (5) whether or not individuals or groups are recognized as bearers of 
rights under the law.  
     The idea that there is a notion of the good operating in society that is connected to 
deeply entrenched societal values and norms and that privileges the dominant culture 
is present in all three of the case studies.  In the instance of proposition 54, the 
historical process of the racialization of the systems, structures, and laws is 
indeterminably linked to the realization of rights in the modern democratic state 
whereby whiteness is viewed as the good or the desirable in the state.  With regard to 
sexual orientation, it is the traditional nuclear family with the man as the head of the 




Implications of the Research: Pulling together the pieces of the puzzle 
     Privileging difference in the discourse on rights is key to increasing our 
understanding of inequality and disparities in the modern democratic state. I have 
demonstrated in this dissertation that difference plays a critical role in the attainment 
and realization of rights in the public sphere. However, the failure of liberal 
democratic theory to take difference seriously constrains struggles for equality and 
freedom in civil society. In this dissertation, I have also maintained that the modern 
democratic state is marked by historic inegalitarian practices of exclusion, conquest, 
and enslavement, which in turn, have shaped the institutions and structures that 
govern society.  As a result of these findings, there are three major implications that 
follow from these findings that will help us understand why formal equality does not 
translate into social and political equality for some groups and individual in the public 
sphere. 
     By understanding the significance of difference to the realization of rights, we can 
begin to create public and social policies that are truly reflective of the lived 
experiences of groups and individuals situated differently within society. Further, we 
can begin to investigate the ways in which social and public polices are shaped by 
historic legacies of racism, classism, homophobia, ethnocentrism, and sexism 
operating in the public sphere.  Connectedly, if we understand that difference has 
shaped rights and privileges from the very beginning of the republic, we can 
understand rights-claims made in the public sphere on the behalf of marginalized 
groups for recognition as a means of bringing this historic reality into focus.  
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     Finally, this study sheds light on the “politics of rights” in the modern democratic 
state. The “politics of rights” refers to the means and strategies individuals and groups 
employ to advance rights-claims or to have their needs met in the public sphere. In all 
three of the case studies, each group identified strategies and campaigns they believed 
would bring them closer to the realization of rights in the public sphere. For example, 
the “No on 54” campaign focused on the health care implications of the initiative and 
down played the racial implications; a move considered necessary if they were to 
avoid an outcome similar to Proposition 209. Similarly, the issue of marriage was 
chosen by gay and lesbian advocates because of the meaning of marriage in the 
modern democratic state. Unlike other issues, marriage could not been seen as only 
impacting gays and lesbians. 
     The “politics of rights” is significant because it also sheds light on what or who 
gets left out in terms of the framing of rights-claims in the public sphere. As stated 
previously, in the modern democratic state, rights-claims tend to be dichotomous and 
polarized—men/women, rich/poor, heterosexual/homosexual. However, framing 
rights-claims in this way denies the complexity of identity and the multiple ways 
under which individuals and groups enter the public discourse on rights. For example, 
in the instance of violence against women, by framing violence against women as 
solely a gender-based issue ignores the experiences of women of color and gays and 
lesbians in relationship to violence.  
Future Research Agenda 
      This dissertation moves toward developing a better understanding of the impact of 
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race, class, gender, sexual orientation, and other markers of difference on the 
realization of rights in the modern democratic state. Liberal democratic theory does 
an inadequate job of accounting for the role of difference in relationship to rights and 
the ways in which difference has shaped freedom and autonomy since the founding of 
the republic.  
    Investigating the ways in which race, class, gender, sexual orientation, and other 
markers of difference impact rights-claims in the public sphere is difficult because of 
the ways in which racism, sexism, homophobia, and other forms of oppression shift 
and adapt to maintain hegemony. As such, I believe the complex theory of rights 
developed in this dissertation can be used to map the shifts and explore the ways in 
which groups and individual struggle to attain their full bundle of rights in the modern 
democratic state.  Future research could apply a complex theory of rights to new 
cases and other issues such as immigration, education, welfare, and the environment. 
     Finally, it would be interesting to examine in more detail the “politics of rights” to 
determine what strategies are most effective and what is necessary to bring about 
success in terms of the realization of rights in the modern democratic state i.e. 
rainbow coalitions, access, resources, or the group’s ability to move closer to the 
core. 
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